Amoveo β₯π§Ώ
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21 March 2019
Z
06:03
Zack
haha, I think people have asked me if HiveOS works with Amoveo, and I said "no".
AK
06:04
A K
Or can be a different sha256 algo, but since it's in the GPU-only must be veo
06:06
Z
06:06
Zack
sha256 probably means bitcoin or bitcoin forks.
No other blockchain has miners compatible with Amoveo.
No other blockchain has miners compatible with Amoveo.
AK
06:07
A K
It's in GPU stats so not Bitcoin
Z
06:07
Zack
GPU can mine bitcoin too, they are just slow.
06:08
it could be a altcoin fork of bitcoin.
AK
SS
08:12
Spike Spiegel
Rainbow protocol seems like obvious rip-off from Amoveo original ideals but at least they managed to produce concise pdf / latex format whitepaper
Z
08:12
Zack
In reply to this message
so lets take their pdf, white out some stuff, write VEO in a few places, and re-publish?
MF
08:13
Mr Flintstone
lol
Z
08:13
Zack
if they want to do free technical writing for Amoveo, that is great
SS
08:16
Spike Spiegel
yes, i want to ( mostly in order to learn the stuff )
Bitcoin whitepaper is very short and doesn't require advanced math / economy knowledge at all.
I think that with nice graphics one can even create 1 pager explaining Veo oracle concept.
http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/contracts-oracles-sidechains/ redpilled me on idea that oracles are key feature for blockchain: most popular ETH projects ( MKR / Compound ) are using centralised oracles in order to work - it's fake decentralisation
Bitcoin whitepaper is very short and doesn't require advanced math / economy knowledge at all.
I think that with nice graphics one can even create 1 pager explaining Veo oracle concept.
http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/contracts-oracles-sidechains/ redpilled me on idea that oracles are key feature for blockchain: most popular ETH projects ( MKR / Compound ) are using centralised oracles in order to work - it's fake decentralisation
Z
08:18
Zack
It's great you figured this out spike, and it sounds like you are on track to help others realize
SS
08:20
Spike Spiegel
But there is one problem - people are willing to do lot of work in order to implement such things on Ethereum while they don't want to invest in new blockchain that's objectively better. It's like VHS vs Betamax
Z
08:21
Zack
https://www.orchid.com/assets/whitepaper/whitepaper.pdf
This paper talks about probabilistic payments to do some very cool stuff.
In some cases, they are better for micropayments instead of channels.
I am thinking of doing a hard update for a new kind of spend transaction that has this probabilistic feature.
This paper talks about probabilistic payments to do some very cool stuff.
In some cases, they are better for micropayments instead of channels.
I am thinking of doing a hard update for a new kind of spend transaction that has this probabilistic feature.
MF
08:22
Mr Flintstone
where do you get the randomness
Z
08:23
Zack
In reply to this message
I think it isn't possible to rebuild an oracle as cheap as ours onto Ethereum.
We combine the consensus mechanism with the oracle mechanism in a way that isn't possible with ethereum smart contracts
We combine the consensus mechanism with the oracle mechanism in a way that isn't possible with ethereum smart contracts
08:23
like the game where we both hold out fingers, and if the total sum is odd, you win, and if it is even, I win.
SS
08:24
Spike Spiegel
The design of difficult-to-manipulate price oracles is an area
of ongoing research, which is far too deep to explore in this paper
of ongoing research, which is far too deep to explore in this paper
Z
08:24
Zack
In reply to this message
I only linked that paper for the probabilistic payments section.
08:25
not related to what you are talking about.
SS
08:25
Spike Spiegel
I'm talking about rainbow protocol
Z
08:25
Zack
oh, right
08:26
so they aren't copying all of Amoveo.
Just a handful of features from our channel system.
Just a handful of features from our channel system.
SS
08:27
Spike Spiegel
08:28
I love the simplicity of this - total sum of USD in the system is always 0
Z
08:28
Zack
yes, that is how financial derivatives work. We can only trade risk, we can't create or destroy it.
08:30
Probabilistic payments seem ideal for a lot of website sybil defense applications.
Because you don't have to wait for a tx to confirm to buy credits, and you don't have to make a channel.
Because you don't have to wait for a tx to confirm to buy credits, and you don't have to make a channel.
08:30
it would be a great upgrade to the encrypted messenger system.
08:31
This could be the solution to the sharing blocks altruism problem.
If we use probabilistic payments to pay the servers who send us blocks, this will make the full nodes completely resistant to sybil spam.
If we use probabilistic payments to pay the servers who send us blocks, this will make the full nodes completely resistant to sybil spam.
SS
08:32
Spike Spiegel
But here is the question: obviously stable-coins are 90% use case for crypto ( except money transfer )
Then it would be nice to have UX that can abstract away Amoveo features so I can just own some virtual USD in VEO Wallet while other "speculator / market maker" is sophisticated enough to take the risk / hedge and provide useful product to end user which may be even clueless grandma
Then it would be nice to have UX that can abstract away Amoveo features so I can just own some virtual USD in VEO Wallet while other "speculator / market maker" is sophisticated enough to take the risk / hedge and provide useful product to end user which may be even clueless grandma
08:33
I cannot wrap my mind - I can understand how to hold DAI in Metmask wallet but I don't understand what I have to do in order to own and keep stablecoin on veo ( and how much it will cost me )
Z
08:33
Zack
In reply to this message
yes, I agree. I tried to design the full node with a simple api, and provide a modular javascript light node to make it as easy as possible for web developers to build exactly these kinds of tools.
08:34
We will get there, incrementally. The derivatives tool is improving quickly.
SS
08:35
Spike Spiegel
Disclaimer: I'm probably not Mensa level bright - it was hard for me to understand how Ethereum works before I've seen actual example ( Mist wallet + Metamask )
Currently holding DAI via CDP cost 3.5% and maybe cost will increase to 7%. But it's possible to have stablecoin with effective negative cost in veo right?
Currently holding DAI via CDP cost 3.5% and maybe cost will increase to 7%. But it's possible to have stablecoin with effective negative cost in veo right?
Z
08:36
Zack
Why would you pay 3.5% to own something that stays the same value as USD?
Wouldn't it make more sense to just buy USD?
Wouldn't it make more sense to just buy USD?
SS
08:37
Spike Spiegel
Many people are using CDP to get more ETH exposure without using exchanges with margin. There are no exchanges with VEO margin so only way to get such thing is on derivative market by offering people stablecoins
Z
08:37
Zack
In Amoveo, the price for USD stablecoin contracts has been 5% to the person holding the USD side.
Because the person wants to pay a premium to go long-veo.
Because the person wants to pay a premium to go long-veo.
SS
08:37
Spike Spiegel
5% per annum?
Z
08:37
Zack
per month
08:38
I sold 10 veo worth of USD stablecoins to sourcex
08:38
and payed him 0.5 veo
SS
08:38
Spike Spiegel
I actually believe that USD is so good that people may be willing to pay up to 10% per year for being able to have something with stable value accepted globally
Z
08:39
Zack
why wouldn't they just buy normal paper dollars?
SS
08:40
Spike Spiegel
Transaction costs + storage costs + liquidity costs + just not having USD bank account or being afraid of KYC
Z
08:40
Zack
That would be amazing. if people would pay me, for me to have even more veo exposure.
SS
08:40
Spike Spiegel
10% per annum in order to avoid tax / laundry money from drug sales is nothing
Z
08:40
Zack
Lets get this happening
SS
08:42
Spike Spiegel
That's hypothetical - I seriously recommend reading this with fresh eyes as it may be very useful for veo https://www.interfluidity.com/uploads/2017/10/Fiat-Is-Effective-Minitalk-light-edit-to-share.pdf
If there would be no USD people would be using something other - but USD holders aren't complaining about inflation or risk of country disappearing
If there would be no USD people would be using something other - but USD holders aren't complaining about inflation or risk of country disappearing
08:43
If DAI will pay more interest then dollar ( via Compound ) people may move USD -> DAI pushing underlying collateral price up
08:44
"Current iterations of crypto are just ridiculously poor candidates for a dominant money, except maybe in countries that lack the capacity to
issue credible fiat."
And similarly Amoveo is bad product compared to CBOE but good if you cannot use CBOE
issue credible fiat."
And similarly Amoveo is bad product compared to CBOE but good if you cannot use CBOE
Z
08:46
Zack
You can also use Amoveo to make markets that are legally restricted from existing in the CBOE or whatever central markets.
SS
08:46
Spike Spiegel
"We want a unit of account and store of value that hedges our risk, inherent in the fact that our contractual obligations and the prices of goods and services we require may fluctuate over time and leave us unable to meet our obligations."
Z
09:38
Zack
There has been debate in Amoveo about whether our futarchy markets for updates to Amoveo should optimize for the market cap or for the price of a VEO.
Spike offers up a third option of what we should optimize for. We should try to keep the volatility as low as possible.
The cost of making derivatives is proportional to how wide the margins are on those derivatives. The width of margins priced in VEO is mostly determined by how volatile VEO is.
So, if we want Amoveo to be a useful platform for derivatives, we should try to keep the volatility low.
We should come up with some ways of estimating the volatility, and make some graphs of it changing over time so we can visualize the situation.
Spike offers up a third option of what we should optimize for. We should try to keep the volatility as low as possible.
The cost of making derivatives is proportional to how wide the margins are on those derivatives. The width of margins priced in VEO is mostly determined by how volatile VEO is.
So, if we want Amoveo to be a useful platform for derivatives, we should try to keep the volatility low.
We should come up with some ways of estimating the volatility, and make some graphs of it changing over time so we can visualize the situation.
EA
SS
09:48
Spike Spiegel
Or even more savage: Amoveo - improved implementation of Rainbow protocol
Z
09:51
Zack
Maybe instead of gambling on the short term volatility, we should have a couple layers.
First there are people gambling on the long-term volatility.
Then we make futarchy markets comparing the price of that asset in the short term vs our governance decision.
First there are people gambling on the long-term volatility.
Then we make futarchy markets comparing the price of that asset in the short term vs our governance decision.
09:54
that way the governance decision can be correlated with something measurable in the short term.
MF
09:57
Mr Flintstone
upside volatility doesnβt break contracts like downside vol does
Z
09:58
Zack
true
09:59
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/issues/237
I made this page where we can discuss this issue
I made this page where we can discuss this issue
09:59
or, I will copy paste relevant info from here into there.
SS
09:59
Spike Spiegel
Yup - that's my point.
The best currency for derivatives:
- stable
- not decreasing
There is some amount of tolerable upside volatility but the network would be unusable with price swinging after small trade orders
The best currency for derivatives:
- stable
- not decreasing
There is some amount of tolerable upside volatility but the network would be unusable with price swinging after small trade orders
10:05
Section 3.4 of RainbowNetwork whitepaper - channels without oracles - I wonder if it's secure
10:06
Z
10:06
Zack
I was working on that with mr flinstone, i'll collect some notes on our conclusions
SS
10:07
Spike Spiegel
It may work like this: use price feed from participants and if they disagree then fallback to oracle or close the position at T-1 price
10:08
It would provide small free option for one party...
Say if bitcoin price is increasing too much one can provide fake data to push counterparty to close the position with price before the price increased
Say if bitcoin price is increasing too much one can provide fake data to push counterparty to close the position with price before the price increased
Z
10:09
Zack
It seems like for this to work, both participants in the channel need to have some shared reference price.
So either this reference price is not cryptoeconomically secure, it is centrally hosted, or a team of people. or it is cryptoeconomically secure, in which case it needs to be a secure oracle mechanism.
The only continuous price feed oracle that I can think of is an on-chain market for the same asset.
So the limitation is that for any market existing on-chain on ethereum, some much smaller continuous market over the same asset could exist on bitcoin.
So either this reference price is not cryptoeconomically secure, it is centrally hosted, or a team of people. or it is cryptoeconomically secure, in which case it needs to be a secure oracle mechanism.
The only continuous price feed oracle that I can think of is an on-chain market for the same asset.
So the limitation is that for any market existing on-chain on ethereum, some much smaller continuous market over the same asset could exist on bitcoin.
SS
10:11
You say the price and I say the price and you can buy for min(my_price, your_price) and sell for max(my_price, your_price)
Z
10:12
Zack
oh, kind of like a I-cut-you-choose protocol
SS
10:13
If you fake the price I will use shotgun clause somehow
Z
10:13
Zack
That is how I would divide cake with my siblings as a child.
10:14
im having troubling understanding this.
10:14
is this still part of a continuous process re-occurring every few seconds?
10:17
I think this does not work as an alternative to an oracle.
Imagine that you put $60 into a channel, and I put $40 so we could make our bet.
Eventually it comes time to do the shotgun protocol.
In reality, you won the bet, so you should get 100%.
You choose the price $100, and I choose the price $50.
So what happens next? Do we each get $50 out of the channel?
Imagine that you put $60 into a channel, and I put $40 so we could make our bet.
Eventually it comes time to do the shotgun protocol.
In reality, you won the bet, so you should get 100%.
You choose the price $100, and I choose the price $50.
So what happens next? Do we each get $50 out of the channel?
SS
10:18
Spike Spiegel
No, to settle the previous bet we are doing another bet with shotgun clause
10:19
It's secure if next bet with shotgun clause is significantly higher in value then previous one
Z
10:19
Zack
it works with the house because there is an actual house that has real value.
You can use this mechanism to incentivize the players to reveal how much they want the house. it is like a second price auction.
If our bet is just over how we will divide a pile of money. We already know how much we each value the money. We can't do a 2nd price auction of a pile of cash to reveal anything.
You can use this mechanism to incentivize the players to reveal how much they want the house. it is like a second price auction.
If our bet is just over how we will divide a pile of money. We already know how much we each value the money. We can't do a 2nd price auction of a pile of cash to reveal anything.
SS
10:21
Spike Spiegel
Say you are giving me BTC price and I have freedom to trade with you X worth of BTC and I can decide If I want to buy or sell
10:21
Then any price different then current price will be X * (price difference) penalty
Z
10:23
Zack
how can you do that on-chain on bitcoin?
The only coins are bitcoins.
The only coins are bitcoins.
10:23
there are no dollars to do a bitcoin-usd trade.
10:23
it only makes sense to use the continuous derivative mechanism on bitcoin, because it is always inferior to the normal derivatives mechanism, and normal derivatives aren't possible on bitcoin because there is no oracle.
10:24
but it looks like continuous derivatives don't work as an alternative to an oracle after all.
SS
10:26
Spike Spiegel
w8, assuming the ping will be each 10 seconds then worst case is getting rate from 10 back in time
Z
10:26
Zack
There is no way they would write a ethereum light node into bitcoin core to allow bitcoin to use ethereum as a continuous price feed oracle.
SS
10:27
Spike Spiegel
You don't need price feed oracles at all
10:27
You sign channel every few seconds
Z
10:27
Zack
the blockchain probably can't enforce anything faster than 3 blocks
SS
10:27
Spike Spiegel
It's all off-chain
Z
10:28
Zack
if your partner is not cooperating, your only recourse it to take it on-chain.
10:28
there will be at least a 3 block delay after you post it on-chain. 30 minutes of free-option time.
SS
10:28
Spike Spiegel
yes, with last price that's ok for me
10:29
he cannot do anything as I've decided to close the channel
Z
10:29
Zack
So lets say you are taking turns updating the channel data
10:29
that means you are taking turns having short free options with each other.
10:30
if you wait slightly longer until you respond, then your free option is longer, so you are more likely to profit from a sudden price swing.
SS
10:30
Spike Spiegel
Only for few seconds
Z
10:30
Zack
it would cause them both to go as slow as possible without breaking the rules of the contract.
SS
10:30
Spike Spiegel
And it can be solved with reputation network - just don't trade with people that abuse it
Z
10:31
Zack
reputation doesn't work very well. retirement attacks are so common.
10:31
it is questionable if it reduces the loss due to theft at all
SS
10:32
Spike Spiegel
Well, for me it's pretty elegant thing with not that much of a downside
Z
10:32
Zack
kyc is no good.
10:33
anyway, the derivatives we already support are always superior to this hacked version they might build on bitcoin. So it is not very important for us to understand.
SS
10:36
Spike Spiegel
If you deal that way with an exchange you may trust them a little
10:37
As reputation value may be higher then one-off small free option cheat
Z
10:40
Zack
We need decentralized alternatives to exchanges.
We can atomic swap BTC - synthetic bitcoin on Amoveo.
Then sell the synthetic bitcoin for VEO.
We can atomic swap BTC - synthetic bitcoin on Amoveo.
Then sell the synthetic bitcoin for VEO.
10:43
having derivatives on bitcoin would be nice. but it is inconvenient needing to leave a computer turned on. What if the power goes out?
Normal derivatives in Amoveo have big advantages.
Normal derivatives in Amoveo have big advantages.
10:43
leaving a computer on with your private key 24/7 is the opposite of cold storage.
SS
10:43
Spike Spiegel
Even if you can create something on bitcoin or veo people will be using ETH based solution due to the ecosystem moat: almost nobody is using LN or doing any smart contracts on bitcoin except multisig - if you create something interesting outside ETH ecosystem then ETH devs will copy and implement it ( even if it's insecure )
10:44
I have vested interest in making VEO succeed but I'm seeing that people are indifferent to non-ETH stuff
Z
10:44
Zack
An insecure copy on Eth is a competitor the same way a centralized market for derivatives is a competitor.
10:45
If you aren't going to be cryptoeconomically secure, then why use a blockchain at all? blockchain tech is expensive to maintain.
SS
10:45
Spike Spiegel
If something cannot be quickly used with beautiful colorful interface with Metamask only then it won't be used even if it can cure cancer
Z
10:46
Zack
a beautiful interface on metamask wont be as comfortable as a centralized app made by facebook.
And if they both allow theft in the same way, then facebook will win.
And if they both allow theft in the same way, then facebook will win.
SS
10:46
Spike Spiegel
Maybe using blockchain is a marketing play after all - company may use fake blockchain solutions and get good PR and hype for being innovative
10:47
Sure:
FB > another website with FB login > website without FB login > metamask eth stuff > bitcoin > veo
FB > another website with FB login > website without FB login > metamask eth stuff > bitcoin > veo
Z
10:47
Zack
If centralized derivatives apps can legally service everyone's needs, then Amoveo does not need to exist.
In my experience, most people's desires for derivatives are outlawed.
In my experience, most people's desires for derivatives are outlawed.
10:49
Decentralized tech wont be as comfortable to use. If you are betting on us, it is because you think that the centralized tech will fail for some other reason.
I think that financial restrictions on derivatives are strict and are only getting stricter in the near future. That there is a lot of pressure for an outlet.
I think that financial restrictions on derivatives are strict and are only getting stricter in the near future. That there is a lot of pressure for an outlet.
10:51
With centralized solutions there is a natural trade-off between the cost of using the service and the probability that all the money will get stolen.
The cheaper it is, the more likely it will all get stolen.
The is because the central operators are weighing the trade-offs between whether they should take fees for a long time, or steal the money for a quick payout now.
The cheaper it is, the more likely it will all get stolen.
The is because the central operators are weighing the trade-offs between whether they should take fees for a long time, or steal the money for a quick payout now.
SS
10:51
Spike Spiegel
It's like saying that people need to trade stocks 24/7 - not only Mon-Friday. I was wondering why markets cannot work 24/7 and the answer is that there is very low demand for such thing.
Z
10:51
Zack
With decentralized technology we can have the fees go much lower, without sacrificing security.
SS
10:51
Spike Spiegel
CBOE isn't stealing customer money AFAIK
Z
10:52
Zack
and how high are their fees?
SS
10:57
The fact that you can charge high fees and people are still using your service is a proof that what you are doing is useful
10:57
Assuming they aren't forced to use it
Z
10:57
Zack
do you have to be rich to participate?
SS
11:01
Spike Spiegel
Dunno, I think that poor people should avoid speculating and trading
Z
11:02
Zack
derivatives can be for insurance
SS
11:02
Spike Spiegel
If you have $1000 then making 100% return isn't going to change anything but losing your capital may ruin you
Z
11:02
Zack
yeah, exactly. that is why insurance is so important.
SS
11:02
Spike Spiegel
Most useful insurance is claim based
11:03
There is no way to use VEO for health insurance or car insurance or fire insurance etc
11:04
Also I've realised that claim "help poor people" is bad as all people are getting positive utility from life and if they aren't happy they are free to commit suicide
11:04
Egoism is ethical, while altruism is bad
11:04
Most ethical people are actually slightly evil
Z
11:05
Zack
farmers like to be able to lock in their profits when the price is good, instead of taking the gamble to sell at harvest.
SS
11:05
Spike Spiegel
Pls stop using this example unless you will get an actual farmer to use such trade
11:06
No amount of code creating will give you the same as meeting with farmer and asking what he needs
11:07
Again - seriously contact farmer and get 1 farmer to use VEO and document proof of concept with him
Z
11:07
Zack
We can start by serving people who have no alternative besides Amoveo.
SS
11:07
Spike Spiegel
I doubt that such people exist at all
11:09
But I don't want to baseless FUD - I believe that catering to rich early crypto adopters willing to try new tech is better then saying that we are creating tech to help farms
Z
11:09
Zack
In reply to this message
that isn't an option until the hard update activates.
Historically, this is the 4th major iteration on how derivatives work on Amoveo.
Every time I work with potential users to realize how to make the next iteration better.
Historically, this is the 4th major iteration on how derivatives work on Amoveo.
Every time I work with potential users to realize how to make the next iteration better.
11:11
Our first version used hub-and-spoke to trade binary options. then we made the same for scalar options.
These didn't get popular because of the legal risk, and because of the cost of locking up so much veo into the contracts
These didn't get popular because of the legal risk, and because of the cost of locking up so much veo into the contracts
11:12
the third generation was P2P, and it worked well, but you had to wait confirmations, and both participants had to be online at the same time.
Which made it unusable to most people.
So this 4th generation that will come out in 3 days, with it you don't have to be online at the same time. You can post an offer, and anyone can accept it and make a channel with you while you are offline.
Which made it unusable to most people.
So this 4th generation that will come out in 3 days, with it you don't have to be online at the same time. You can post an offer, and anyone can accept it and make a channel with you while you are offline.
11:14
The 1st and 2nd generation would not have worked for farmers at all, because the cost of liquidity means it doesn't work on the time scales they need.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
EA
13:49
Eric Arsenault
Keep on sniffinβ...the market is somewhere
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π» invited π»
M
20:54
Minieep21
I gave some much needed praise to @denis_voskvitsov and the exan.tech team here
https://twitter.com/Malk_Trade/status/1108646825895084032
Get them known on Twitter.
Thank you for all the hard work on making Amoveo better!
https://twitter.com/Malk_Trade/status/1108646825895084032
Get them known on Twitter.
Thank you for all the hard work on making Amoveo better!
aoi | KudasaiJPπ―π΅ invited aoi | KudasaiJPπ―π΅
JM
22 March 2019
Z
00:01
Zack
They are copying a lot of stuff from Amoveo
JM
00:01
J M
yeah
Mβ
Nvl invited Nvl
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AK
01:04
A K
01:04
β€οΈ
01:04
let's run a DAC for Paul to review Veo? or smth )
01:07
have to admit, I thought hivemind is dead when I found veo, that's why I got into initially. then I found out hivemind was not dead )) now torn!
Z
01:08
Zack
hivemind is a great project. There is nothing wrong with being involved with both.
01:12
A lot of the most poweful ideas I have had didn't come from my own creativity. They happened because I stepped back and forth between different cryptocurrency silos, mixing and matching the best ideas from each subculture.
AK
01:13
A K
indeed that applies even to holy Satoshi )
EA
01:13
Eric Arsenault
That is usually how the best ideas come to life
01:14
I find the more I am exposed to, the more effective I can mix siloed thinking and be creative
01:14
It is where the magic happens π¦ΉββοΈ
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SS
03:29
So the problem is that Augur lacks "invalid question" option?
AK
03:53
A K
thatβs the easy fix for this particular problem, it seems, yep
Z
04:17
Zack
In reply to this message
I think Augur has an invalid option.
Their problem is that when invalid occurs, all the money gets split 50-50.
So if you bought at a price below 50, you still profit.
In Amoveo all the bets get un-done. you get the same money out that you put in.
Their problem is that when invalid occurs, all the money gets split 50-50.
So if you bought at a price below 50, you still profit.
In Amoveo all the bets get un-done. you get the same money out that you put in.
04:17
I think it isn't so easy to fix on Augur, because there is no good way to keep track of the prices that everyone originally bought their shares at in order to undo all those trades.
Z
05:04
Zack
Amoveo smart contracts are in channels, so if a bug is ever found, it doesn't cost us anything to fix the contract. Nothing on-chain is getting changed. A fix is as easy as refreshing your light node in the browser.
AK
05:54
A K
In Augur I think "invalid question" price will go to 1, rest to 0
05:55
Those who bet invalid win
Z
05:56
Zack
Are you talking about Augur trading, or the rebalancing of rep due to the voting process in the oracle?
Z
06:14
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/issues/238
looks like probabilistic payments don't actually work.
looks like probabilistic payments don't actually work.
Z
06:56
Zack
How about we use hashlocking to connect a tx for a probabilistic payment with a tx to make a channel? Is that something people would want?
06:56
or we could connect a probabilistic payment to the updating of a channel smart contract
06:57
Maybe this is how we can re-fill channels, to start accepting more payments.
That way we don't have to close and open new channels so often.
That way we don't have to close and open new channels so often.
EA
07:02
Eric Arsenault
TBH, for me to understand if I want it, I would need to understand how it is experienced from a UX perspective... What does it mean to a user of the platform?
07:03
(we don't need to get into that, but that is the first thing that comes to mind)
Z
07:04
Zack
In reply to this message
people like the idea of micropayments.
These are very tiny payments with no tx fee, they are instantaneous, they don't involve writing anything on-chain.
People don't like thinking about channel relationships, or having to log on periodically to make sure no one is closing the channel at the wrong state.
probabilistic payments is a way to achieve the goal of micropayments without burdening the user with channels.
These are very tiny payments with no tx fee, they are instantaneous, they don't involve writing anything on-chain.
People don't like thinking about channel relationships, or having to log on periodically to make sure no one is closing the channel at the wrong state.
probabilistic payments is a way to achieve the goal of micropayments without burdening the user with channels.
EA
07:05
Eric Arsenault
That clears things up!
Z
07:06
Zack
micropayments could mean that the server is able to direct more resources per user, because the user can efficiently pay for those resources.
Sybil defense, like DOS attacks, are a big headache for maintaining servers.
Sybil defense, like DOS attacks, are a big headache for maintaining servers.
EA
07:06
Eric Arsenault
this seems like it would be useful
07:07
I assume you can use the same probabilistic payments for larger payments too?
07:07
or is it really custom for micro?
Z
07:07
Zack
I am trying to imagine someone buying a $3 cup of coffee, by giving starbucks a 0.3% chance to win $1000.
07:07
Deleted Account
Hi gents
07:08
Today my question will be simple
Z
07:08
Zack
if you can save enough money on tx fees, it might make sense.
If the tx fee is $1, and coffee is only $3. a 33% tx fee isn't reasonable.
probabilistic payments is a way to avoid these fees.
If the tx fee is $1, and coffee is only $3. a 33% tx fee isn't reasonable.
probabilistic payments is a way to avoid these fees.
07:08
Deleted Account
In order to use question oracle, one still needs a full node?
EA
07:08
Eric Arsenault
ah
07:08
Deleted Account
or light node is enough
Z
07:09
Deleted Account
in the command line it should look like this: βapi:new_question_oracle(Start, Question)β
Z
07:09
Zack
but you need a full node to be a reporter. we haven't added reporting tools to the light node yet.
07:09
Deleted Account
ok thanks
Z
EA
07:09
Eric Arsenault
yeah, I would agree on those fees. For mass adoption you can't have fees higher than 0-4%
07:10
Deleted Account
but you plan to built the same functions in light node too?
Z
07:11
Deleted Account
both questions and reporters?
Z
07:11
Zack
eventually we will have both in the light node.
EA
Z
07:12
Zack
and someone out there will end up spending $1000 on coffee 2 days in a row.
imagine being that guy.
imagine being that guy.
EA
07:12
Eric Arsenault
people would stop buying coffee
Z
07:13
Zack
well, you could lock only $100 into your probabilistic payment account. Then starbucks would have a 3% chance of getting $100 for your $3 coffee. maybe that would be more reasonable
07:13
you need to pay tx fees 10x more often, but you are putting 10x less at risk.
EA
07:14
Eric Arsenault
I'm not sure how you could make people use such a system
Z
07:14
Zack
I want to build this feature, even though it isn't very directly related to financial derivatives
EA
07:14
Eric Arsenault
I see
07:14
I just see big challenges in terms of usability
Z
07:15
Zack
It could also be useful for making the full nodes more hardened.
Right now we depend on altruism for downloading blocks for example.
Right now we depend on altruism for downloading blocks for example.
07:15
if it was profitable to run a full node, the system would be a lot more secure.
EA
07:16
Eric Arsenault
this makes sense
Z
07:16
Zack
If you were paid 0.001$ ever time a light node downloaded a merkel proof from your full node, then it would be expensive to spam your full node
EA
07:16
Eric Arsenault
and is not really usability related (ie, you would know much more about the benefits of that part)
07:17
ah - hence micropayments
07:17
yes, this makes sense
Z
07:18
Zack
It is hard to guess how people could end up using an economic tool like this. Once it is available, they might surprise us.
EA
07:18
Eric Arsenault
I agree
SS
07:19
Spike Spiegel
probabilistic payments - love the idea - it's like microgambling
EA
07:20
Eric Arsenault
I like it in theory
Z
07:21
Zack
I can't see any way it could harm Amoveo to try it out.
And if we don't like it, we can always get rid of it later.
And if we don't like it, we can always get rid of it later.
EA
07:21
Eric Arsenault
but people accepting payments want assurance they are going to get payments. people giving payments don't want to pay $100 for coffee... it's a stretch for me to see real work use cases
07:21
yeah I agree
Z
07:22
Zack
they would have cryptographic proof that they had a 3% chance of receiving $100.
EA
07:22
Eric Arsenault
yeah I get it in theory, but try selling that to Starbucks
Z
07:23
Zack
try and calculate how much Starbucks is paying VISA every year to accept debit card payments.
EA
07:23
Eric Arsenault
ah - now we are talking
07:23
what would fees be for these micropayments?
Z
07:25
Zack
if you have a 3% chance of making a payment, then on average you are paying 3% of a tx fee per payment.
EA
07:25
Eric Arsenault
it isn't much better than visa
Z
07:25
Zack
but it looks like a probabilistic account requires 3 on-chain txs in total.
So 3% * 3 = 9%
So 3% * 3 = 9%
EA
07:26
Eric Arsenault
that is higher than visa
SS
07:26
Spike Spiegel
Hmm... but what if you pay and never use the same vendor again?
EA
07:26
Eric Arsenault
exacltly - it sucks!
SS
07:26
Spike Spiegel
Is this gambler fallacy?
Z
07:26
Zack
a tx fee on amoveo is 0.00152000 veo, which is like $0.10
9% of that is $0.01
That is a lot less than VISA.
9% of that is $0.01
That is a lot less than VISA.
EA
07:27
Eric Arsenault
oh, that makes more sense
[
Z
07:28
Zack
if you lock $1000 instead of $100 into the account, then the fee is 10x lower. $0.001 per payment.
07:30
it looks like a debit card payment is almost always at least $0.20
SS
07:44
Spike Spiegel
Isn't making blocksize drastically bigger better solution?
07:45
But keeping it manageable so it would be always possible to have a node in 4U rack server
07:49
What's exactly strongest Amoveo innovation?
- governance via futarchy?
- cryptoeconomically secure oracles?
- state channels?
- governance via futarchy?
- cryptoeconomically secure oracles?
- state channels?
07:51
What's exactly novel and what is state of the art?
Z
07:59
Zack
Amoveo combines lots of different technology to make an ideal platform for financial derivatives.
08:04
innovations aren't so important in cryptocurrency, since we all just copy each other's features.
This isn't the kind of business where we can use patents to maintain a monopoly.
What matters more is bringing together the right technology to build a useful product.
This isn't the kind of business where we can use patents to maintain a monopoly.
What matters more is bringing together the right technology to build a useful product.
SS
08:07
Spike Spiegel
But it's important in academy word - to say where you got the idea from where
08:07
08:15
To pay homage / give credit
EA
08:16
Eric Arsenault
AWESOME
SS
08:29
Spike Spiegel
Can we create similar list for VEO? Obviously you didn't invented all building blocks for blockchain - explicitly naming projects / people that were inspiration increases street cred of the project itself
Z
08:34
Zack
Jae Kwon from Cosmos showed me how to do secure encryption, and he taught me about how to take full advantage of merkelized data structures to save on bandwidth.
But he didn't invent either of those things.
But he didn't invent either of those things.
08:35
Robin Hanson came up with the name "futarchy", and wrote papers about using prediction markets to make decisions for communities.
08:35
Paul Sztorc came up with the idea of putting a prediction market onto a blockchain, and he discovered a lot of consequences of doing this, and came up with a lot of ideas about how to build this.
08:36
Nakamoto consensus comes from Bitcoin.
08:36
The accounts system in Amoveo and our patricia merkel tree is from ethereum.
The idea of blockchain smart contracts as an alternative to updating the consensus mechanism is from ethereum.
The idea of blockchain smart contracts as an alternative to updating the consensus mechanism is from ethereum.
08:38
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=193281.msg2224949#msg2224949
Tier Nolan came up with the idea of atomic swaps, which is when people started realizing about hashlocking, an essential technology that enables generalized smart contracts in channels.
Tier Nolan came up with the idea of atomic swaps, which is when people started realizing about hashlocking, an essential technology that enables generalized smart contracts in channels.
08:40
Satoshi knew about payment channels when designing bitcoin. I am not sure who came up with that idea.
08:45
I invented the specific kind of oracle used in Amoveo, which is based on nakamoto consensus instead of voting, making is orders of magnitude cheaper than other existing design at that time.
I invented the idea of putting smart contracts inside of channels, and built all the first implementations of this.
I invented the idea of putting smart contracts inside of channels, and built all the first implementations of this.
SS
08:47
Spike Spiegel
It's not about people but rather specific published papers / articles - usually the point of thesis / article is to show how exactly you advanced state of the art.
Bitcoin innovation was online value transfer without trusted intermediary ( it was not possible before )
Bitcoin innovation was online value transfer without trusted intermediary ( it was not possible before )
08:48
What's the key most important feature of VEO?
// So even if you remove other features the project would be still interesting from scientifical point of view
// So even if you remove other features the project would be still interesting from scientifical point of view
Z
08:49
Zack
I invented limit-orders in channels which are secure against front-running. It was thought impossible until I built it.
08:51
In reply to this message
this is less of a scientific project, and more of an engineering project.
Users care about how much it costs for them to buy a service.
That cost is determined by the interaction of many different features.
Users care about how much it costs for them to buy a service.
That cost is determined by the interaction of many different features.
WL
09:33
Wilson Lau
In reply to this message
If a group of ppl set up a probabilistic payment network, will it helps?
Z
09:58
Zack
In reply to this message
so, like, I would send 0.1% chance to get $1000 to you, and you would send a 4.9% chance to get $20 to the coffee shop,
And you keep the extra 0.1% chance of $20 as a fee.
And you keep the extra 0.1% chance of $20 as a fee.
09:59
since the probabilistic payment is based on hashlocking, it is easy to connect them together like this.
It is a good idea.
It is a good idea.
10:01
Maybe it makes more sense to make a probabilistic payment to someone who has a channel with the coffee shop already. And they can use the channel to pay the coffee shop immediately.
10:01
connecting a channel payment to a probabilistic payment should be easy. since they are both based on the same hashlocking protocol.
10:02
it is like a lightning payment.
10:03
What if there are 2 tiny lightning networks, and we use probabilistic payments to settle things between the channel networks.
10:04
Say I want to buy a coffee.
I would make a lightning payment to my channel operator, who uses a probabilistic payment to forward the lightning to the coffee shop's channel operator. where it turns back into a normal channel payment to pay the coffee shop.
I would make a lightning payment to my channel operator, who uses a probabilistic payment to forward the lightning to the coffee shop's channel operator. where it turns back into a normal channel payment to pay the coffee shop.
WL
10:04
Wilson Lau
In reply to this message
yes, that's the idea. but it will involve setting up channel. I am not sure is this the best way to avoid Tx fee. Cause I think originally probabilistic payment happen on the chain not on addtional channel, maybe i get something wrong.
Z
10:05
Zack
the probabilistic payment happens on-chain, but only if money actually gets transfered.
So if I have $100 in my pp-account, any payment of $1 only has a 1% chance of costing a fee.
So if I have $100 in my pp-account, any payment of $1 only has a 1% chance of costing a fee.
WL
10:09
Wilson Lau
In reply to this message
That's mean it is a lighting network happened on chain with a probability to settle
Z
10:12
Zack
a lightning payment can start on bitcoin, pass through ethereum, and then end up on bitcoin again.
10:12
the probabilistic payment has some expected value, just like btc or eth. so it can be a step of the lightning path.
10:15
I think this is a huge improvement over the hub and spoke version of the lightning network. We would almost never have to settle a channel on-chain.
WL
Z
Deleted invited Deleted Account
15:20
Deleted Account
Hello, everyone. I like to make friends.
15:20
Sticker
Not included, change data exporting settings to download.
π, 51.0 KB
T
S
18:08
Sy
In reply to this message
its pretty much unchanged over the last weeks, even decreased a bit
Z
18:09
Zack
In reply to this message
Yeah, the message is old now.
There was a bitcoin ready to be sold at 0.02 when I wrote that.
There was a bitcoin ready to be sold at 0.02 when I wrote that.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Deleted invited Deleted Account
23 March 2019
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Deleted invited Deleted Account
π Ben invited π Ben
Z
09:35
Zack
Thinking about P+epsilon attacks against PoW.
oh, here is a potential solution. We could lock up the block reward for like 1 week until it becomes spendable. Then if a mining pool commits this attack, we can burn 1 week of their block rewards as a punishment.
oh, here is a potential solution. We could lock up the block reward for like 1 week until it becomes spendable. Then if a mining pool commits this attack, we can burn 1 week of their block rewards as a punishment.
MF
09:57
Mr Flintstone
do we find out about the attack by asking an oracle?
09:57
or do we just do the burning with a fork
09:58
I guess you canβt use the oracle cuz pools can censor tx
Z
10:01
Zack
the attacker needs to get his alternative software to the mining pools, or convince the mining pools to forward their PoW to him.
MF
10:01
Mr Flintstone
what is the procedure to identify the address, identify that there was an attack and then burn the coins
Z
10:02
Zack
Hopefully one of the mining pool operators will alert the rest of us, and then we will be ready to do hard updates to delete any block rewards the attacker finds
OK
10:02
O K
We should take a vote of course
MF
10:02
Mr Flintstone
lol
10:02
wonβt we have enough time to realize something was going on
Z
10:02
Zack
if the attacker is sending a modified full node to the mining pools, they could show us the modified code
MF
10:03
Mr Flintstone
1 week is a while
Z
10:03
Zack
if the mining pools are forwarding work to the attacker, then we wont see his code
OK
10:03
O K
We could choose a random bitcoin block in the future and whether it's odd or even do one thing or the other
MF
10:03
Mr Flintstone
users will try to use the chain and it wonβt work as expected
Z
10:04
Zack
if the attacker can get 50% hashrate before we realize what he is doing, then it could be a disaster
MF
10:05
Mr Flintstone
what attack can they do that will net them 50% of not-attacked veo blocks for a week
Z
10:06
Zack
If the mining pool operators warn us about what is happening, I think we will survive.
And I am pretty sure it is always in their interest to warn us.
And I am pretty sure it is always in their interest to warn us.
MF
Z
10:06
Zack
if they have >50% control, they can rewrite all the rules, and confiscate any coins.
MF
10:07
Mr Flintstone
they can only confiscate coins through the spend limit trick we talked about? they donβt have private keys
Z
10:07
Zack
I think it is kind of important to do an update in Amoveo so that block rewards are locked for at least a week.
But I think miners might hate this.
But I think miners might hate this.
10:07
yeah, they can do the spend limit trick.
Soft forks, which means censorship, can change any aspect of the consensus mechanism.
Soft forks, which means censorship, can change any aspect of the consensus mechanism.
MF
10:08
Mr Flintstone
but that can be reverted easily. I donβt think the new coins would be valued highly
Z
10:08
Zack
what can be reverted?
10:08
what new coins?
MF
10:09
Mr Flintstone
reversing the spend limit trick is also a sf?
Z
10:09
Zack
sure. a soft fork can undo any other soft fork, or do any other change to consensus.
MF
10:09
Mr Flintstone
my node wonβt accept anyoneβs tx spending more than x% if I choose
10:09
so even if miner is limiting me, I limit the miner
Z
10:10
Zack
if you have weird extra rules like that, then your node will just get frozen at a height and stop downloading new blocks
MF
10:10
Mr Flintstone
it depends if people want to defend against this type of attack or not
10:10
not a chance anyone is spending more than the amount I can out of my pubkey
Z
10:11
Zack
I think instead of locking up more money, it is best to unlock everything and revert to the normal software.
I very much am not interested in maintaining some hacked up soft fork version of Amoveo.
I very much am not interested in maintaining some hacked up soft fork version of Amoveo.
10:13
@potat_o
What do you think of a hard update so that block rewards from mining will be unspendable for like 7 days?
How bad would an update like that be for miners?
What do you think of a hard update so that block rewards from mining will be unspendable for like 7 days?
How bad would an update like that be for miners?
OK
10:14
O K
Bitcoin is like that, but I think it's more about protecting orphan spends. We've already integrated that into the pool software, yours too.
Z
10:15
Zack
I think you aren't currently waiting 7 days though, right?
OK
10:15
O K
Right
Z
10:15
Zack
so how about a 7 day limit enforced on-chain?
MF
10:16
Mr Flintstone
I thought bitcoin was 100 blocks?
OK
10:16
O K
π€·ββ why?
Z
10:16
Zack
yes, maybe less time is enough. I will do some more math, and get back with a more detailed proposal at a later date.
$FX invited $FX
S
16:52
Sy
There are coins out there with high mature time of block rewards...does it really help with anything or is it just a gimmick? I dont know
16:52
You basicly just invest a week longer in your attack, nothing more
16:52
If at all
16:54
If you do any 50% stuff you already have the coins, do the spends, revert them, do them again quickly on another Exchange or more ppl and be gone...
16:54
You dont really care about block reward at this point, mining wont be the source of your coins anyway
Z
19:03
Zack
We just want to make it so that participating in the attack is not a Nash equilibrium.
As long as less than 50% hashpower participates in the attack, then the attack fails.
As long as less than 50% hashpower participates in the attack, then the attack fails.
19:04
If we can confiscate a weeks worth of rewards from any pool that participates, that makes this attack expensive
Z
19:49
Zack
How big does amoveo have to get until we can have an amoveo conference?
[
19:50
[Riki]
At least 3 active women in the community
Z
19:50
Zack
Hahaha
19:50
I can switch genders for the conference, if it helps
S
19:50
Sy
In reply to this message
how do you confiscate a weeks worth of coins if someone sets up a pool, puts 50% on it, does his attack and leaves within 24h?
[
19:50
[Riki]
I guess 50 would be very meaningful already. Geography is an issue though.
S
19:50
Sy
a 50% attack wont go on for a week+
19:51
if you do this it will probably be done in 2h tops
Z
19:51
Zack
In reply to this message
It takes a week to receive any block rewards from malicious mining. So we have time to delete those rewards before they are distributed.
19:51
This reduces the incentive to mine maliciously
S
19:52
Sy
is there any single 50% attack that cared about mining rewards?
19:52
you buy 2k on an exchangen, you sell them at different places using 50%, you leave
Z
19:52
Zack
This is for P+epsilon attacks against POW.
19:53
https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/01/28/p-epsilon-attack/
Near the bottom he talks about doing p +epsilon to pow
Near the bottom he talks about doing p +epsilon to pow
19:54
Maybe a week is too long. Maybe we can get by with a shorter time. We should do some math and find out.
19:55
It is generally considered an unsolved problem. It would be cool if we solved it in amoveo while everyone thinks it is unsolvable
S
20:06
Sy
it would call this more a workaround than a solution
20:06
but it discourages miner hopping aswell, you cant just switch to veo when it is lucrative if the reward isnt instant
Z
20:07
Zack
If the Nash equilibrium switches to not running the attackers version of consensus, then it is a solution.
20:07
The mining pool could take on risk and pay early.
20:08
The odds of a 5+block reorganization is practically zero
SS
20:13
Spike Spiegel
FYI people are paying now 7.5% pa. for stablecoins in MKRDAI
Z
20:14
Zack
So people are willing to lose 7.5% annually to hold something that stays the same value as bitcoin on ethereum?
20:15
I can't see how mkrdao could compete with normal leveraged derivatives.
It seems to me that the premium for different stablecoins should be different, and it should change based on the margins of that particular contract.
It should change based on the interest rate of the native currency
It seems to me that the premium for different stablecoins should be different, and it should change based on the margins of that particular contract.
It should change based on the interest rate of the native currency
SS
20:18
Spike Spiegel
The problem with multiple stablecoins with different margins is that it's fragmenting the market preventing it from reaching scale
Z
20:20
Zack
So you think if everyone in USA holding a financial derivative of a foreign currency, if they are all charged exactly the same fees for these derivatives, that would unify the market for derivatives and allow it to reach higher scale?
20:20
So you would be charged the same fees to hold euro or argentine peso
SS
20:21
Spike Spiegel
Crypto isn't the same as financial markets - it's skewed because there is lot of "dumb money" and people aren't perfectly rational
20:21
And such irrationalities may stay much longer then anybody can remain solvent ( so shorting bad ideas is hard )
Z
20:21
Zack
Forcing obviously different goods to have the same price is a mistake.
Either some are underpriced, or others are too expensive, or both.
Either some are underpriced, or others are too expensive, or both.
20:23
The interest rate to hold usd is determined by a market.
The interest rate to hold btc is determined by a market.
Pretending that both these interest rates are the same, that is clearly not true.
The interest rate to hold btc is determined by a market.
Pretending that both these interest rates are the same, that is clearly not true.
SS
20:23
Spike Spiegel
Who cares? I've realised that winning is more important than being right and logically consistent.
T
SS
20:23
Spike Spiegel
20:23
It seems that optimal rate is maybe between 3.5% and 7.5%
Z
20:24
Zack
In reply to this message
If you sell a good at below cost of production, you will have many customers and lose money on each sale.
If you sell above the cost of production you have few customers and earn money on every sale.
If you sell above the cost of production you have few customers and earn money on every sale.
20:25
Imagine going to a restaurant, and everything on the menu is the same price.
Water costs the same as wine. Steak is the same as bread sticks.
Water costs the same as wine. Steak is the same as bread sticks.
SS
20:26
Spike Spiegel
What is the cost to create stablecoin in MKR system? If you have lots people willing to get 2x exposure to eth you may get stablecoin as byproduct for negative price
Z
20:26
Zack
A restaurant like that will quickly be out competed against a restaurant that has accurate prices
SS
20:26
Spike Spiegel
Disclaimer: I still don't understand fully the concept of interest rates for cryptocurrencies
20:27
Have you ever run a biz?
20:27
If you have customers that aren't price sensitive you may increase or decrease prices without much changes in demand
20:28
How to understand concept of interest rate for bitcoin for example?
20:29
Both banks and centrals bank of US pays interest on deposits - so so called "risk free return rate" exists
But what's the meaning of this concept for cryptos? There is no central bank of bitcoin
But what's the meaning of this concept for cryptos? There is no central bank of bitcoin
Z
20:29
Zack
If you are abandoning the position that rationality matters, if you really think logic doesn't matter, then it doesn't make sense to waste time writing reasoned messages to me on this forum.
20:30
In reply to this message
Many banks offer interest bearing accounts denominated in different currency.
The interest for different currencies is different.
The interest for different currencies is different.
SS
20:31
Spike Spiegel
I think that rationality is systematised winning - if something works then it's rational. If something works in theory yet doesn't work in practice then it isn't rational
Z
20:31
Zack
The interest rate of bitcoin is how muh you would need to pay someone to lock the bitcoin in a bond for a period of time.
SS
20:32
Spike Spiegel
Current rates are ~5% range
Z
20:32
Zack
So you would adjust your practice to achieve your goals? That sounds like a rational strategy to me.
I guess you aren't abandoning rationality and logic.
I guess you aren't abandoning rationality and logic.
SS
20:32
Spike Spiegel
What's the current rate for VEO?
Z
20:32
Zack
How would I know?
20:35
I know that the profit margin for a restaurant tend to be a lot less than 5%.
So if I was losing more than 5% of each trade due to bad prices, it would completely wipe out my profit.
So if I was losing more than 5% of each trade due to bad prices, it would completely wipe out my profit.
SS
20:36
Spike Spiegel
By observing how much does it cost to create stablecoin on veo - for example interest rate for ETH is currently 1% ( rational people should not lock ETH for lower reward )
Z
20:36
Zack
the profit margins for financial derivatives are even tighter, they are practically zero
20:37
In reply to this message
Interest rate is determined by the market price.
Not whatever "rational" means to you in this context.
Not whatever "rational" means to you in this context.
SS
20:37
Spike Spiegel
irrational - below market price
Z
20:38
Zack
It's very rational to pay below market price, given the opportunity
SS
20:39
Spike Spiegel
Ok so my point is that people are willing to pay currently 7.5% APR to create DAI and get more ETH exposure - maybe Amoveo can undercut MKRDAO offering similar financial product with lower cost
Z
20:40
Zack
I think we can sell usd stablecoin at negative cost, because of the demand for long-veo
SS
20:41
Spike Spiegel
There is strong evidence that demand for both stablecoins and ETH leverage is strong. Almost $89M worth of stablecoins - if it would be backed by VEO then MCAP of veo would be at least $89M
Z
20:41
Zack
You should be paid a premium to hold stable usd
SS
20:42
Spike Spiegel
My point is that making stablecoins yielding premium accessible to public and advertising such thing would drive people to buy more VEO for nonspeculative purpose ( real utility )
Z
20:42
Zack
The market for financial derivatives is measured in trillions
20:42
Ethereum is a tiny fraction of this market
20:42
Yeah, we should try and target people who want stablecoins
20:43
It is clear that there is enough demand so that Amoveo's market cap would be fully utilized for this service
SS
20:44
Spike Spiegel
People who use ETH based financial products are easy to convert to other system - friction is low because people may easily convert ETH to VEO without KYC...
And they already own crypto and are using competing product that's significantly overpriced
And they already own crypto and are using competing product that's significantly overpriced
Z
20:44
Zack
Yes, these are probably the easiest kinds of users to acquire
20:47
I think tomorrow the hard update activates. Then it will be far easier to trade stablecoins on amoveo
20:48
We should start with some small scale testing of people in the network, then make the UX better, then we can start to really push into taking users from ethereum
SS
20:52
Spike Spiegel
From what I know: "Financial innovation is always and in all ways one of two things β a new way of securitising something or a new way of leveraging something."
So this would be equivalent of securitising a product that pays you two digit interest for holding VEO based USD
So this would be equivalent of securitising a product that pays you two digit interest for holding VEO based USD
Z
20:53
Zack
Cash settled synthetic assets aren't an innovation. That is a very old kind of contract.
20:53
It might be older than written history
20:54
And we supported these contracts over a year ago.
20:55
The p2p tool is new though. I think it will make it a more useful way to trade stablecoins
SS
20:55
Spike Spiegel
The future of VEO is bright.
- Amoveo desktop wallet is dope
- stablecoins in wallet with nice UX - even better
- Amoveo desktop wallet is dope
- stablecoins in wallet with nice UX - even better
Z
20:56
Zack
I didn't try the desktop yet. Which version did you try?
20:56
It only does spend and receive, right?
20:56
Do you have to think about syncing headers? Or is it automated?
SS
20:57
Spike Spiegel
Automated, slick UI and syncing is blazingly fast
Z
20:57
Zack
That's great :)
βΏooker invited βΏooker
Z
21:04
Zack
I think Amoveo, financially speaking, is more of an exnovation than innovation.
We are returning to the tried and true financial contracts that humans have used for all of written history.
We are abandoning the wild subcurrency type innovations of ethereum, which have all turned out worse than the contracts we inherited from our ancestors.
Amoveo is technologically innovative. As far as blockchain tech and software development.
We are returning to the tried and true financial contracts that humans have used for all of written history.
We are abandoning the wild subcurrency type innovations of ethereum, which have all turned out worse than the contracts we inherited from our ancestors.
Amoveo is technologically innovative. As far as blockchain tech and software development.
21:06
In a sense, the blockchain innovations have allowed for financial exnovations.
AK
22:07
A K
main benefits of DAI vs VEO-stable-USD: fungibility and ERC20 network effects
22:08
you canβt use stable VEO to bet in PMs, but you will be able to use DAI on Augur
22:08
you can send DAI to any Ethereum compatible counterpart, exchange, wallet, API etc
22:08
Maker is aware that one-size-fits-all APR isnβt optimal, I think theyβre working on smth to make rate marketable
22:09
and allowing collateral other than ETH, too
22:09
so e.g. stable coin on EOS, NEO or VEO, even if cheaper, doesnβt have same utility, nowhere near as ERC20
MF
22:24
Mr Flintstone
I feel like synthetic financial assets with scalar markets will be more popular than binary options in prediction markets
22:25
in that case, you can trivially get rid of your veo price risk by just accounting for it in the oracle question
22:26
but I can see the utility argument around dai for binary options. but when you interlock these systems you assume the failure mode of all of them right
22:28
also, augur needs to fork every time makerdao does right? Because maker is going to upgrade their system, and I donβt think there is an elegant way to include the upgraded system in augur automatically
22:28
and makerdao has been much more open to political risk and voting than augur with their risk committees and trusted feeds, so idk. Iβm not sure augur would be completely trust free for years
22:29
funnily enough itβs probably more trust free right now than itβs about to be when they force users to use dai
A invited A
Deleted invited Deleted Account
24 March 2019
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Z
00:15
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/basics/trust_theory.md
I wrote this paper about the different flavors of trust that exist.
I wrote this paper about the different flavors of trust that exist.
00:19
it proposes some open problems
Z
00:35
Zack
I hope "sincere trust" become a widely used term.
Z
01:05
Zack
According to this trust theory, it looks like Amoveo is a lot more secure than Bitcoin Hivemind or Augur
1.1 vs 3.1
1.1 vs 3.1
AK
01:38
A K
In reply to this message
Augur hasn't integrated Dai yet, maybe waiting for new Dai indeed
EA
02:34
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
Zack, DM me for testing. We can work on second DAC...π€π€π€
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Z
03:53
Zack
27 blocks until the hard update activates
Paul Sztorc invited Paul Sztorc
PS
05:56
Paul Sztorc
So, how do I learn how Amoveo works, anyway?
Z
05:57
Welcome Paul, thank you for joining us
PS
05:57
Paul Sztorc
This is like in alphabetical order https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/tree/master/docs/design
Z
05:57
Zack
Paul invented the idea of blockchain prediction markets, Amoveo is trying to achieve the goals he spelled out for us.
05:58
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/design/oracle.md
I think you would be interested in the oracle
I think you would be interested in the oracle
05:58
we are trying to re-use nakamoto consensus to power the oracle
PS
05:58
Paul Sztorc
In reply to this message
I also gave a talk about the blockchain oracle problem and why it is so hard https://www.infoq.com/presentations/blockchain-oracle-problems
Z
06:00
Zack
that might not be the best way to share your video, it isn't working in firefox with ubuntu
PS
06:00
Paul Sztorc
miners do not want to have to look into any outcomes, especially difficult-to-resolve ones (especially ambiguously-worded ones)
Z
06:00
Zack
yes, I agree
06:01
we have some escalation mechanisms in place, and the nash equilibrium is that the miners will never actually have to care about any oracle
PS
06:01
Paul Sztorc
Ah, but then why would you say that you are using nakamoto consensus for the oracle?
Z
06:02
Zack
By using nakamoto consensus as a final source of truth, it is possible to make a much cheaper design, in comparison to trying to rebuild an entire consensus mechanism
06:02
because that is what a trustless oracle is. it is a way for a community to come to consensus about some data.
PS
06:03
Paul Sztorc
Ok so can you explain the outcome-resolution process
06:03
?
06:03
give me everything that happens in order
Z
06:03
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/design/transaction_types.md
there are 3 tx types for oracles
there are 3 tx types for oracles
06:04
one for asking a question. it has to be a true/false question.
one for making a bet in the oracle. which is a way to move your money to the side of the fork that you think will have higher valued tokens.
and finally, a tx to close the oracle, if it has stayed in the same state for along enough period of time.
one for making a bet in the oracle. which is a way to move your money to the side of the fork that you think will have higher valued tokens.
and finally, a tx to close the oracle, if it has stayed in the same state for along enough period of time.
06:05
we combine the results of multiple oracles to encode binary data.
The turing complete smart contracts make it possible to write stuff like this.
The turing complete smart contracts make it possible to write stuff like this.
PS
06:05
Paul Sztorc
No, I just want everything that happens, in order
06:05
1. "ask question" message
2. "bet" message
3. "close oracle" message
2. "bet" message
3. "close oracle" message
Z
06:06
Zack
1) someone makes a new_oracle_tx, asking "did trump win the election?"
2) trump wins.
3) someone makes a bet in the oracle saying they would prefer owning veo on the version of the chain where trump wins.
4) after enough time passes, someone does an oracle_close_tx to close the oracle.
2) trump wins.
3) someone makes a bet in the oracle saying they would prefer owning veo on the version of the chain where trump wins.
4) after enough time passes, someone does an oracle_close_tx to close the oracle.
06:07
chronologically
06:07
that is the typical order of events.
06:07
the nash equilibrium is that only one person makes one bet in the oracle.
PS
06:07
Paul Sztorc
You can't bet on the outcome until after it happens?
Z
06:08
Zack
when you ask the oracle the question, you can choose the block height when the oracle activates, and it becomes possible to bet in it.
PS
06:08
Paul Sztorc
So, yes? or no?]
Z
06:08
Zack
being able to ask the question ahead of time means we can start making smart contracts that reference that oracle's id
06:08
you can't bet on the outcome until after it happens.
06:09
in the oracle
PS
06:09
Paul Sztorc
?? Then what is the point
06:09
of having an oracle at all
Z
06:09
Zack
the oracle isn't for betting. only one person makes a bet per oracle question. and their bet isn't 'even matched
06:09
the oracle provides data, our smart contracts can access the data
PS
06:09
Paul Sztorc
Ah, so what you mean to say is that your list is incomplete
Z
06:09
Zack
we have markets in the smart contracts that match trades in single price batches
PS
Z
06:10
Zack
I thought you wanted to just know about the oracle first
06:10
14 blocks until the hard update activates
06:10
ok, ill make a longer chronological list
PS
06:11
Paul Sztorc
Ok so it is
1. Question asked ; appears in list
2. Users bet
3. There is a meta-market about the oracle itself; people bet on just one outcome
4. After a contest period, it is decided that whatever was bet on in 3 is what happened
1. Question asked ; appears in list
2. Users bet
3. There is a meta-market about the oracle itself; people bet on just one outcome
4. After a contest period, it is decided that whatever was bet on in 3 is what happened
06:13
Of course, there will be many people who are going to lose a ton of money. And they want to manipulate outcome-resolution
Z
06:14
Zack
1) someone makes a new_oracle_tx, asking "did trump win the election?" using this page: http://139.59.144.76:8070/new_oracle.html
2) Bob uses the same light node tool to generate a request to bet on whether trump will win. they publish it online and then turn their computer off.
3) Alice sees the trade online, uses the same light node tool to accept it. she generates a new_channel_tx to create a channel with Bob and publishes it.
4) trump wins.
5) Bob comes online, and sees that trump won. Now that he knows the result of the bet, he sends a request to Alice so they can get their money out of the channel.
6) Alice comes online, she sees the request from Bob. She signs it, and publishes it as a channel_team_close tx to the blockchain.
7) someone makes a bet in the oracle saying they would prefer owning veo on the version of the chain where trump wins.
8) after enough time passes, someone does an oracle_close_tx to close the oracle.
2) Bob uses the same light node tool to generate a request to bet on whether trump will win. they publish it online and then turn their computer off.
3) Alice sees the trade online, uses the same light node tool to accept it. she generates a new_channel_tx to create a channel with Bob and publishes it.
4) trump wins.
5) Bob comes online, and sees that trump won. Now that he knows the result of the bet, he sends a request to Alice so they can get their money out of the channel.
6) Alice comes online, she sees the request from Bob. She signs it, and publishes it as a channel_team_close tx to the blockchain.
7) someone makes a bet in the oracle saying they would prefer owning veo on the version of the chain where trump wins.
8) after enough time passes, someone does an oracle_close_tx to close the oracle.
PS
06:15
Paul Sztorc
What does the person in 7 get, in return for their message?
Z
06:15
Zack
If you bet on the wrong outcome in the oracle, then that is the same as moving your money to the side of the fork that will be less valuable.
So everyone will want to bet against you to own more money on the side of the fork that is more valuable.
So everyone will want to bet against you to own more money on the side of the fork that is more valuable.
06:16
In reply to this message
since Alice and Bob already closed their channel, it doesn't actually matter to them how the oracle is actually settled.
If Alice refused to cooperate in closing the channel, then the result in the oracle would be important to Bob.
So he would pay the $2 minimum bet to make the oracle close correctly, and then the smart contract could execute and give the money to Bob.
If Alice refused to cooperate in closing the channel, then the result in the oracle would be important to Bob.
So he would pay the $2 minimum bet to make the oracle close correctly, and then the smart contract could execute and give the money to Bob.
06:17
it is profitable to make an accurate bet, so Bob could just post on our forum that it is ready to be closed, and probably someone else will do it.
Especially once I add that to the browser light node.
Especially once I add that to the browser light node.
06:21
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/white_paper.md
The white paper gives a good overview, and has more coherent links to other places in the docs
The white paper gives a good overview, and has more coherent links to other places in the docs
PS
06:22
Paul Sztorc
In reply to this message
Let's stress test it
1) Alice makes "did trump win the election" question
2) Bob bets Alice $10,000,000 that trump will win.
3) Alice accepts.
4) Trump wins, meaning that Alice is about to be $20,000,000 poorer than she thought. She will not only lose 10M but will fail to win 10M.
5) Bob tells Alice to surrender the 20M worth of value...
6) ...but Alice ignores Bob.
7) Alice bets $2 in the oracle that Trump actually didnt win.
...(something happens)...
1) Alice makes "did trump win the election" question
2) Bob bets Alice $10,000,000 that trump will win.
3) Alice accepts.
4) Trump wins, meaning that Alice is about to be $20,000,000 poorer than she thought. She will not only lose 10M but will fail to win 10M.
5) Bob tells Alice to surrender the 20M worth of value...
6) ...but Alice ignores Bob.
7) Alice bets $2 in the oracle that Trump actually didnt win.
...(something happens)...
Z
06:24
Zack
in that case, Bob can come to the forum, tell us how much money Alice is willing to bet, point to the oracle question, and we will all bet against her.
The market cap is only like $4 million though
The market cap is only like $4 million though
PS
06:24
Paul Sztorc
Imagine the market cap is 4 trillion
Z
06:24
Zack
if Alice has more money than the rest of us put together, then by default her side of the oracle would win
PS
06:25
Paul Sztorc
Bob comes to the forum and other people bet on the the trump=win oracle market
Z
06:25
Zack
So in that case, we would have a week to set up a soft fork that will censor any block that closes the oracle the way we think is a lie.
So then we all stay on the side of the fork where we get rich from Alice.
So then we all stay on the side of the fork where we get rich from Alice.
PS
06:25
Paul Sztorc
when does it close
Z
06:25
Zack
If alice has more money than everyone else put together, it closes on both sides after the fork
06:25
if alice has less money, then it never forks.
06:26
and she loses all her money when we close it
PS
06:26
Paul Sztorc
the 20M stays trapped forever
06:26
?
Z
06:26
Zack
in no case does the money get trapped forever
PS
06:26
Paul Sztorc
What happens if some people bet in the oracle market trump=win and others bet trump=lose?
06:26
what happens next?
Z
06:26
Zack
oh, if the blockchain forks, then all the accounts and channels exist on both sides.
So Bob would win the channel on the side with valuable tokens, and Alice would win on the side with worthless tokens
So Bob would win the channel on the side with valuable tokens, and Alice would win on the side with worthless tokens
06:27
Sometimes the community forks, and it makes sense for the blockchain to split so we can each achieve our different dreams. in that case, the oracle mechanism is a way to move your money to the side of the fork that you think will be more valuable.
But it is not very efficient, it only matches bets at a price of 1:1.
But it is not very efficient, it only matches bets at a price of 1:1.
PS
06:27
Paul Sztorc
In reply to this message
Yes we all agree that can be used as a last resort, in a very limited scale...maybe once every few months for very obvious questions
Z
06:28
Zack
my expectation is that it will never happen.
PS
06:28
Paul Sztorc
Ah see
Z
06:28
Zack
No one will be willing to throw so much money at the system.
PS
06:28
Paul Sztorc
So the oracle-market-bets
Z
06:28
Zack
but we still need to be ready. if we weren't ready, then they would attack.
PS
06:28
Paul Sztorc
Are pledges, and the people going against you are by definition sacrificing their money on that side of the chain
Z
06:29
Zack
yes, it is a way to try and reuse nakamoto consensus for making a binary decision
PS
06:29
Paul Sztorc
But you said you were only using nakamoto consensus as a last resort? You seem to be using it basically as a first resort
Z
06:30
Zack
the expected case is that one person makes one bet in the oracle, and no fork occurs.
PS
06:30
Paul Sztorc
So the blockchain splits into three ("yes" "no" "ambiguous") for each semi-ambiguous question, though
06:30
?
Z
06:31
Zack
yes, there are 3 possible outcomes.
The smart contracts can which of the three an oracle finalized in, and you can program the contract to do whatever you think is right.
The smart contracts can which of the three an oracle finalized in, and you can program the contract to do whatever you think is right.
PS
06:31
Paul Sztorc
In reply to this message
And you did not answer my question as to what this person receives. Anything?
Z
06:31
Zack
since bets are matched in a price of 1:1 in the oracle, we only store one kind of bet in the order book at a time.
06:32
In reply to this message
there is a cost to asking the oracle a question. this fee is used to make the very last bet in the oracle, and it is always a bet for the losing side.
This gives incentive for the first person to make that one bet.
This gives incentive for the first person to make that one bet.
PS
06:33
Paul Sztorc
Ah I see
06:34
An incentive for them to make some bet, not necessarily the winning bet. They try to make a winning bet to avoid a fork
06:34
When someone buys Amoveo for the first time, they must personally research all of the past events, however. If there are many forks
Z
06:35
Zack
it is better to own veo on the side of the fork that is more honest, because the honest side will have more valuable coins.
PS
06:35
Paul Sztorc
That is a problem if some of the forks are from questions in a different language
Z
06:35
Zack
Most people just use the light node
PS
06:35
Paul Sztorc
or which are generally difficult to answer
Z
06:35
Zack
In reply to this message
yeah, dealing with different languages could get tough, we haven't thought much about that.
PS
06:37
Paul Sztorc
Well if I were going to lose 20M, I would try to make my fork do well
06:37
At least the trump=ambiguous fork
06:38
Especially if it were a multivariate market, if the crypto-price collapsed it wouldn't affect my winnings
Z
06:38
Zack
if you already lost 20M, you would throw more money into the oracle and launch a fork of a cryptocurrency?
PS
Z
06:38
Zack
Would you hire developers to run the github and maintain the software?
06:38
Launch a mining pool?
PS
06:39
Paul Sztorc
I would just copy the development / software of the most popular rival team
Z
06:39
Zack
If you are willing to go through all that, it isn't much different from ICO's giving out free money to competitors
PS
06:40
Paul Sztorc
The 20M is in the channel in any case
Z
06:40
Zack
you can fork any blockchain from any point in history
PS
06:40
Paul Sztorc
I would just be spending $2 and saying that the Trump question was actually ambiguous
Z
06:40
Zack
if you had 20M in bitcoin, and sold it. you could decide to fork from before when you sold those bitcoins
06:40
someone would bet more than $2 against you that he lost.
06:41
Bob told us that it is worth $20 million to you. we are like sharks smelling blood, hoping you will throw more cash at us.
06:41
the order book will fill up, because the oracle's order book is first come first serve.
06:41
you can't pay more to get ahead, because there is only 1 price.
06:42
so then you wont be able to change the oracle to ambiguous again so easily.
PS
06:42
Paul Sztorc
What happens after I put $2 on trump=ambiguous ?
Z
06:42
Zack
someone else puts $4 on trump = true
PS
06:42
Paul Sztorc
Someone else puts $2 on trump=win ?
06:43
ok
Z
06:43
Zack
right
PS
06:43
Paul Sztorc
When does the blockchain fork?
Z
06:43
Zack
or more
06:43
they might put $1000 on trump=win immediately, because of the first come first serve aspect of the oracle bets
06:43
the nash equilibrium is that it would never fork
PS
06:43
Paul Sztorc
No I'm trying to get it to fork though
Z
06:44
Zack
if you had more money than everyone willing to bet against you, and you kept betting on the lying outcome
06:44
then eventually we would reach a point where we have 7 days to set up a soft fork to censor any blocks that would close the oracle in the lying state.
PS
06:45
Paul Sztorc
??
Z
06:45
Zack
So then you would have to convince some mining pool to run your version of the software without the soft fork, so you can close the oracle on your side the way you think is right
PS
06:50
Paul Sztorc
Ok, but every time there is a semi-ambiguous outcome, the blockchain *will* fork
06:50
that is an outcome where it is objectively unclear if the true outcome should be "true" or "ambiguous" (or "false"-or-"ambiguous")
06:51
So there would eventually be thousands of blockchains, seemingly
06:51
Meaning that lots of the outcomes would not really be resolved at all
Z
06:52
Zack
I think in practice we will find solutions to overcome these rare edge cases.
A fork hurts almost everyone. We have an incentive to stick together, and we have futarchy to help us decide.
A fork hurts almost everyone. We have an incentive to stick together, and we have futarchy to help us decide.
PS
06:52
Paul Sztorc
But as I have explained, it isn't rare at all
06:52
And it is already happening to Augur
06:52
An attacker can just make many semi-ambiguous questions
Z
06:52
Zack
if is objectively ambiguous, then we can decide with a coin flip
06:53
there is a lot of incentive not to fork, and futarchy is powerful.
PS
06:53
Paul Sztorc
You could, but your oracle mechanism would then be a coin flip
06:53
and you'd need some way of knowing what the coin's outcome was
06:53
and why people should agree to what it says
Z
06:54
Zack
for a financial derivative to be useful, it needs to approximate a certain risk profile
06:54
as long as the approximation is near, then the user is happy.
06:54
if it is a close call, then the decision is not important
PS
06:55
Paul Sztorc
But if there are 1,000 forks of Amoveo, each with a different market cap
06:55
you are ok with that?
06:55
The user will have a hard time knowing which one to buy
06:55
and the hashrate will be split each time
Z
06:56
Zack
I think that this oracle mechanism holds the potential to be very cheap.
I doubt it will fork the way you imagine, but if it does, we will adapt.
I doubt it will fork the way you imagine, but if it does, we will adapt.
PS
06:57
Paul Sztorc
That is just denying the existence of semi-ambiguous questions
06:57
even though they do exist and have already been used against Augur
Tv
06:58
Tarrence van As
Why would someone bet on an intentionally ambiguous question? If no one bets, then the stakes are low and the outcome doesn't matter. Seems there will only be forks if the stakes are high enough
PS
06:59
Paul Sztorc
Hopefully they would not
06:59
bet
06:59
but it seems already your betting is taking place in channels?
Z
06:59
Zack
over time we will develop a culture to filter questions more and more finely into the 3 types. like how the legal code grows
PS
06:59
Paul Sztorc
So you wouldn't be able to tell high-bet questions from low-bet questions
06:59
So it seems that that distinction couldn't matter
Z
06:59
Zack
I sold some USD stablecoins recently
06:59
for a 1 month contract
PS
07:00
Paul Sztorc
In reply to this message
culture does require some kind of meta-culture to enforce it
07:00
but I am suggesting that an attacker could spam the system
07:00
intentionally inserting many semi-ambiguous questions
Z
07:01
Zack
In Amoveo there is no obligation for anyone to report to an oracle. This makes it easier for us to ignore the meaning of the words, and follow the spirit of what is useful.
07:01
if they spam questions, we can just ignore them entirely. if no one bets, the results of an oracle don't matter.
JS
07:01
Jon Snow
Wow, the lengary Paul is here. Welcome
Tv
07:02
Tarrence van As
Protocols can be developed to help pose well formed questions. Like veil is doing ontop of augur today. Questions can be "endorsed" by reputable parties. Those reputable parties can run markets and earn fees for providing their service
07:03
Today it is very immature though
Z
07:05
Zack
In our scalar markets. we use 10 bits to encode the price of bitcoin, and each bit is an oracle.
So the least significant bit is almost always ambiguous.
But the least significant bit also has the least influence on the outcome of the contract. So it isn't likely to create an incentive for a fork to occur.
So the least significant bit is almost always ambiguous.
But the least significant bit also has the least influence on the outcome of the contract. So it isn't likely to create an incentive for a fork to occur.
PS
07:07
Paul Sztorc
So the oracle model is entirely hashrate-dependent, though
07:07
not that that's the worst thing
07:07
but basically you are assuming everything will be uncontested
07:07
and if something is contested it forks the chain
Z
07:07
Zack
im not sure what "hashrate dependent" means
PS
07:07
Paul Sztorc
and investors need to decide which version of amoveo they'd rather support
07:08
investors will have a strong incentive to support whichever version they think other people are supporting, though
07:08
hashrate-dependent means "miners decide"
Z
07:08
Zack
nakamoto consensus fundamentally supports forking, and it is also possible to sell bitcoin, and build a fork from before you sold them.
It seems like these same risks exist in bitcoin as well.
It seems like these same risks exist in bitcoin as well.
PS
07:09
Paul Sztorc
I dont agree
Z
07:09
Zack
miners have to mine the version that has coins valuable enough to sell for electricity
PS
07:09
Paul Sztorc
in Bitcoin you can ignore all forks
Z
07:09
Zack
investors decide
PS
07:09
Paul Sztorc
The requirement that hodlers research all outcomes and validate them makes it much more annoying to run a node
Z
07:10
Zack
if someone undoes 3 blocks of bitcoin quickly enough, all the full nodes will follow them and you wont even notice that 3 blocks were undone
PS
07:10
Paul Sztorc
that is why I outsourced the task to VoteCoin-ers
Z
07:10
Zack
in Amoveo we outsource it to the oracle reporters. they escalate the decision to the point where miners can profitably get involved.
PS
07:10
Paul Sztorc
not really though
07:11
because it is ultimately outsourced to hodlers
07:11
when the blockchains fork
Z
07:11
Zack
if the situation never escalates, then that means not enough money was at stake in that oracle for it to matter
07:12
if the situation does escalate, then hodlers and miners can profitably figure out what is going on and resolve it.
07:12
mining pools run the software, not the miners.
miners can only choose which pool to use.
miners can only choose which pool to use.
PS
07:13
Paul Sztorc
yes but in Amoveo, every users is expected to resolve all oracle outcomes
07:13
so that they know which fork to back, if the network splits
Z
07:13
Zack
only the ones that have escalated to the point where it is profitable to get involved.
PS
07:13
Paul Sztorc
that is the only way that it becomes true that "no forking happens" becomes a nash equilibirium
Z
07:14
Zack
Well, I guess we will find out soon if Amoveo will die in forks like you predict
PS
07:15
Paul Sztorc
no I instead predict that running a node will be very expensive
07:15
but either way
Z
07:15
Zack
its pretty cheap so far
PS
07:15
Paul Sztorc
zzzzzz
07:16
As I said
Z
07:16
Zack
why would it be expensive to run a node?
PS
07:16
Paul Sztorc
because it includes the labor of personally checking every oracle outcome
07:16
even ones that you know nothing about, don't care about or are written in differnet languages
Z
07:16
Zack
http://139.59.144.76:8070/txs.html just click this link, and you have synced with the network
07:17
It isn't so useful to end up on a fork by yourself. users will chose a fork that is being maintained by developers and has active mining pools.
07:17
they will have a full node software that syncs with the version they want.
PS
07:17
Paul Sztorc
yes but deciding what they want
07:18
is very expensive in this case
07:18
You seem to want something both ways
Z
07:18
Zack
there is an incentive for us all to stay on the same fork. trustless coin flip protocols are easy to write.
PS
07:18
Paul Sztorc
β people will know every outcome and enforce it, and people will be lazy and just click your hyperlink to find out what happened
Z
07:19
Zack
If the question is ambiguous, then it shouldn't matter how it resolves. as long as we can all agree.
PS
07:19
Paul Sztorc
Interesting
07:19
ok, well thanks for explaining it to me π
Z
07:20
Zack
feel free to ask questions about any part any time
07:20
We are big fans of you here
07:33
If we used the heat of all the Amoveo miners together, we could cook about 2.5 frozen chickens per second.
B
07:35
Ben
3600 frozen chickens/day feeds the whole channel
Z
08:10
Zack
7 blocks till the hard update.
Z
08:59
Zack
If anyone can find a bug in Amoveo, it is probably Paul. We are lucky he was curious to learn.
09:00
I am thinking of adding some multisig transaction types to amoveo. It seems like this is a pretty standard feature that people like to use.
Z
10:31
Zack
http://139.59.144.76:8080/home.html
I updated the light node for the new way to make channels.
I updated the light node for the new way to make channels.
10:31
because the hard update has engaged
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Z
21:36
Zack
it will engage the hard update, so any nodes that haven't updated yet will get frozen.
21:51
The channel market mechanism only has a security level of 2.1.
Amoveo full node is 1.1
I wonder if we can build a better market mechanism to have a security of 1.1?
Amoveo full node is 1.1
I wonder if we can build a better market mechanism to have a security of 1.1?
Z
22:11
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/basics/trust_theory_1.1.md
I am trying to make a general proof that any financial application we could be interested in can be written in 1.1
I am trying to make a general proof that any financial application we could be interested in can be written in 1.1
Ed Tim invited Ed Tim
25 March 2019
$
01:30
$FX
In reply to this message
how many person totally you have in your team?
what's the market value of your token?
what's the market value of your token?
Z
01:31
Zack
In reply to this message
1317 in the telegram group now, but there are more on discord, so it is best to round to 1337.
You can see the price here https://veoscan.io
You can see the price here https://veoscan.io
Z
01:52
Zack
Amoveo doesn't have a big team or money to throw around. What we do have is a year of continuous incremental improvement.
A
01:56
Aries
Rapidly!
01:56
π
Z
03:58
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/basics/using_oracle.md Here is some new documentation for some useful ways to make oracles. Mr Flintstone realized how to have protections against the free option problem when establishing the new channel relationships.
MF
04:02
Mr Flintstone
you still have exposure to the term structure changing but this isnβt nearly as bad as the price I think
Tv
04:23
Tarrence van As
Should something like a price oracle reference a source such as an exchange?
Z
04:23
Zack
it can, but does not have to. Depending on the situation either strategy could be better.
EP
Z
08:38
Zack
we should start thinking about language compatibility for non-english in the oracle.
We need to be cautious of forking on ambiguous questions.
We need to be cautious of forking on ambiguous questions.
EA
08:41
Eric Arsenault
I agree - those are some great learning points
08:41
can we prevent ambiguous questions from ever getting asked in the first place?
Z
08:42
Zack
Any set of rules we come up with for dividing questions into the 3 groups: true/false/bad-question, will inevitably have some questions that it can't handle
EA
08:42
Eric Arsenault
right
Z
08:44
Zack
I think the space of ambiguous questions doesn't overlap much with the space of questions people want to bet on.
EA
08:44
Eric Arsenault
but is there some way to encourage people to only make bets for non-ambiguous questions?
08:45
what if we have prediction markets for the questions, bets for which will be non-ambiguous vs ambiguous... or something like that?
Z
08:45
Zack
if you are running a central market, and a question turns out to be a bad-question, then it is possible for you to end up with less veo than you started with.
So even if a question like this existed, no channel hub would make a market for trading it.
So even if a question like this existed, no channel hub would make a market for trading it.
EA
08:45
Eric Arsenault
maybe some form of TCR, bubbling up only non-ambiguous Qs
Z
08:48
Zack
if there is no market matching trades meaning it is only used for p2p derivatives, then it is unlikely that your derivative has much trading volume. It was probably just a handful of bets.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Mihai Neacsu invited Mihai Neacsu
King Pepe Alexander III invited King Pepe Alexander III
S
15:00
Sy
What if you create some kind of simplified programming syntax for questions and not just freetext?
15:01
I mean isnt it usually events? The words you need should be limited...
15:05
Or will that limit it too much? I gotta check the previously asked questions
T
16:16
Topab
What cases of ambiguos questions there are? Maybe by categorising first we can think f a way to go about it
16:17
Somebody can send an example of a an ambiguos question?
K
16:27
King Pepe Alexander III
Will the weather be hot tomorrow?
T
16:30
Topab
There is no way to quantify that, could this question be asked if someone wanted to ask this?
Laura invited Laura
Z
16:44
Zack
In reply to this message
I think we should fit what we can into a standard format. It will make the language barrier less.
Not all oracles will meet the standard format, and that is ok
Not all oracles will meet the standard format, and that is ok
S
17:31
Sy
In reply to this message
maybe create 2 oracle types? like one with standard words that you can translate into each language and it will still work and then freetext which are...well less trusted or something ^^
17:31
i mean all those "will <x> be higher than <y> on <date>" is basicly np or "will <name> win <competion>?`"
Z
17:31
Zack
Why would we need another oracle type?
The existing oracle supports arbitrary english text
The existing oracle supports arbitrary english text
S
17:32
Sy
im pretty sure you can cover like 80% of the current question oracles we had with a frame
17:32
arent we talking about bad texts?
17:32
if you dont define a standard and make it mandatory, there is no standard
17:32
you have worked in teams, how good do standards work? xD
17:33
or rather "rules"
Z
17:33
Zack
I agree having a standard is good.
But if I make another tx type and it is not functionally different from the existing tx types, that just doesn't make sense from a software perspective
But if I make another tx type and it is not functionally different from the existing tx types, that just doesn't make sense from a software perspective
17:34
I think what we want are tools in the light node to guide people towards asking questions that fit the standard format.
And tools for browsing oracle questions that parse and organize based on the format.
And tools for browsing oracle questions that parse and organize based on the format.
S
17:35
Sy
maybe add templates for questions where you just fill out the blanks?
17:35
and the last option is "custom question" π
Z
17:36
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/basics/using_oracle.md
I'm working on a standard here
I'm working on a standard here
17:37
Once we like a standard, I guess we need to update new_oracle.js to guide you towards following the standard
SP
23:42
Stepan Panov
Big week guys, big week
SP
23:42
Stepan Panov
A
Amoveo News 25.03.2019 23:42:16
Weekly Amoveo Newsletter #3.
We've had a big week with new wallets being released, Paul Sztorc talking about Amoveo in the Telegram Chat, tons of new developments and ideas as well as some new features in the newsletter. Subscribe & Share π.
https://amoveo.substack.com/p/3-new-wallets-and-paul-sztorc
We've had a big week with new wallets being released, Paul Sztorc talking about Amoveo in the Telegram Chat, tons of new developments and ideas as well as some new features in the newsletter. Subscribe & Share π.
https://amoveo.substack.com/p/3-new-wallets-and-paul-sztorc
26 March 2019
EA
00:41
Eric Arsenault
great job Stepan
SP
02:06
Stepan Panov
thanks guys!
qTrade Eric invited qTrade Eric
03:30
Deleted Account
re: ambiguous outcomes
03:31
how would Amoveo handle these historical disputes from Intrade? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrade#Disputes
03:31
e.g. "On 3 January 2012, Intrade settled contracts related to the 2012 Iowa caucus in favour of bettors supporting Mitt Romney, on the basis that Iowa Republican Party chairman Matt Strawn (incidentally a Rick Santorum supporter) had declared Romney to be the winner by a narrow margin of 8 votes, adding that there would be no recount. The contracts specified that
"Expiry will be based on the officially declared winner of the Iowa caucus, as reported by three independent and reliable media sources."
However, the normal process of certifying the vote count (not recount) revealed simple arithmetic errors which resulted in Santorum being declared the winner (by 34 votes) on 20 January. Intrade, having already paid out winnings to Romney supporters, maintained that its original decision had been correct, since at least three reliable media sources had reported a Romney victory."
"Expiry will be based on the officially declared winner of the Iowa caucus, as reported by three independent and reliable media sources."
However, the normal process of certifying the vote count (not recount) revealed simple arithmetic errors which resulted in Santorum being declared the winner (by 34 votes) on 20 January. Intrade, having already paid out winnings to Romney supporters, maintained that its original decision had been correct, since at least three reliable media sources had reported a Romney victory."
Z
05:50
Zack
In reply to this message
3 of Jan and 20th are 17 days apart.
I think it is very likely that Amoveo would have paid out the wrong way for this.
Our oracle only waits like 1 or 2 weeks in the same state before it thinks it is ready to close.
If the waiting period of oracles is too short, we can lengthen it with the governance mechanism.
A prediction market platform doesn't have to be perfect to be useful.
We just have to be a better way to hedge your risks compared to any other platform.
I think it is very likely that Amoveo would have paid out the wrong way for this.
Our oracle only waits like 1 or 2 weeks in the same state before it thinks it is ready to close.
If the waiting period of oracles is too short, we can lengthen it with the governance mechanism.
A prediction market platform doesn't have to be perfect to be useful.
We just have to be a better way to hedge your risks compared to any other platform.
05:57
Deleted Account
.
D
Z
06:28
Zack
Maybe buttons got clicked in his pocket
MF
06:35
Mr Flintstone
maybe itβs code
[
06:49
[Riki]
it means "word."
JS
07:09
Jon Snow
Itβs a wordless way to say βZEC > BTCβ
D
07:11
Deleted Account
π
Z
07:11
Zack
crypto gatsby has posted questions here before, im pretty sure he isn't trying to spam
09:13
Deleted Account
haha, just to scroll down on the messages
09:14
apologies, lot of times the βrecent messagesβ button does not popup
EA
09:17
Eric Arsenault
Mystery solved + new trick in my repertoire!
Deleted invited Deleted Account
azza invited azza
SS
09:52
Spike Spiegel
https://www.evanvanness.com/post/183629647376/a-simple-way-to-fund-more-public-goods-in-ethereum
Seems like Eth community is unable to fund public goods in decentralised way (giving money to EF is decentralisation risk)
Seems like Eth community is unable to fund public goods in decentralised way (giving money to EF is decentralisation risk)
Z
09:54
Zack
dominant assurance contracts are the right way to raise funds, and futarchy is the right way to decide what to spend funds on.
SS
09:54
Spike Spiegel
Merely showing that DAC's without centralisations of governance are possible should be a shocker for them
09:55
Sure, but Consensys / Gitcoin are raining money while Amoveo community doesn't afaik.
Flawed plane flying > theoretically perfect plane in blueprint stage
Flawed plane flying > theoretically perfect plane in blueprint stage
09:57
Also I've realised that one can manipulate crypto prices not only by placing market orders but merely by interest rates
Alex S invited Alex S
SS
09:59
Spike Spiegel
Imagine quite illiquid coin with some spot traded price - and suddenly somebody offers you significant % just to lock your funds - such incentive is like a magnet for financially illiterate people that would buy such thing for "muh passive income" inflating the price.
And because the interest rate is paid in such currency it's "free" for issuer while he can enjoy dumping the coin on the market
And because the interest rate is paid in such currency it's "free" for issuer while he can enjoy dumping the coin on the market
10:07
Cost for stablecoin may be negative is currency is appreciating while if currency is deprecating it may run-away increase:
- high cost of stablecoin -> people closing the position and selling locked currency
- pressure on selling -> price depreciation & volatility which further increases stablecoin cost
- high cost of stablecoin -> people closing the position and selling locked currency
- pressure on selling -> price depreciation & volatility which further increases stablecoin cost
Z
10:07
Zack
What if mining pools used probabilistic payments to pay the workers?
Then each worker could have constant cryptographic guarantees about the rate at which value is going to them.
Then each worker could have constant cryptographic guarantees about the rate at which value is going to them.
SS
10:08
Spike Spiegel
Isn't mining almost pure lottery by design? With tickets = hashrate?
10:09
Workers are using pools to reduce variance in rewards because they have to pay real electricity costs - if you can pay via probabilistic payments for electricity it could be useful
10:09
Or it's for guaranteed fairness of pools?
Z
10:10
Zack
it is nice not to have to run a full node.
And small miners can set their payout to much less than a block reward.
And small miners can set their payout to much less than a block reward.
10:10
it's guaranteed fairness, yes
10:11
big miners are already being paid like 1 block reward or more per payout.
So it isn't about variance for them, it is the convenience of not having to run a full node.
So it isn't about variance for them, it is the convenience of not having to run a full node.
10:12
I think they would appreciate the proof of how much you are being paid, because then you could immediately know the relative expected profit of different mining pools. you don't have to wait a month and take an average.
SS
10:21
Spike Spiegel
I think focusing on miner's needs is bad pathway as if mining is profitable then people will be doing it even if it would require doing crazy and hard things.
Mining is profitable is hashrate is increasing if price per coin increases.
What measures health of mining network?
- maybe things like (total ATH hashrate vs current hashrate) ( if there is lot of cheap potential hashrate and current hashrate is low then it's dangerous as it decreases cost to attack )
- maybe cost to attack for 1h?
https://www.crypto51.app/
Mining is profitable is hashrate is increasing if price per coin increases.
What measures health of mining network?
- maybe things like (total ATH hashrate vs current hashrate) ( if there is lot of cheap potential hashrate and current hashrate is low then it's dangerous as it decreases cost to attack )
- maybe cost to attack for 1h?
https://www.crypto51.app/
EA
10:23
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
I like the idea of creating a pool of funds which can be used for public goods
10:24
Although I would love to see widespread adoption of DACs, Iβm still not convinced
Z
10:24
Zack
Well, I am implementing probabilistic payments already to make state channels more scalable. So I am just trying to think of more ways they can be useful.
10:25
If you want to make drastic changes, you would need the futarchy mechanism to agree with them.
10:31
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/issues/238
you can follow the probabilistic payment development here
you can follow the probabilistic payment development here
SS
10:33
Spike Spiegel
btw "Repository owner deleted a comment from homakov 18 minutes ago"
10:33
Was it spam?
10:34
I've never seen somebody censoring GH comments
Z
10:39
Zack
it was spam. something about linking your bank account to channels so that your bank can deposit and withdraw money to your channel with trust.
10:43
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/tree/probabilistic
I made a different branch for writing this probabilistic code, so we can test it out heavily before making the hard update.
I made a different branch for writing this probabilistic code, so we can test it out heavily before making the hard update.
Murzik invited Murzik
N
12:46
NM$L
why pump
S
EW
S
15:30
Sy
and that π
15:30
159$ on hitbtc lol
S
16:39
Sy
fun fact about spam, on my mobile in the native telegram app it asks me about further user actions (ban and so on) and the web client doesnt...too bad π
Ricky Love invited Ricky Love
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Aleksandr Naumov invited Aleksandr Naumov
Z
19:31
Zack
I think people are excited about the new way to make channels and smart contracts
M
21:18
Minieep21
qtrade down for anyone?
AK
21:21
A K
confirm - cloudflare error
Z
21:29
Zack
I messed them on discord, they usually respond fairly quickly
Ε½M
21:29
Ε½ivojin MiriΔ
I think Eric entered this chat recently
21:30
Z
21:30
Zack
I can see the graph on qtrade just fine
I
21:30
Instinct
Looks to be back Working
CD
23:15
Crypt Dweller
damn, I wish there had been a predictions market on the Mueller report
Deleted invited Deleted Account
27 March 2019
Deleted joined group by link from Group
qE
01:48
qTrade Eric
In reply to this message
Thanks for the ping. We did have a short outage for 5-10 minutes this morning while one of our databases rebooted. We've been working on improving some load issues due to our recent growth and a lot more people using the service, expect another short downtime later today and improved performance after that.
Z
01:49
Zack
the hug of death from all of us refreshing your price graph so often.
qE
01:50
qTrade Eric
Haha yea one of the outcomes of this is to raise priority on some planned websocket updates. Ideally refreshing won't be needed after that ;)
T
S
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Deleted invited Deleted Account
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EA
03:13
Eric Arsenault
Below is a short 1 question survey to understand which DAC the community would like to participate in next. Please share your thoughts! Survey results will be shared in the Amoveo Newsletter.
MF
03:17
Mr Flintstone
nice
03:17
a DAC to bootstrap further DAC haha
EA
T
03:35
Tromp
Cool
S
06:02
Veo thread on biz
SP
06:05
Stepan Panov
I saw a VEO thread die after just 4 or 5 messages a couple of months ago, we're definitely getting there guys
MF
06:08
Mr Flintstone
glad to see mature and constructive discussion on veo outside telegram and discord
Z
06:08
Zack
Haha
06:10
We do so little moderating in amoveo forums, but somehow the quality of discussion is so high. It's always a culture shock leaving for the rest of the cryptocurrency world.
SS
06:13
Spike Spiegel
Do we have amoveo memes?
Z
SS
06:17
Spike Spiegel
I've found an explanation why it's true:
https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2007/04/formalist-manifesto-originally-posted/
https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2007/04/formalist-manifesto-originally-posted/
EA
06:18
I'll add it to the survey I just sent out
Z
06:18
Zack
A survey to prove that voting is bad.
When surveys are a type of voting.
When surveys are a type of voting.
EA
06:18
Eric Arsenault
LOL π
06:18
the irony
06:19
driving you nuts I'm sure. However, we already have 14 responses, with many really good ideas.
SS
06:20
Spike Spiegel
Voting actually works for small groups
[
06:20
[Riki]
In reply to this message
Animation
Not included, change data exporting settings to download.
255.7 KB
SS
06:22
Spike Spiegel
""The basic idea of formalism is just that the main problem in human affairs is violence. The goal is to design a way for humans to interact, on a planet of remarkably limited size, without violence"
The point of governance is to reduce violence, not to create artificial fairness"
The point of governance is to reduce violence, not to create artificial fairness"
Z
06:24
Zack
In reply to this message
For a group size of 1, you get a dictatorship.
Which is vulnerable to bribery and corruption.
In some ways it is more secure than voting, but it is a lot worse than the potential of futarchy.
Which is vulnerable to bribery and corruption.
In some ways it is more secure than voting, but it is a lot worse than the potential of futarchy.
SS
06:26
Spike Spiegel
With group of 5 you may use voting to decide where to go for food, low stake situation, voting offers quick and better solution than dictatorship
Z
06:26
Zack
There is a smooth spectrum between universal democracy to representative democracy to monarchy.
None of the mechanisms on that spectrum are cryptoeconomically secure.
None of the mechanisms on that spectrum are cryptoeconomically secure.
06:27
In reply to this message
Deciding where to get food as a group by voting actually does not work.
There is a strong tendency to keep going to the same place, even if no one likes it there.
There is a strong tendency to keep going to the same place, even if no one likes it there.
06:27
Using futarchy would be a more effective way to decide where to eat
06:28
Letting one leader decide where to eat is probably more efficient than voting
06:30
I guess I would make a terrible addition to your group of friends.
"Actually guys, we should do all this math instead of eating where you want to go."
"Actually guys, we should do all this math instead of eating where you want to go."
EA
06:30
So, in plain words, how would it work with futachy... with me and my friends
SS
06:31
Spike Spiegel
People are so irrational that forming theories based on people's rationality is irrational
06:31
06:31
example
Z
06:32
Zack
After you eat, everyone ranks the choice from 0 to 10.
Before we eat we do some futarchy bets to determine which restaurant is most likely to result in the high score.
I recommend LMSR for small settings with friends.
Before we eat we do some futarchy bets to determine which restaurant is most likely to result in the high score.
I recommend LMSR for small settings with friends.
06:33
In reply to this message
Each individual particle moves randomly according to brownian motion.
So any physics that tries to make sense of groups of particles must be impossible according to your logic?
So any physics that tries to make sense of groups of particles must be impossible according to your logic?
SS
06:34
Spike Spiegel
You can ask people about their preferences and ideas while you cannot do the same for particles.
06:36
Economy isn't real science like mathematics or physics or biology - it uses many equations and it's magnet for people attracted to scientism.
You cannot derive ought from is. Anything with "X should Y" is moral statement based on moral axiom
You cannot derive ought from is. Anything with "X should Y" is moral statement based on moral axiom
Z
06:37
Zack
Even though eah individual particle is completely random, we can still use conservation of momentum and energy to understand collections of particles.
Even though an individual might behave randomly in an individual act, we can still come up with math to explain people in aggregate. Or explain long term trends of repeated trials of one person.
Even though an individual might behave randomly in an individual act, we can still come up with math to explain people in aggregate. Or explain long term trends of repeated trials of one person.
06:37
In reply to this message
If you think incentives are imaginary, that economics is fake, then you don't believe in half of cryptoeconomics.
06:38
Economics is politically charged and often mixed with propaganda.
But underneath all that, the math about how people act according to incentives in aggregate is accurate.
But underneath all that, the math about how people act according to incentives in aggregate is accurate.
SS
06:38
Spike Spiegel
Yup - cryptoeconomics is based on weak grounds + exploiting greed so it "works": people are able to sell totally unsecure systems to the public
06:39
If you can sell shittoken 10 times in a row and people will still enjoy buying it - then who is irrational?
06:40
I mean systems 3 or 4 where even with low amount of money you may create large loss for others
06:43
People are complicated - economy explains small % of things while in physics theory is more or less finished and basic rules will not change drastically
Z
06:44
Zack
In reply to this message
So you think that math is "science", and you want to tell us that cryptocurrencies are all a scam because everyone is irrational.
I can't understand why you would want to be a part of this forum.
Anyway, this is a place to talk about amoveo. Not a place to discuss philosophy of knowledge
I can't understand why you would want to be a part of this forum.
Anyway, this is a place to talk about amoveo. Not a place to discuss philosophy of knowledge
SS
06:47
Spike Spiegel
"people are able to sell totally unsecure systems to the public" -- this is my claim
06:47
Augur and Aeternity both have higher mcap than VEO while being worse. How to explain it?
Z
06:48
Zack
In reply to this message
This claim is unrelated to amoveo, doesn't belong on this forum.
S
06:49
Sebsebzen
How about Zack posts on biz with a pic and timestamp haha
Z
06:49
Zack
In reply to this message
What does "worse" even mean?
At least you are talking about amoveo now. Keep it up.
At least you are talking about amoveo now. Keep it up.
SS
06:50
Spike Spiegel
extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence - if voting isn't working yet it's applied almost everywhere then what's going on? Why people are using unsecure systems? What VEO currently lacks to convince them to use VEO?
Z
06:54
Zack
In reply to this message
Voting works very well for making a decision.
But it doesn't necessarily make the right decision.
It tends to make whatever decision most benefits the rich and powerful.
Historically, communities that have been able to make a decision as a group out competed all the communities that could not.
So voting was an effective growth strategy for some cultures.
Futarchy makes the better decision, even if the rich and powerful disapprove.
But it doesn't necessarily make the right decision.
It tends to make whatever decision most benefits the rich and powerful.
Historically, communities that have been able to make a decision as a group out competed all the communities that could not.
So voting was an effective growth strategy for some cultures.
Futarchy makes the better decision, even if the rich and powerful disapprove.
06:55
Voting is great for coming to a decision, but it fails at making good decisions.
06:56
The math to show that voting fails is extraordinary evidence.
Mathematical evidence is as good as it gets.
Mathematical evidence is as good as it gets.
06:57
People use insecure voting systems because it is written into their law code.
06:58
What Veo lacks to convince people?
Most people can't understand math.
Statistical thinkers will believe in Veo after they have seen it have a long and consistent history of success.
And then the rest of the culture will follow within a generation or two.
Most people can't understand math.
Statistical thinkers will believe in Veo after they have seen it have a long and consistent history of success.
And then the rest of the culture will follow within a generation or two.
ES
07:18
Ed Sonic
Long after we have left the earth
Z
07:20
Zack
I doubt any self sustaining colony will exist before futarchy becomes mainstream.
Antarctica is probably more hospitable than the moon, and we are a long ways from finishing colonization of Antarctica.
Antarctica is probably more hospitable than the moon, and we are a long ways from finishing colonization of Antarctica.
07:22
Early movers of futarchy can start benefiting from better community decisions before the rest of humanity has realized. This gives us big advantages.
If we just live our best lives, the rest of humanity will come around on their own eventually.
If we just live our best lives, the rest of humanity will come around on their own eventually.
07:32
Jehan tremback had this idea of programming channels inside of channels.
He was calling them virtual channels.
If Alice and Bob have channels with hub Carol, then Alice and Bob could make a smart contract through carol. The smart contract is a virtual state channel.
So Alice and Bob can update how much money each of them has in that virtual channel bet without having to bother carol.
Alice and Bob could go offline together, and continue making trust free payments, and they never had to make an on-chain tx to enable this channel relationship.
He was calling them virtual channels.
If Alice and Bob have channels with hub Carol, then Alice and Bob could make a smart contract through carol. The smart contract is a virtual state channel.
So Alice and Bob can update how much money each of them has in that virtual channel bet without having to bother carol.
Alice and Bob could go offline together, and continue making trust free payments, and they never had to make an on-chain tx to enable this channel relationship.
07:33
Is this something people would actually want to do?
EA
08:21
Eric Arsenault
channels within channels within channels within channels
08:21
I have no idea
Z
09:11
Zack
There is this idea in ethereum that governance is preventing people from being able to say "can't" instead "wont" to regulator.
Andreas describes it in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6euy5W1js4
Futarchy doesn't have this limitation.
Futarchy means the blockchain can adapt to a changing environment, but it is also impossible for us to stop it from doing what is best for Amoveo, even if the vast majority of the community want it to.
Andreas describes it in this video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6euy5W1js4
Futarchy doesn't have this limitation.
Futarchy means the blockchain can adapt to a changing environment, but it is also impossible for us to stop it from doing what is best for Amoveo, even if the vast majority of the community want it to.
13:01
Deleted Account
Zack was there FPGA or ASIC like 'attacks' on the network that effected the distribution of this coin?
Z
13:01
Zack
i'm not sure what you are asking
13:02
Deleted Account
I heard this coin had FPGAs for a while
Z
13:02
Zack
you can not use an ASIC or FPGA to steal VEO.
13:02
Deleted Account
Mine*
Z
13:02
Zack
yeah, we have had FPGA mining for a while.
13:02
Deleted Account
Just don't care about that or is there an anti-asic stance?
Z
13:03
Zack
we have a pro ASIC stance.
13:03
Deleted Account
Ok cool
13:04
You worked on Augur?
Z
13:04
Zack
yes, I made their MVP before they used Ethereum
13:11
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/progress_reports/forking_concerns.md I made this document based on Paul Sztorc's concerns from our conversation here the other day.
I am trying to show that Amoveo's oracle wont die in thousands of forks like Paul said.
I am trying to show that Amoveo's oracle wont die in thousands of forks like Paul said.
13:41
Deleted Account
my take on Paul Sztorc's questions:
13:41
Resolving outcomes as True/False/Ambiguous is hard work. Who will do that work, and how will they be compensated?
13:50
He wasn't saying that forks are inevitable, he just couldn't figure out (nor can I) who is incentivized to police the oracle.
Tv
14:05
Tarrence van As
There is a clear incentive when the stakes are high. Those with winning bets are incentivized.
There is not a clear incentive when the stakes are low, which could happen in the case of an ambiguous Oracle. In that case there isn't an incentive to care how it resolves at all. So even if the Oracle resolves in a bad state, when the stakes are low it isn't detrimental to the network.
This can already be tested today. Create an ambigous Oracle, resolve it in a bad state, and see if you can force a fork...
There is not a clear incentive when the stakes are low, which could happen in the case of an ambiguous Oracle. In that case there isn't an incentive to care how it resolves at all. So even if the Oracle resolves in a bad state, when the stakes are low it isn't detrimental to the network.
This can already be tested today. Create an ambigous Oracle, resolve it in a bad state, and see if you can force a fork...
14:15
I think the expectation that all oracles always resolve correctly doesn't necessarily hold. Rather an oracle resolves correctly probabilistically based on its open interest
14:18
In Amoveo it is hard to assess open interest though
Deleted invited Deleted Account
S
16:05
Sy
If nobody cares then you are the only one betting on that oracle -> nothing happens much
16:06
If there is money involved it should always resolve in the correct state because of greed, you tell the community that an oracle is lieing and someone put like 2000 veo on the lie, free veo for everyone and im sure it will be matched
SP
17:19
Stepan Panov
so here's an interesting question and a chance to take the conversation out into a public domain - would anyone care to get involved? https://www.reddit.com/r/Amoveo/comments/b5pdtk/how_can_amoveo_users_shield_themselves_from_veo/
SP
17:55
Stepan Panov
Anyone knows the issue price of VEO?
S
18:00
Sy
issue?
18:00
first otc were around 10$ i think the first i know were roughly 40$ each
18:00
after that, 70-900 xD
SP
S
18:14
Sy
my old gamer brain always translates this to death match, bring it on! π
SP
20:03
Stepan Panov
A
Amoveo News 27.03.2019 20:03:09
Today, we are officially rebooting the Amoveo Medium blog with an article called 'Introducing Amoveo!'.
This blog will feature articles, explainers, community stories, updates, opinions, interviews and more. As always the case with Amoveo, every community member can contribute to the publication. If you have an article related to Amoveo that you would like featured, contact Amoveo Editor.
Don't forget to give the article a few claps and share it π
This blog will feature articles, explainers, community stories, updates, opinions, interviews and more. As always the case with Amoveo, every community member can contribute to the publication. If you have an article related to Amoveo that you would like featured, contact Amoveo Editor.
Don't forget to give the article a few claps and share it π
Z
20:05
Zack
In reply to this message
"Oracles are usually used in blockchain networks that facilitate prediction markets and/or d. In the case of Amoveo, there are two types of oracles"
RL
20:06
Ricky Love
Sticker
Not included, change data exporting settings to download.
π, 49.2 KB
SP
Z
20:09
Zack
Good job on the blog post Stepan
SP
20:12
Stepan Panov
ππ»
Z
20:22
Zack
In reply to this message
I felt like this was not his concern with amoveo.
We covered who reports to the Oracle and why.
His concerns were about forking.
I saved a copy of our conversation.
We covered who reports to the Oracle and why.
His concerns were about forking.
I saved a copy of our conversation.
N
20:48
NM$L
good job
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Deleted invited Deleted Account
M
23:30
Minieep21
23:30
Blockfolio posted :)
28 March 2019
Z
00:17
Zack
The blockfolio is set by Stepan. I don't have any control of what he writes, and I am not downloading the app to be able to see what he is writing there.
SP
00:19
Stepan Panov
I didn't realize the first signal was going to go out in Zack's name, my applogies. Zack should have access to the dashboard as well, as we both went through the onboarding process.
JS
Z
01:08
Zack
I tried setting up an account on blockfolio, but then they emailed me saying that they deleted the account entirely.
SP
01:10
Stepan Panov
Mine too
MF
01:12
Mr Flintstone
this has been quite the saga
SP
01:15
Stepan Panov
I was logged in to the signal dashboard under my name and sent out a signal, thinking it would go out under my name, but it went out under Zackβs. Iβve asked them to edit it, they refused, so I asked them to delete it all together, which they did but also disabled both our accounts.
S
01:15
Sy
Lol that was briefly
SP
01:16
Stepan Panov
So yeah that was short lived, sorry everyone.
S
01:20
Sy
Zack posted Something about being disapointed in signal but it was deleted already
SP
01:21
Stepan Panov
They have been weird in several aspects
Z
02:08
Zack
looks like blockfolio is working again
02:11
they had just shut it down temporarily until they could figure out what was going wrong.
AK
02:34
A K
Oh yeah!
SP
02:42
Stepan Panov
ππ»ππ»ππ»
JS
Gress invited Gress
Z
07:24
Zack
We have got to try out the p2p derivatives tool.
I will make some bet and post it here so anyone can accept. What should I bet on?
I will make some bet and post it here so anyone can accept. What should I bet on?
07:26
I guess I should sell some stablecoins
SS
07:28
Spike Spiegel
With 80% yield I would sell a kidney to buy VEO for stablecoisn
[
07:52
[Riki]
In reply to this message
πππππππππ u should add a veo tipping address
Z
07:52
Zack
I set up a USD stablecoin oracle for 1 month in the future
07:54
looks like it is around $30 to make a scalar oracle now. maybe we should make it cheaper.
Z
08:24
Zack
Here is the page to view and accept my proposal: http://139.59.144.76:8080/otc_listener.html
08:25
There is an offer so anyone can buy stablecoins from me
08:25
it is selling 5 veo worth of stablecoins.
08:25
at a price of $100 per veo.
08:25
no fee is paid in either direction.
08:30
https://www.investing.com/etfs/spdr-s-p-500-historical-data
Is this what you guys want to bet on?
Is this what you guys want to bet on?
$
10:22
$FX
In reply to this message
Can I get more details about the main chain?
Such as Consensus,
node list, etc
Such as Consensus,
node list, etc
MF
11:59
Mr Flintstone
idk where to start with this one
T
13:52
Topab
Podcasts, medium, etc talking about prediction markets but little about Amoveo. I do not care too much at this point and I think things will turn one day. Looking forward to that moment
Deleted invited Deleted Account
16:28
Deleted Account
Hello,
Please the CMO of this project should pm me for promotional offer.
Thanks.
Please the CMO of this project should pm me for promotional offer.
Thanks.
b
16:36
bitcoinsfacil - pedro
In reply to this message
Sticker
Not included, change data exporting settings to download.
π, 20.1 KB
SP
17:24
Stepan Panov
In reply to this message
Sticker
Not included, change data exporting settings to download.
π€, 12.7 KB
Z
N
Z
19:11
Zack
In reply to this message
chainlink aggregates many trusted feeds.
This results in a trusted oracle.
If a lot of money was being gambled on the outcome of a chainlink oracle, it is highly likely that the oracles will lie in order to steal money from the market.
It doesn't make sense to use a blockchain is you are going to trust random strangers to hold your money for you.
This results in a trusted oracle.
If a lot of money was being gambled on the outcome of a chainlink oracle, it is highly likely that the oracles will lie in order to steal money from the market.
It doesn't make sense to use a blockchain is you are going to trust random strangers to hold your money for you.
M
19:45
Marco
In reply to this message
do you really think oracles would act that way and risk that nobody will ever ask them again in the future?
I think it is possible but not highly likely
I think it is possible but not highly likely
Z
19:48
Zack
In reply to this message
yes. I expect everyone to be greedy.
You can use math to calculate the most greedy strategy. https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/01/28/p-epsilon-attack/
The cost of participating in the attack is shared, but the benefit of participating in the attack are privately earned by the person who attacks.
This causes tragedy of the commons.
You can use math to calculate the most greedy strategy. https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/01/28/p-epsilon-attack/
The cost of participating in the attack is shared, but the benefit of participating in the attack are privately earned by the person who attacks.
This causes tragedy of the commons.
19:48
This is a kind of retirement attack.
Where people build up reputation over a period of time, and then use their reputation to steal money.
Where people build up reputation over a period of time, and then use their reputation to steal money.
M
19:51
Marco
ok this seems reasonable. but what would be the best solution to rely on oracles? I mean if you argue that way it would never ever be safe to use an oracle to resolve payouts with big stakes right?
19:51
at least in a trustless environment
Z
19:55
Zack
Chainlink oracles are not trustless, that is exactly the problem.
You have to trust them to altruistically choose honestly over profits.
You have to trust them to altruistically choose honestly over profits.
19:55
Amoveo oracles are trustless. We reuse Nakamoto consensus for the oracle.
So you never have to trust anyone.
So you never have to trust anyone.
19:58
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/design/oracle.md
You can learn more about Amoveo's oracle here.
You can learn more about Amoveo's oracle here.
M
19:58
Marco
how exactly do the amoveo oracles work? who publishes the response to the chain? I have to trust this party or not?
as you describe it I would assume that I can define a query and I say that I need at least e.g. 10 parties that respond to the query and then amoveo builds consensus from these 10 responses. is that correct?
as you describe it I would assume that I can define a query and I say that I need at least e.g. 10 parties that respond to the query and then amoveo builds consensus from these 10 responses. is that correct?
Z
20:00
Zack
In reply to this message
Amoveo oracles rely on nakamoto consensus to determine the outcome.
Anyone can publish the response on-chain.
You do not trust anyone in Amoveo.
No, amoveo does not use any voting.
It is not possible to put limits on who can do oracle reporting, adding limits like that would break the protocol and make it trustful.
Anyone can publish the response on-chain.
You do not trust anyone in Amoveo.
No, amoveo does not use any voting.
It is not possible to put limits on who can do oracle reporting, adding limits like that would break the protocol and make it trustful.
M
20:01
Marco
In reply to this message
so if only 1 person/machine responds to the query I will always be cheated? I just wonder about what approach is the better one
Z
20:02
Zack
in the nash equilibrium, only 1 person needs to report per oracle.
This way we have as little on-chain txs as possible.
If that 1 person lies, then more people will be incentivized to show up and correct the lie.
if the 1 person is honest, then no one is incentivized to change it.
This way we have as little on-chain txs as possible.
If that 1 person lies, then more people will be incentivized to show up and correct the lie.
if the 1 person is honest, then no one is incentivized to change it.
20:03
did you read the documentation? https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo/blob/master/docs/design/oracle.md
M
20:03
Marco
I will have a more detailed look into the docs. thanks!
29 March 2019
Z
01:21
Zack
Im discussing an alternative oracle design with someone.
What if made the oracle even simpler.
Every mining pool has to look up the answers to oracle questions in order to mine valid blocks.
What if made the oracle even simpler.
Every mining pool has to look up the answers to oracle questions in order to mine valid blocks.
01:21
so we cut out the betting mechanism entirely.
S
01:21
Sy
doesnt sound simpler xD
Z
01:22
Zack
the idea is that, if we do it that way, then the mining pools could have software to automatically check API, so the answers to oracle questions could be included in the next block. instead of having to wait 2 weeks.
SS
01:22
Spike Spiegel
Great idea - so you can provide easy to use API that gives trustless data
M
01:36
Marco
In reply to this message
But this only works for public APIs that everybody is able to use right
Z
01:37
Zack
There is some shortest amount of time for us to actually make a fork
if it is faster than that, then we can't use nakamoto consensus
So I guess fast nakamoto oracles don't work.
if it is faster than that, then we can't use nakamoto consensus
So I guess fast nakamoto oracles don't work.
MF
01:40
Mr Flintstone
I still think the solution to fast and secure oracles in general is a market
Z
01:42
Zack
https://medium.com/@mykelp/introducing-polaris-ced195dd798e
So you think the polaris design is ideal for fast secure oracles?
So you think the polaris design is ideal for fast secure oracles?
MF
01:43
Mr Flintstone
but you need to get clever about proving what happened inside a channel market
01:43
the market you reference needs to be trust free