22:47
Ric
Awesome work Zack! Exciting times
Captain Haddock invited Captain Haddock
05:59
Zack
I added this button, and a dispute button, so that if you don't get paid, you can escalate the situation.
I still need to do some testing on the main net. and I want to make some small adjustments for security. Like, figuring out when we need to verify merkle proofs, to have cryptographic evidence that the contract is set up correctly.
14:40
Ric
What happens if you escalate? How is the dispute resolved?
14:40
(Probably been discussed here a lot already; point me at some if that’s better)
15:53
Zack
It makes an oracle question like: "did bitcoin address X receive more than 0.034 btc?"
15:54
Ric
Oh. Hah that’s really neat.
21:20
Zack
a more specific answer.
You sell your side of the contract to someone who is willing to go through the process of making the oracle.
21:33
Ric
Yeah makes sense. Neat and unified with the rest of Amoveo. How big is that community of builders, or how will it grow?
21:50
Zack
the current goal is to get a community of regular users
01:42
Zack
im doing some testing on the main net, and I ran into some small issues.
in order to release the veo or dispute the trade, you need to convert your subcurrency to the child contract first.
I should be able to do this in the same multi-tx.
02:01
Eric Arsenault
nice
02:02
do you think the features you are working on will work for ERC20 tokens as well?
02:07
Minieep21
Zack, you are insanely dedicated to making the world a better place, kudos to you
02:09
Zack
you can use the amoveo DEX to trade ERC20 from other blockchains yes. that is why the interface has a location to choose your blockchain as well as a location to choose your ticker.
03:31
Eric Arsenault
🔥 wow nice
03:31
any ideas about Monero?
03:32
Zack
We already confirmed that monero works. They have a way to prove that money was sent to an address.
03:32
The sender can prove that they sent.
03:36
Eric Arsenault
nice
03:36
I wonder what we should focus on first? BTC and wBTC <> VEO?
03:37
also, can these offers be categorized on the front-end so you can browse by currency type?
03:37
Zack
It isnt supported yet, but that is something we will need
03:38
Eric Arsenault
A lot of the cross-chain exchanges seem to constantly have MPC issues (as well as liquidity issues)
03:38
Zack
Stablecoins could be high priority too.
03:38
Eric Arsenault
feels like a big challenge will be liquidity
03:38
Zack
Mpc= multi party computation?
03:39
Eric Arsenault
yeah
03:39
Zack
Thorchain for example has triple liquidity inefficiency.
Money in the market.
Security deposit for the bridge.
Stake for consensus stakers.
Amoveo is like a normal swap. No extra liquidity needed.
03:39
How is that an issue?
03:40
Eric Arsenault
No extra liquidity needed, but ideally there is some deep liquidity so you can get in / out easily
03:40
Zack
Or quadruple liquidity inefficiency, if it uses an oracle too.
03:41
Eric Arsenault
bootstrapping order book liquidity is tough
06:51
Zack
oh, I had it wrong.
We don't need to convert to the new smart contract.
What we need is for participant 1 to make an offer to sell for 99% at the first step, simultaneous with their other offer.
So at the end, participant 2 can match that to unlock the veo.
06:52
now that I got this straight, im going to do another round of tests in the testnet, and bring it back to the main net when it seems like everything is ready.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
14:30
Eric Arsenault
@zack_amoveo what would be the steps for someone go from BTC to a stablecoin using the dex? Assuming we don’thace synthetics. Also what can we do to make it as quick as possible?
14:32
Could we somehow just have a BTC <> VEO swap combine with VEO <> DAI swap? I guess we would need enough liquidity so this is possible right?
14:32
Feels like liquidity will need to be incentivized once we know our go to market
16:22
Zack
Im thinking it would be more like one person would advertise their bitcoin->dai swap by posting lots of swap offers. This would require a safety deposit of like 10% the value of the bitcoin in veo.
Then someone else would match it by posting a bunch more swap offers and making a similar safety deposit in veo.
Then bots would use veo to accept lots of swap offers and post them to the chain.
The bots would temporarily hold the bitcoin and dai, but send them to their correct destination for a slightly larger value of veo.
16:25
So no one needs to leave veo in a market.
And the bots only use veo for the duration of time until the contract is finished.
Either until the currencies are delivered, or until they can sell their part of the contract to someone who is specialized in waiting for the oracle to resolve.
Tonya Codego invited Tonya Codego
18:20
Tonya Codego
hey people does anyone have an email of Amoveo
18:20
Zack
this is the place to talk about amoveo.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
03:59
Devender
What's the URL for veo explorer?
04:02
what data exactly do you want to see?
04:03
Devender
Genetic stuff like block time, pool, difficulty etc.
04:04
Looks like it's not updated
04:06
sy's explorer gives the most pool info. since it is the only mining pool
04:06
Devender
Thanks Zack
Gatis Eglitis invited Edgars Vecozolins, Davis Ziedins, your_advisor and_admin and Mark
13:44
Eric Arsenault
is there a way to make trading more silimar to traditional order book exchanges? For example: if I want to sell 1 BTC for VEO at a certain price, I just put my order, and any number of traders can fill my trade until it is fully complete?
13:45
the UX around making such a trade will probably dictate how easily something like this will be adopted
16:28
Zack
Someone needs to send the bitcoin to the recipient.
17:03
Josh
We need to make a wrapped bitcoin and then trade the wrapped bitcoin for veo.
17:15
Zack
You can use the dex to trade for wrapped bitcoin on ethereum.
We can make a synthetic bitcoin and trade that for veo using the limit orders or constant product markets.
I dont want to hold your bitcoin for you to make a wrapped product. Sounds like a legal nightmare.
17:17
If you are going to trust someone to hold your bitcoin for you, why not use a centralized market as well?
17:19
Trusting someone to hold your bitcoin, and then using a trustless exchange. It seems like that gives the negative aspects of centralized finance and the negative aspects of decentralized finance. And it doesnt give the benefits of either.
17:22
Josh
There would be an issuer who does monthly future contracts for bitcoin that are backed by an oracle. Then you can have another contract that's a perpetual future that rolls them over. This is basically wrapped btc.
17:23
Zack
I don't understand.
Are you talking about a perpetual stablecoin?
17:24
Josh
It's denominated in BTC so I don't call it a stablecoin, but basically the same thing.
17:26
Zack
we have plans to set up perpetual stablecoins yes
17:38
Josh
Once we have those, trading should be easier
23:00
Eric Arsenault
yeah, maybe that will be needed before we get adoption
23:01
UX might still be too far from what people are used to in the current state?
23:26
O K
Rule 5, no talking about UI
00:35
mr x
make binary bets about anything interaction free app still the most low hanging fruit ui wise imo
00:37
Zack
Yeah, thats a good one.
The new direction in the dex is nearly ready, and ill probably do that next.
Willams Ben invited Willams Ben
00:51
Willams Ben
hi i am listing partner dex trade exchange, i want to talk someone who's responsible for listing, can anyone tell me who's the right person to talk??
01:11
Zack
You dont need our permission to list your coin in the amoveo dex. It supports all currencies.
05:03
LOL. Describe how system is broken but in cool way so guess it's okay.
20:41
Zack
I wonder if it makes sense to have a non-fixed radix for the tree?
Since we update the root nodes a lot more frequently, making them smaller would mean generating proofs faster.
20:41
The root node could have 16 children, and the next is 32, then 64, then 128
20:54
Josh
Can the proofs be done in parallel? GPUs have tons of cores.
21:02
Zack
Yeah. But i think that doesnt help.
I think that the bottleneck is reading bytes from the hard drive.
Ill know better if i try implementing it.
21:03
Lots of servers can generate proofs for different users at the same time.
21:47
Josh
NVMM might fix that soon
23:11
Ilmu Somebody
As well as data oriented design, biggest reason for cache miss is often oop
00:22
Josh
Sorry, meant this:
00:22
Non volatile main memory
00:23
Is oop object oriented programming?
01:03
Zack
oh, a change in hardware. yeah, bottlenecks can shift from changes in hardware.
It is good to be able to adapt for that.
01:36
Josh
I think the future is going to be utilizing lots of GPU cores and maybe these NVMMs. Numbers of cores on GPUs could keep doubling for a while, while CPU speed won't.
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19:11
Ben
GPU'S are also maxed out
19:11
if you compare GPU from last generation to actual generation pretty much they just got bigger
19:13
they are now like double or triple the size they were before
19:13
Memory design and bandwith did not evolve either.
19:28
Josh
What do you mean by bigger? The next gen is supposed to have 8000 cores.
19:36
Ben
the actual physical size
🅰🅷🅼🅴🅳 🅺🅷🅰🅻🅸🅵🅰 invited 🅰🅷🅼🅴🅳 🅺🅷🅰🅻🅸🅵🅰
06:31
Zack
I got the user interface working for making an offer to sell veo, for the simple case where you release the bitcoin after receiving your bitcoin.
I need to test that out on main net, and also I want to test out canceling the trade offer on mainnet, and and disputing the trade on main net.
The way it worked out, I had to transform both of the subcurrencies to the child contract in order to withdraw them.
07:21
Eric Arsenault
Nice! 🔥
Vyacheslav Privolshskiy invited Vyacheslav Privolshskiy
08:53
Vyacheslav Privolshskiy
Is coin mine? Is F1 asic mine amoveo?
09:49
Zack
Bitcoin mining hardware does not work to mine amoveo.
17:42
Vyacheslav Privolshskiy
Is F2 fpga asic mine amoveo?
18:10
Zack
Maybe. Some fpga can mine veo. You can try asking in the mining channel in discord.
18:27
Minieep21
There's a few companies that are making them
18:27
I reached out ages ago but no one got back to me 😂
Муҳайё ❤️ invited Муҳайё ❤️
19:09
Vyacheslav Privolshskiy
I will want to buy F2 for mine amoveo
19:36
Zack
I got this one to run. the other one in python has dependencies I couldn't find.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
12:17
seems to be a very safe exchange for trading veo too
15:25
Ben
looks like that it is some source of signup scam
15:25
please remove the link
15:48
I have used it before
15:48
They seem to quite low veo volume though
17:57
Minieep21
wow
bitcoin.com listing VEO is pretty awesome
17:57
did someone submit?
18:00
Zack
I don't see it on their website.
Asya Meryem invited Asya Meryem
18:14
Minieep21
nono, they are linked. it's just hard to find the link to their own exchange for some reason
18:14
if you go to the
bitcoin.com sitemap, you can open their exchange there
18:15
it's so strange that no one would have reached out to you before
18:15
Do they even track for updates or is it a HitBTC scenario
18:17
Zack
Maybe I should make a special light node just for exchanges, so they don't have to worry about doing updates.
18:18
Minieep21
If it can help them sounds great!
19:30
Ben
i dont see where amoveo is listed on
bitcoin.com
19:30
when you follow the twitter link it try to lure you into sign up via referal
19:35
x
u need to log in to see
00:10
this link you dont need an acc
00:18
O K
Roger Ver is behind bitcoin . com and has a history as a bad actor in the bitcoin space. I would be careful
07:40
Zack
I realized we don't even need a "dispute trade" button. because you can make an offer to sell for 99% of the value before that point, and it simplifies everything.
07:44
the new interface is working pretty well now.
The only part im not confident about is when an advanced user is buying the winning shares and running an oracle.
They need to convert the shares from the parent contract to the child contract, and there is currently no way to do that from the light node. So I need to make some interface for that.
07:45
I think we also need some interface for making the oracle, and the contract explorer needs to be fixed to display these new kinds of contracts.
13:19
Ben
thnaks for the heads up. deposit works at least well
19:57
Zack
Where should I put the button to make the oracle for one of these buy veo contracts?
There is only one possible oracle per contract, so it is easy to check if that oracle was already created and only display the button if it is needed.
one option is to put it in the crosschain_swap2 tab. but I don't want to add unnecessary complexity for people who don't need it.
Maybe I should add another section to the contracts.html page.
01:19
x
disagree with that , about btc vs bch, i dont think btc core devs are more correct.
bitcoin.com listed a lot of coins , so this probably should not be interpreted as roger ver investing in this too, probably he isnt even aware of the project.
they choose to list horizen and amoveo together, both are good choices and that's a good sign.
01:20
Zack
they still haven't given any way to contact them about updates
01:56
Zack
im making some interfaces for the advanced users to be able to make oracles and settle the contract.
There are some cases I need to handle.
1) if the deposit address was not revealed in time, and one person owns both currency types, then we can end the contract and one of the parent type currencies wins. the child contract isn't created.
2) if the deposit address was revealed, and one person owns both currency types. we need a button to convert the 2 currency types into the child contract, and combine them back to veo.
3) if the address was revealed in time, and the oracle doesn't exist, you need a button for creating it.
4) if the address was revealed in time, and the oracle already exists, you need a link to be able to the oracle explorer.
5) if the oracle has already settled, and you own the winning shares, then you need a button to convert them to the child contract and then convert them to veo.
02:12
O K
Has nothing to do with "core devs" and rather his own behavior and language all of which is well documented.
I didn't say he had any idea about the listing, I said he is behind the website, which is also well documented.
You can choose to use them at your own risk.
22:47
Z
Hello all! What’s the best pool to mine VEO at the moment?
22:49
Ben
there is only one.
22:53
Z
Hoping to have 75gh/s running by this evening 🤞🏻
22:54
Zack
There is a mining channel in discord if you need advice
01:41
Z
(Also asked on discord)
With FPGA miner what should i use as address to mine?
http://veopool.pw:8880Or
stratum+tcp://stratum.veopool.pw:8086
Deleted invited Deleted Account
01:45
Zack
I didn't know there is a difference.
@Simon3456 runs the pool, he probably knows.
01:46
Deleted Account
A miner that digs VEO has a computing power of 51.24G/s. The following picture is the currency that can be dug and calculated. The price of a miner for 1399💲 needs to contact me.
01:50
Z
I have three, struggling to set them up to mine on the pool at the moment
01:52
Deleted Account
Do you need a miner?
01:52
Z
No i have already
01:52
I need help to set it up
06:33
Zack
I got cases (1), (2), (3) and (4) working.
we still need (5).
additionally, we need a tool so that if they failed to reveal their deposit address in time, then you can withdraw all the money in the contract.
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08:29
Zack
I got all the parts implemented.
I still need to test getting your money out after the oracle has resolved.
and I need to do the test where they ran out of time to reveal their address, and you own winning shares.
These tests involve waiting a few blocks, so they take longer and I left them for last.
09:04
Eric Arsenault
🔥 sweet!
09:04
Who’s going to test it with you?
Deleted invited Deleted Account
00:50
Vyacheslav Privolshskiy
Which is miner mining amoveo? Is F2 black miner?
00:50
Zack
Maybe try asking in the mining channel in discord.
02:11
Z
Hey Sy, thank you, got you already on discord, all good
18:10
Zack
I messed up somewhere, and now the buy veo contracts have invalid contract ids.
So i added a check to the server, it only accepts contracts with valid cids.
I added a check to the light node, it requires valid cids to download from the server.
Ill figure out what broke soon.
00:34
Someone independently discovered amoveo protocol
المسيح الدجّال (زيد) invited المسيح الدجّال (زيد)
Deleted invited Deleted Account
18:58
Zack
there were a couple small differences in how the 2 chalang compilers work. looks like it is working now.
19:19
Charles Maurice
so, the javascript light node chalang vm emulates the full node one, and 'passes' blockchain infos to the full node?
19:21
Zack
One goal is that we want to be able to use a contract_id to look up info about that contract from the p2p_derivative server.
The contract_id is based on the hash of the contract bytecode.
So we need the p2p_derivative server to generate identical contract bytecode as the light node does.
The way we are doing this currently is by having them both have identical compilers, and compiling the same contract.
19:23
Charles Maurice
thanks
bgbrthrs@Huobi CM | WILL NOT DM YOU FIRST invited bgbrthrs@Huobi CM | WILL NOT DM YOU FIRST
15:59
Z
Hey all, what’s the best way to sell VEO, qtrade?
16:00
I’d rather not sell but i need to recoup the investment in the mining machines :-/
16:43
x
qtrade.io probably has most volume now
22:35
Eric Arsenault
hopefully using Amoveo soon!
22:35
how are things coming along zack?
11:37
Toby Ganger
What’s our ETA on having a marketable product? 2027?
14:17
x
it already has blockchain and prediction market. it has a marketable product since 2018
21:04
Fića
Has no marketing tho
01:47
Z
The gift of ubiquity has not been bestowed on
@zack_amoveo quite yet, i’m sure any constructive advice would be taken into consideration 😉
03:20
Toby Ganger
i’m aware…i’ve been bagholding since then
05:44
Toby Ganger
I’m a professional VEO bag holder
05:45
it’s my purpose in life..it gives me meaning to carry around these giant (and for now) worthless bags…i’m just waiting for the magic pixie dust to be sprinkled all over it so we can finally take it to market so I can generously disperse my bags among the masses
tianyun dong invited tianyun dong
21:44
O K
If you double the size of your bags at the lower price, you won't have to wait as long
23:22
Ben
If you quadruple them…
18:58
Ilmu Somebody
Martingale system
00:59
Zack
yeah, that phrase works for amoveo too. the light wallet accepts any text.
11:07
Zack
yes. blocks can be processed in parallel. we have a plan to process txs in each block in parallel. our smart contract language is optimized to enable for this.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Лариса Ежова invited Лариса Ежова
07:47
Лариса Ежова
Hey, any admin here to talk about any potential growth/marketing strategies?
23:30
Z
Forgot the password to my VEO wallet on iphone.....
23:31
Any way to access the funds or are they lost?
23:34
Zack
Probably gone. Maybe ask the exantech devs who made that app.
23:40
Found the secret passphrase phew
15:59
Wu Peng
Why are there so few VEO exchanges
18:32
Zack
there isn't much trading volume yet, so we don't need many exchanges yet.
19:28
Z
Qtrade works fine, just got myself 0.012BTC thanks to VEO 🙏🏻 thank you Zack for this amazing project
I plan to HODL long term 50% and capitalise(need to repay the miners) the other 50%
20:23
Zack
I made a couple oracles on main net to do the final tests of the contract for buying veo.
22:39
Toby Ganger
Because no one is aware VEO exists. Superior tech and inferior marketing. This is partially frustrating and partially exciting. Enjoy the ride.
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06:04
Z
Can one make NFTs on VEO?
06:06
As in tradeable images / art
06:06
Zack
you can, yes.
I think the way to do this is by making a program that scans the amoveo blocks, and has some rules for assigning art to accounts.
06:06
so if you do a tx in the right format, it causes the NFT to change account.
06:08
Z
Would be cool to do a NFT / Art auction for charity in VEO
06:09
Zack
sounds good. Feel free to ask for advice here if you are going to be building something like this.
06:09
Z
Would it be possible to do Royalties? So that every time a piece is sold a % goes to the creator and a % goes to a charity pot?
06:10
Apologies... i know zero about programming.... also very little time, my skills are in business development (aviation)
06:11
I’d be happy to assist with what skills i have though
06:11
Zack
I think this is impossible to enforce for any blockchain?
Like, I could agree to sell it to someone, and we could have a smart contract on a other blockchain watching what happens with the NFT sale.
So it works out that I send 10% of the payment on the NFT blockchain, and 90% in the smart contract on the other blockchain.
That way I don't have to pay so much royalties.
Maybe if there is some restriction that NFTs can only be sold in auctions, then it could be possible to enforce something like that.
06:13
Z
The auction itself could be managed by you via a dedicated website or whatever, offchain
The NFT would be “minted” amd assigned to the auction winners
For the ROY i’m sure i read something about it but was a ERC something number
06:14
Zack
It is like how people will do a real estate transaction, and do part of the payment off the record in cash. so the official transaction price is lower, and they pay less tax
06:14
Z
Ah yes i get what you mean
06:15
Two could meet in a bar exchange a bar of gold and “trade” the nft for 0.1VEO
06:15
But still, that would be just a percentage, others would try to sell it via auction sites that are starting to become a thing
06:16
Zack
so then, what forces the auction site to do royalties?
Wouldn't people prefer to use auction sites that don't charge extra this way?
06:16
Z
Just thinking of ways to get VEO attention (i’m mining with some FPGA so.... )
06:17
For my understanding the ROY are based on the value of the trade... but really i know zero about programming so apologies if stupid question
06:17
Zack
Well, the DEX is probably operational
06:18
It is certainly a lot nearer to completion in comparison to starting on an NFT project
06:18
Z
Can i help in any way with that?
06:19
Zack
have you tried using the DEX to make offers to sell veo?
That direction of the DEX is live
06:19
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
This has been "solved" by some eth collectables by using harberger taxes iirc
06:20
Zack
I would be interested if you have any ideas on how it could be improved
06:22
wouldn't that only give the value to the collection of people who own the currency that the harberger tax is priced in?
If you gave proceeds from harberger tax of some nft to all the previous owners of that nft, then you are paying people to sell that nft to themselves repeatedly.
06:23
Z
Not all previous owners, only the original creator
06:23
Zack
oh right, that makes sense
06:24
I think to enforce this, there needs to be an on-chain auction. so that the blockchain knows the price and sends it to the original owner.
harberger tax is a kind of big continuous auction optimized for non fungible assets.
06:27
so this program that needs to be written. it is scanning amoveo transactions in amoveo blocks, and calculating who owns which nft.
So it looks at amoveo txs, and interprets them for people making harberger tax payments, or purchasing nfts from existing owners.
For a tx to be a valid harberger payment, that tx needs to be a payment to the original creator of that NFT, from the current owner of the NFT.
For a tx to be a valid purchase of an NFT, it needs to be a payment to the current owner of the NFT.
06:52
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Good point wrt paying to past owners, but I think the way this tax works is that it isn't burnt but is paid to the creator
Deleted invited Deleted Account
15:25
Deleted Account
Hi Admin! Whom should i contact about listing proposal or Marketing proposal?
17:50
Ben
nobody, just move on
12:25
Crypt Dweller
Zack, you missed the timing to pump the coin. As I said 8 months ago, your window was quite limited. Not that you ever would do that.
12:26
I am not sure how you will sustain yourself as dev if the tide goes out. VEO may go to $5 and not reach $100 again until 2024, on top of potential political instability and deflationary collapse of the real economy.
12:28
If I were you I would consider joining a more sophisticated network than trying to singlehandedly create the infrastructure of the future of commerce and derivatives trading. Have you considered whether your inability to draw users may be a result of hubris?
12:29
Not saying that to denigrate your dedication and intelligence, just an honest question whether your approach was flawed from the beginning.
12:30
Anyways, good luck. Still gonna hodl my VEO til the bitter end after I sold everything else.
12:33
Your skills would be indispensable to the right team but I think you may lack the basically omnipotent mind of a true genius to pull off what you set out to do.
Meenakshi Gangadharan invited Meenakshi Gangadharan
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15:01
Charles Maurice
I don't agree. I've been sitting in my pants well over 20 years now watching individuals make significant contributions to decentralization, and think that it is still possible even in this crypto evo for an individual with domain expertise to do so.
15:02
The trouble for the moment is that the devs who could provide meaningful assistance can't be directed here for love nor money.
15:04
But what I'm wondering right now is... when/how/what might it look like for it to be possible to enter a billion wants (say 20 shopping items of 50m people over the next year e.g. product, quantity, dimensions, weight, location, date), and have, say, a manufacturer to scan that for, say, 'aspirin' ?
17:50
Zack
I got the buy veo contracts working.
So now the DEX works in both directions. you can sell veo for other cryptocurrencies, and you can sell other cryptocurrencies for veo.
21:25
Josh
Anybody want to try it?
21:25
wts 5 @ 0.018 VEO/ETH
Александр Нескажу joined group by link from Group
02:44
Eric Arsenault
🎉 nice job Zack!
Fedrick Kleger invited Fedrick Kleger
Khizer Hayat invited Khizer Hayat
Deleted invited Deleted Account
17:16
Zack
25 pages of miniscule text without any table of contents. I wonder what their goal was in writing this?
17:37
Zack
the abstract says they only consider voting based oracles and reputation based oracles. Neither type can be secure.
CryptoDev invited CryptoDev
18:24
CryptoDev
I am a Full Stack/Blockchain Developer with 5+ years of experience.
I am very familiar with Blockchain Stacks (Solidity Smart Contract, DeFi, Web3 DApp, NFT marketplace, React, Vue).
I am looking for new development opportunity now.
Thank you!
20:52
Zack
Any suggestions on how to improve this before I put it on twitter?
21:07
Zack
the next 3 contracts:
* A simpler binary bet interface that doesn't create any AMM.
* collateralized loans.
* DEX where you go from altcoin to altcoin, instead of needing VEO on one side of the trade.
21:37
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
What do you think of the benefits/trade offs of capital-pool/amm based lending protocols as compared to p2p ones as described in the above document?
I presume for example that the inability to carry out automatic liquidations and the ability for borrowers to recollateralise their position would be limitations of the described design?
I must say though that I found the above document to be very insightful in how it distinguishes the utility of lending protocols from derivatives, it crystalized some thoughts I had been having on the topic recently 👍
21:38
Also it may be worth mentioning arbitrage as another important application of collateralized lending markets
21:40
Zack
Ill need to look into amm lending. I havent heard of it before.
21:41
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
E.g compound/aave. Maybe it is not often referred to that way?
23:23
Josh
Would you be able to trade different chains with the actual coins? This is what thorchain was doing and they were getting a lot of market share until they got hacked.
23:30
Zack
Yes. It is already possible in 2 steps.
Making it one step will make the user interface simpler.
00:40
Z
A nice noob friendly GUI for all things would help a lot, as in 5 year old proof
01:03
Eric Arsenault
I’ve heard it referred to as peer to pool
01:28
Z
Not sure how to articulate it but the way it presents puts me off a bit
Not immediately clear to me how it works, if i can use any wallet to receive/send, the costs involved
01:28
I guess a very simple solution could be a few video tutorials
01:32
Nowadays 90% or more of people are so used to “apps” layout, point and click buttons, hover for explanation....
Maybe one page for betting, one for swapping (can’t you make it look like uniswap/pancake/etc ?)
A big untapped market is betting, need to have an indepth video tutorial that covers all bases
Show that one can put a bet up on a football game, how it would happen step by step
The info for a complete noob on how to set it all up nicely packed in one place
02:07
O K
There is only one person in the community who thinks the current layout is intuitive
02:13
Z
Well... it’s not that it really isn’t if you take time to explore it,
it’s just that people who aren’t programmers and use windows clicking around aren’t going to get “turned on” by the current layout
02:15
If people use a DEX today they expect a specific layout, any variance from that “standard” will scare them
02:25
Zack
Now that it is working, moving the buttons around is easy.
Amoveos dex is differently designed than existing solutions, so we probably cant make it 100% identical.
02:51
Z
Doesn’t need to be identical, just very intuitive to use
Have it’s own dedicated page, big buttons you can’t miss
a little ? Icon you can hover your mouse over with cues
Instructions for what is needed (for example i use the iphone wallet app, would it work with that without me having to send the secret passphrase over a webpage?)
02:51
Zack
I didnt write the iphone app.
02:52
Its own page.
? Buttons.
These are good ideas
02:55
Z
Still, if i am to use the functions i need to land on it, learn very quickly what to do and feel safe about doing it
The graphics, the GUI, need to be “oh ok, this looks legit”, not only to a programmer who understands what’s going on under the hood but also to normal joe like me
03:01
The walkthrough for each page/function being it betting or dex need to assume the person looking at it knows zero about everything
How to get VEO (buy/farm etc)
How to hold VEO (wallet, compatibility with phone etc)
How to use it in the most simple terms a kid can understand (and in depth for who has the technical knowledge on another page maybe)
If one could see that they log on, go to bet page, wager that X football team will beat Y or this or that fighter wins an MMA match in very easy to learn/use steps it would be amazing
The “open” bets need to be displayed each with it”s own box and sorted via different criteria or searched
CK-CHRIS.12 invited CK-CHRIS.12
03:54
CK-CHRIS.12
Hey, any admins I could talk to for potential influencers/growth marketing on this project?
04:14
Z
Also, as soon a the dex and bet pages are nice and shiny and user friendly, nice onboarding process for newcomers and all.....
Regular updates on media channels, Reddit, Twitter especially, at least once a week, just even for any newcomers that do research on VEO to see the project is alive
08:15
Zack
I think automatic liquidations is doable in Amoveo.
Lets say you can win 1 veo if they get liquidated, and the price moved enough for them to get liquidated.
You should have an open offer to sell your side of the contract for 0.995 veo.
So someone else can buy your side for 0.995, and then call the liquidation contract.
What is more difficult is that you want to automatically renew the contract.
So after the liquidation occurs, and you have your 0.995 veo, you want to loan it out again and keep earning interest.
13:27
Eric Arsenault
I feel like this would be easy to manipulate for an illiquid market like veo
13:29
In this order? Curious to know why these three? What about just pushing the DEX and trying to get some adoption?
13:30
Loans sound interesting though
13:30
Ben
could not agree more
13:30
we need to get it moving
14:57
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah this is a problem if the cost to manipulate the price of the collateral is very low, as then one can do so, take out a loan against their artificially highly valued collateral, and then not pay it back
14:57
So basically it becomes very capital inefficient as overcollateralisation ratios would need to be very high
14:57
Depending on the cost of price manipulation (specifically in the upwards direction)
15:01
But if course the more veo is adopted the less of a problem this becomes
15:01
It is always a chicken and egg problem
15:10
I presume the way #3 would work is that you would have individuals specialising in acting as liquidity providers and who are willing to directly trade any altcoin for any other altcoin with any other party but are bonded with veo collateral using amoveo oracles?
15:14
I should have mentioned it earlier, and I apologize in advance for not doing so if you find it to be a valid criticism, but I think I have a pretty decisive criticism of the idea of decentralized altcoin exchanges between individuals (as opposed to those on say ethereum which can be used by smart contracts and which I think have some value due to the determinism which they bring)
15:14
I could definitely be wrong
15:15
But it is basically that there generally isn't much risk of using a centralised "ephemeral" (shapeshift-esque) altcoin to altcoin exchange
15:15
Due to them at any one point in time not being very profitable to "rug pull" for their owners
15:16
This is as opposed to exchanges like binance where the stock/flow ratio is much higher
15:16
And I also don't think the regulatory risk is an argument for decentralized alt to alt exchanges either, as it only impacts the users using the exchange at the exact point in time where the state cracks down on it
15:17
So it is extremely low risk for the average user
15:17
Even if they are outlawed by the us without enforcing kyc, I think regulatory arbitrage will always result in reputable ones being online, as they don't need to interface with the us-dollar payment network, so can't be easily censored by the us govt
15:20
This criticism doesn't apply to any decentralized finance platforms that require long term custody of funds, as they are honey pots for regulatory (state), hacker and owner theft.
15:21
It only applies to platforms where the custody over funds is ephemeral/short term
15:24
Would #1 be just between two parties?
15:24
Like an AC type design
15:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm I suppose an issue might be that the barrier to being a liquidator here is relatively high insofar as that they would need to also hedge against the price of the collateral, which may have significant capital lock up costs
15:40
And depending on the oracle delay would mean that they are limited in their capacity to carry out liquidations compared to say liquidators or maker CDPs
15:41
Who don't need any capital nor have any capital lockup costs as their liquidation tx is verified against an oracle price with "fast finality",
15:41
So is there a trade off between fast oracle price finality and capital lockup and hedging costs of liquidators here?
15:42
This is actually something I was thinking of a few months ago and meant to ask you about
15:42
I.e whether this is a case where there is at least some "benefit" in using fast finality oracles
15:43
Not that it necessarily makes them worth their other costs and incentive incompatibilities ofc
15:48
If the average period between liquidations for example is smaller than the oracle settlement period, then a lender may actually make a loss on average as the liquidation compensation fee is actually higher than the interest they earn
15:50
Another feature that would be useful would be the ability to sell your debt obligation to another lender, like the way banks sell CDOs
15:50
This increases the liquidity therefore decreases the cost of lending and allows for lower interest rates for borrowers
15:52
I think covenants could potentially solve the problem of automatic renewal
15:58
This would be especially useful if they could be made fungible, for improved liquidity, which would likely work better though with peer to pool rather than p2p
16:45
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
@zack_amoveo Actually nvm I think I realized the error in this argument
16:47
It is that the liquidation settlement period can be arbitrarily short if the borrower agrees that it should have happened
16:47
Do they have an incentive to agree quickly though?
16:50
I guess unless they are bribed by the arbitrators, then they don't
16:51
But what if they demand that the arbitrators pay them the entire potential cost of interest/hedging for the full lockup period? I wonder what the equilibrium bribe amt here will be
17:24
Zack
The order book can last a long time and have a lot of open orders.
17:25
Yeah. Our interface now defaults to creating an AMM, but that isnt always needed.
17:25
I dont know what is AC.
17:29
The liquidator never touches collateral.
They pay .995 veo now for 1 veo when the oracle resolves.
17:32
I dont think so. As long as there are veo holders who are willing to be paid a small amount to lock up some veo for a week, then it works the same as a fast oracle. The major difference being that amoveos oracle is secure.
17:33
I think there is no significant benefit.
17:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Assassination contract ;)
17:42
Hmm interesting yeah I suppose it depends on the extent to which people value the benefit of being able to make limit orders over the ux downsides of decentralized order matching and exchanging... Or in other words the extent to which the ux benefits of something like
sideshift.ai (or similar platforms which support more coins) outweigh the benefit of being able to place limit orders 👍
17:45
Zack
Liquidations are supposed to be infrequent. So the borrower can lock up a little extra to cover the potential cost of the liquidator. Knowing there is a >95% chance that they get that money back at the end.
17:46
The debt obligation is a subcurrency. You can send it like any other. You can even make contracts in it.
The problem is that you cant chop it up. Either the obligation is filled or unfilled for all that currency.
17:47
Zack
Maybe we can split the contract up into several smaller ones
17:47
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I was referring to the .995 veo as the collateral
17:47
Zack
Yes. Makes sense.
17:48
Idk what a covenant is.
What i cant solve is, it seems like you need to know the price of the 2 coins every time you make an offer.
17:49
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah that is a good point... Hmm. So the liquidator/arbitrager fee is just the interest cost I suppose then for the duration of the settlement period
17:50
Zack
Making them fungible is cheaper. So we publish fewer contracts and reuse them.
17:50
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah definitely not on net, I 100% agree due to the incentive incompatibility. The only small benefit I can see is the interest cost, which we have discussed before and is very small for any reasonable settlement period
17:51
Zack
As long as slow enforcement is possible, it seems like the most they could possibly demand is what slow enforcement would result in, plus interest on the other party's money
17:52
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I suppose that isn't very different from the % of CDPs that are liquidated on other platforms like maker and compound, so is probably a reasonable estimate. So therefore making liquidation costs pretty negligible relative to the interest earned by the lender.
17:53
Zack
You can sell your position to someone willing to wait longer
17:55
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah... I guess fungibility is enough for liquid markets even if it isn't arbitrarily divisible.
Kind of like gold bars, except where you can verify that it is real gold and not fake very cheaply.
17:55
Zack
The decentralized ux is constantly improving. But centralized tools do not get more secure.
17:56
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah the interest component is all I was referring to.
17:56
Only at a greater interest cost though
18:00
I don't think though that security is a practical concern for users of sideshift/shapeshift due to the aforementioned reasons, so it is a question of if the ux benefits of ephemeral CEXs become subjectively less valuable to users than the ability to place limit orders and any slippage savings that may bring takers. I presume this would, as you mentioned, occur via improvements over time in the ux of dexes
18:03
So it doesn't solve the problem... As in if the dispute period is three weeks after which the oracle automatically resolves in favour of the liquidator then it seems the interest cost will never be much lower than three weeks worth of interest
18:04
As the borrower can't be expected to act charitably against his own interest, by settling early
18:05
Zack
cex have their own ux issues. they get taken down.
18:05
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Agreed, but if they are ephemeral then the timeframe in which this is an issue for users is a negligible % of the total period over which they exist
18:06
And it only affects users using them at that point in time
18:06
So it is almost a non issue
18:07
Zack
I don't understand what you are trying to say here.
18:07
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
This is why I distinguish between non ephemeral and ephemeral CEXs, as I think non ephemeral ones such as binance definitely suffer from take down ux costs
18:07
Zack
Websites lose a lot of users when they go down. People look at alternatives.
18:08
Legal uncertainty can lock out countries for months
18:08
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I was trying to see whether the borrower can be expected to settle early with the liquidator to save the liquidator the cost of waiting until the settlement period.
18:09
But it seems that that won't happen and that the liquidator will generally have to pay the interest cost either to the borrower or simply have to incur it by holding onto the coins
18:09
What do you mean by this?
18:09
Zack
the liquidator can offer to sell at 0.996, and after some time, raise the price to 0.9965
etc.
making offers that don't get accepted, it is free.
18:10
aren't there some places where these tools are blocked?
18:11
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
But can the liquidator expect the borrower to accept any offer in equilibrium besides one where the borrower is paid the full extent of any remaining interest costs that that the liquidator would otherwise have had to incur by waiting until automatic settlement?
18:12
Well all of this is designed to be black market technology
18:12
There is no reason to expect regulators to be any nicer to dexes than cexes
18:12
It is possible to evade bans on both
18:17
Zack
the borrowers side can have a little extra money that goes to the borrower, even if a liquidation occurs.
but this little extra is shrinking over time. So the borrower has an incentive to end the contract sooner and not lose it.
The rate at which this money moves is related to the interest rate of the money on the other side of the contract.
18:21
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
That makes sense, but what I am saying is that if the borrower say accepted the offer immediately, wouldn't the amount they are paid be about equal to the interest cost that the liquidator would have otherwise had to incur?
I guess it depends on the bargaining power of each party?? How can one reason about this
18:21
Do you know what I mean?
18:22
Like it may be anywhere between $0 and the full value of the interest cost that the liquidator would have otherwise incurred
18:22
Zack
If one side of the channel has >90% of the value and wants to end early, then the side with <10% should be paying interest to the side with 90%.
If it isn't supposed to end with one side controlling nearly everything, then don't do this interest payment system.
18:24
If you both lose the same amount of value by waiting, then you can't hold each other hostage
18:24
oh, it is like a game of chicken. you can hold each other hostage
18:26
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah basically
18:26
That was what I was getting at
18:26
Zack
well, you can always just sell your side of the contract to someone who is already holding veo anyway, and is willing to take any amount of interest
18:27
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
But they could be lending it out instead
18:27
Zack
how would you lend veo?
18:28
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I mean I suppose in the future it will be possible
18:28
It can't be assumed not to be, it is quite inevitable if veo succeeds imo
18:29
Like you can lend ethereum out
18:29
If someone created a lending platform like the one we have been discussing, but on another blockchain using a different collateral asset
18:29
Then you can lend out veo that way at the very least
18:30
Zack
What is the equilibrium of these strategies? What percentage of the time are people expected to refuse to unlock the contract early?
18:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I have no idea how to read about such things
18:31
Have you written about such similar situations before in other contexts?
18:32
Zack
we can make a nash chart at least
_____ Cooperate Betray
C___ 0/0 _______ -10/10
B___ 10/-10 _____ -10/-10
18:34
Maybe it has a solution like, people are going to cooperate 2/3rds of the time.
Where as long as everyone else is using the 2/3rds strategy, you are most profitable by using it as well.
18:34
Maybe it is just a matter of empirical observation?
18:35
Zack
it isn't a repeated game, so it shouldn't be too tough to solve
18:35
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I suppose so
18:37
I think you are significantly more skilled at reasoning about such things than I am
18:38
I haven't really ever formally employed Nash charts in my reasoning, I mainly just use reasoning without them although I have found them useful and understand them when you employ them in your github wiki explanations
18:40
Zack
Looks like the best strategy is 100% betray
18:41
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
As in both parties lose out?
18:41
Zack
_ Cooperate Betray
C___ 0/0 ___ -1/1
B___ 1/-1 _ -1/-1
Assuming your partner has p probability to cooperate.
profit_cooperate = (1-p)*(-1) = p-1
profit_betray = p - (1-p) = 2p - 1
18:41
yeah, it seems like they would wait for the expiration every time. never end early
18:42
But if that is the case, they should both be very willing to sell to a third party for slightly above what they will get from playing this game.
So a third party could buy both sides and end it early?
18:43
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I think that pushes the problem back
18:43
To what price the 3rd party pays
18:44
Zack
lets say both sides of the contract are available as sell offers.
I can make a single tx that either buys both sides of the contract, or neither.
18:45
oh, I think I made a mistake
18:45
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I was thinking the same
18:45
I don't get the calculations there ...
18:45
Or maybe I am misunderstanding them
18:47
Zack
I fixed it. I had dropped a 2p. now it makes more sense.
18:48
the idea is that my partner has p odds of cooperating, and I need to decide the relative profit of cooperating vs betrayal.
18:49
but it looks like for any value of p>0, I am better off always betraying
18:54
There is bound to be someone in the system for whom the cost of holding VEO is slightly less than the cost for the pair of people in this contract.
It seems like they should be willing to both sell to him.
18:55
both sides are getting the maximum amount they could get for holding the contract hostage, and this other person is profiting slightly as well.
18:56
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
If the borrower cooperates and the liquidator cooperate, the borrower's return is the same as if he cooperated and the liquidator betrayed, but this isn't reflected in the chart. Or am I missing something?
18:57
Zack
the borrower can lock up a little extra money in the contract to make the situation symmetrical.
This extra money slowly moves to the liquidators side of the contract, so the borrower is incentivized to end sooner instead of later.
19:00
Does the liquidator receive this money if it isn't claimed by the borrower?
19:01
Zack
yeah.
the liquidator is losing according to the interest rate. so the borrower can pay 1/2 this interest rate to make it symmetrical.
19:08
If we do manage to split the cost 50-50, then the borrower can freeze the money and make a maximum demand, and it doesnt cost the liquidator any different to either wait for the oracle, or give in to the demands.
19:09
And since it is symmetrical, i think it works both ways.
19:09
So if we estimate the interest rate a little wrong, one of the parties loses a tiny amount of value.
19:10
If the interest rate estimate is good enough, they can just always give in to demands and not care.
19:10
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Doesn't that just push the problem back to agreeing on the interest rate? ;)
19:10
Zack
They agree to that when they first make the contract. Before they know if a liquidation will occur.
19:10
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah interesting
19:11
Hmm yeah I must be getting tired now
19:14
Couldn't they still blackmail each other?
19:14
And try to eat in to the other's share?
19:16
Zack
yeah, they could.
19:17
maybe it should be a 3-way contract. and have a third party who is like, the burnt funds. maybe even use a burner address for them.
19:18
maybe burning doesn't help either. It just raises the stakes
19:20
oh, I see.
You burn some of the veo to cancel out the cost of interest.
So waiting a little extra time to close the contract, it means more veo is available to you to compensate you for having waited longer.
19:21
so neither party gains or loses from ending the contract earlier or later.
And it would be deflationary pressure on the price of veo.
19:24
it is like you are playing a game of chicken, where the 2 cars are driving at each other. but you set up your car to self destruct moments after a collision could occur.
So avoiding the collision will not protect you or your car, and you have no incentive to avoid the collision.
19:46
Zack
This solves the problem of holding the money hostage.
But it means there is no incentive to end the contract early without an oracle and running the contract on-chain.
So it is removing the disincentive against some spam.
19:49
Another issue is if an attacker starts making micro-bribes to encourage spam.
If it is free for certain people to make spam, then the cost to bribe them to do that will be very low.
19:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
It reminds me of police shooting people who are threatening committing suicide ;) I think it solves a problem that was only useful to solve due to it reducing total costs for the liquidator and therefore for the lender, but it has solved it at the expense of increasing costs for all parties except other veo holders (although veo will become less useful due to oracles becoming more expensive). Or am I missing something? ;)
20:01
Zack
if veo is regularly being destroyed, it lowers the interest rate you need to pay for someone to hold veo. Deleting veo is a lot more efficient than letting an attacker take it.
20:03
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm I actually think I might be misunderstanding your proposal slightly. Unfortunately I have to go to sleep though now 👍 It has been interesting, as always, discussing this with you though.
20:08
Zack
I think deleting veo doesn't help, because the burner account that holds deleted veo, they can't combine their side of the contract with the other 2 sides. so there is no way to get the money out early.
20:09
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Also btw just before I go, I wanted to note that I think the interest rates that would be necessary to be paid to liquidators would not just be the risk free rate of interest but would also include compensation for the fact that the lender can no longer easily sell their veo during the lockup period, so suffers from extra liquidity costs (a lender can't rule out the possibility of them wanting to sell their veo over the lockup period for something). This will especially become important as a greater % of all veo is locked up in such liquidation lock up periods, as increasingly less dedicated hodlers will be lending their veo out and requiring increasingly higher compensation for the lost liquidity.
20:10
Zack
I thought that was the definition of risk free interest
20:12
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm I am not sure what the definition is, but I suppose it doesn't matter as long as we understand what each other mean. I have like 30 econ papers on my reading list arguing for various definitions and theories of interest... It is not very clear cut it seems.
20:15
Zack
It seems like this game is a kind of prisoner's dilemma.
The usual solution is to impose some external cost to players who do betrayals.
Maybe some kind of reputation system.
20:20
Maybe the analysis of the game isn't right.
Like, I could make an offer to end the contract at the current price, and once I have signed this offer, it is clear that I am not doing the betrayal strategy.
I can then go offline, so my partner either has the option of splitting the cost of the oracle with me, or else I am making the oracle.
Really there are 3 strategies.
1) fair split, no compromise.
2) holding money hostage.
3) giving in to ransom demands.
20:26
There are 3 strategies.
1) fair split, no compromise. Fair
2) holding money hostage. Demands
3) giving in to ransom demands. Folding
_______ Fair Demands Folding
Fair 0/0 -1/-1 0/0
Demands -1/-1 -1/-1 1/-1
Folding 0/0 -1/1 0/0
It looks like fair is no less profitable than folding.
So we can expect folding to be 0.
So everyone will either be Fair or Demands.
In that case, fair is the better strategy. Every row is either equal or better.
So it looks like the nash equilibrium is the fair strategy.
20:27
so that means the oracles wont need to be put on-chain, except very rarely.
20:28
the nash equilibrium is that they stay off-chain.
23:42
Zack
I think there is still a problem. If Fold and Fair have nearly identical payout, couldnt a small bribe tip us into Fold?
00:12
Zack
How about if there is one person who specializes in having a reputation for never folding. They always play the fair strategy.
So everyone could sell their winning shares to this person, and they can withdraw easy because everyone knows that making demands doesnt work with them.
00:34
Zack
ok, I fixed the doc.
01:50
Zack
Oh, this has a big implication.
In a generalized state channel, you cant sell your side of the contract to a 3rd party, because they dont know if you signed any other secret commitments in that channel.
So this means, the generalized state channel, this solution doesnt work. You really need to make the oracle and do enforcement on-chain.
Maybe this means state channels do not work for privacy.
01:52
Or at least they dont work for privacy is the 2 participants in the channel have no reputation together.
If you are going to make another channel later with the same counterparty, it could work.
03:12
Z
Forgive me all but aren’t you talking way too conplicated projects for “normal joe” when you have an AMAZING product already working (betting) that needs just a nice GUI and a few videos / social media interaction?
04:42
Z
Why not use the DEX contract VEO provides?
szabo gergo invited szabo gergo
06:15
Zack
Knowing whether we can resolve these contracts cooperatively without always invoking the oracle, it is important for betting, and for how the GUI is configured to enable betting.
06:51
Zack
As a fun twist on assassination contracts, how about prank contracts?
Where we pay people to do funny public things.
07:16
Eric Arsenault
seems like a distraction to me
07:48
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Maybe it could be used for decentralized contract enforcement
07:48
Like you can hire private law enforcement to go and enforce a contract that someone broke with you
07:58
Or maybe they could be hired on behalf of a victim of a contract violation by a dao who specializes in contract enforcement (like a court dao)
07:59
Because then the court would have extra funds to spend on the hiring of the enforcement agents
07:59
Since they could have subscribers who pay them a fee and are therefore insured against any contract violations
08:01
It also is much more efficient to have a dao manage this as if the dao succeeds in deterring contract enforcement and has good systems in place for effectively doing so, then they won't need to spend much on actually hiring security
08:02
Since people will not violate contracts that are enforced by them
08:02
I suppose it is questionable though whether this is compatible with pseudonymous crypto networks though
08:03
As it is quite difficult to gain physical access to someone who you only have minimal information about the whereabouts of
08:05
Zack
An AI government inside the blockchain. That could be an improvement.
08:05
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And if contract enforcement requires that both parties share their identity with each other then it kind of defeats the purpose of crypto as a state can use that information against them
08:05
Well it could just be a standard corporate structure, just decentralized
08:06
Zack
Blockchain bounty hunters. Like a sci fi wild west.
08:06
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
The problem though is that there seems to be an inherent incompatibility between anonymity which is required to prevent states from attacking crypto users, and physical contact enforcement which requires the physical identity of both parties to the contract to be know.
08:07
Are there any solutions to this?
08:08
Zack
Maybe we as a species can find ways to cooperate, without needing the ability to enact physical violence on each other.
Security deposits for example.
08:08
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I have thought about this
08:08
It obviously can work to an extent
08:09
But it is relatively inefficient (in some ways)
08:09
Ofc it may still be the best way to do contract enforcement
08:09
But it limits the potential maximum liability of any individual to the amount they are willing to bond
08:10
Zack
Kind of like an llc
08:11
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah except llcs also have reputation
08:11
as in their owners do
08:11
and it is persistent
08:12
so therefore it is much more expensive to harm ones reputation
08:14
And also I suppose that llcs have the benefit of their owners being able to bootstrap themselves via using full liability contracts initially until the llc accrues enough capital
08:15
I hadn't really considered llcs though in relation to this though, it is an interesting point
08:17
(Note that this is not the case with decentralised reputation)
08:17
if your decentralised reputation ever goes below "0" (whatever that may be) you can start afresh
08:18
0=the reputation you start off with when you create a new identity
08:18
Zack
What if you do a proof of burn along with your new identity?
08:19
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
It is symmetric to harming malicious and innocent new entrants
08:19
but yeah you can do that, and then 0 just becomes a bit below the reputation you start off with
08:19
if you know what I mean
08:21
I am using "0" here to refer to the reputation "score" where you are indifferent to keeping your current reputation to starting a new one
08:21
Zack
There are billions of humans. Ignoring each one when they scam you doesnt scale to that size.
The cost of a new human offering their scam to you is zero.
08:22
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm can you elaborate? I am not sure what you mean
08:23
Zack
It seems like requiring a unique human isnt much different than requiring a new pubkey. There are a lot of people.
08:24
If requiring a unique human does work to block spam. It must be because there is some effort put into the existence of each one.
Which seems like it could be duplicated with a big enough proof of burn.
08:24
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I mean I guess to a degree, but for example I myself do not base my proclivity to scam others on how many other humans there are
08:24
That doesn't really matter to me
08:24
So I suppose what will be impacted is the % of people who are scammers
08:27
I think it is mainly because of the effort being asymmetric in that it only significantly impacts scammers and not non-scammers
08:27
i.e the legal system
08:27
A pob impacts everyone equally
08:30
sorry I will be able to discuss this more thoroughly later
08:30
unfortunately right now I am having to sit through a mandatory online english class
08:32
Which is very distracting to any thinking about reputation and decentralised contract enforcement
17:03
Z
Like dancing flashmobs?
18:22
Zack
maybe. but it needs to be something publicly verifiable.
Probably the way this would need to work is that the prankster would propose their joke here, and we would make a contract to pay them for it.
18:29
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I don't think the case was considered in the ambiguous oracle document where there is a disagreement about what precedent should be set for the enforcement of future contracts
18:30
Zack
Like, how we should interpret previous rulings in the enforcement of future oracles?
18:32
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah where one set of users thinks the platform is more valuable if a certain precedent is set and the other thinks it is more valuable if another precedent is set
18:33
I suppose the risk can be minimised by having a very well defined syntax, legal code and grammar
18:33
for oracle enforcement and interpretation
18:33
Zack
It is hard to completely understand the consequences of decisions about this. Maybe at this point the best path forward is to try it out, and learn as we go.
18:34
rules about how to make rules can be tough to reason about
18:35
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
hmm I suppose often a good way of making such decisions is to see what has worked in the past in other contexts (like how honk kong and many other countries ctrl+c, ctrl+v 'd the english common law system
18:36
ofc that wouldn't be a solution here seeing as it serves a different purpose
18:36
but maybe there are already standards for contract arbitration that could be ported over
18:38
Zack
we might need to follow an evolutionary path on this one. Like, different cultures on different forks to see which Amoveo is best.
Even if we knew what the best culture is for adding rules, it is such a controversial idea. and it can be changed without touching the code, so everyone will want in on the debate.
Giving a recommendation in the docs probably wont matter anyway.
18:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I suppose once it becomes necessary, due to meaningful volumes of capital being at stake in oracle questions, oracles will have a significant incentive to solve the problem and agree on standards. It could always probably be helped though by input from you as you are likely a useful shelling point
21:18
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Also btw pure rate of interest represents the value one places on spending their capital now vs forgoing consumption and
21:18
So liquidity costs are in addition to that
21:19
They just mean it is more expensive if you change your mind about the interest rate being paid to you being enough to make it worthwhile for you to save
21:20
So low liquidity makes it more like a lock in contract even if your internal subjective interest rate/time preference is higher than that which you are being paid
21:20
I.e you decide that you want to spend
07:16
ethereans finally discover the superior way to do public goods
07:16
they will not marry this with futarchy and money print though
07:20
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah it is not possible to have retroactive PMs
07:20
mr x
setting good precedent is good for token value
07:23
rewarding person with tokens for doing good things is good for token value
07:24
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
hmm interesting so the benefit of rewarding a past project is that you are implicitly making future projects more confident that they will be rewarded
07:24
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
ha that is not something I had considered before
07:26
mr x
tinker first reward later much better for digital world than funding some plan
07:30
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah we have discussed here before that a plan could be funded by a pm but where the payment is conditional on it being built (so they only receive the funding once it is built)
07:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I suppose there isn't really any extra information that the pm would have after it is built than before it is built (information about how valuable it is to the coin)
07:31
so maybe it is better to commit to paying them *if they build it* before they build it
07:31
to create more certainty for them
07:32
mr x
no plans... let them tinker... let them release... if it turns out useful then print them money
07:32
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
ah I see
07:33
so the benefit of doing that is that the pm has access to better information about how useful the project was
07:33
since it is already out in the wild and being used (or not)
19:47
Zack
I am thinking about anonymizing swapping between different currencies.
Maybe NFTs are a key ingredient.
Imagine I have A-coins, and want to sell them to you for B-coins, and we don't want there to be any evidence that the txs on each side of the swap are related.
A problem we can run into is that if you suddenly gain a bunch of money in one of these currencies, you might be required to show the history of where that money came from.
That is where NFTs come in.
You can sell NFTs to each other on each side of the trade. So the history of your money is that you sold an NFT.
19:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
As in for plausible deniability?
19:59
So you can claim that the money was from the sale of the nft rather than from the trade?
20:00
or if half the trade is in fiat, you could use physical art I guess
20:01
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm but won't basic analysis be able to be used to determine that it is likely only an attempt at obfuscation
20:01
I.e if the nft isn't actually a unique or valuable nft
20:02
And if a similar value tx occured on another chain
20:02
Zack
art is created more than once by people with a natural talent
20:02
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And also by looking at the orderbook
20:02
Zack
how is a bureaucrat supposed to determine the "correct" value for something totally subjective?
20:03
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah they couldn't necessarily, but what about the other heuristics that I mentioned above, i.e order book records combined with activity on other chains
20:04
Zack
the txs don't need to occur simultaneously.
20:05
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Also is the intended goal to break linkability with your previous coins on the other chain?
20:05
This can be solved simply if one of the coins is amount obfuscating I think
20:05
Also ideally tx graph obfuscating
20:06
Zack
if you use obfuscating tech, that shows you have something to hide.
If the security enforcement regime is about providing a history of your money, then crypto-privacy just makes your money unusable.
20:08
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah I agree generally with that although in this case I am not quite sure what the goal is
20:08
So I am not very easily able to reason about the viability of certain solutions yet
20:08
What is a context in which you are interested in this being useful?
20:11
Zack
Paul Sztorc has articles about how deniability is more important than privacy, because of how meta-information that gets leaked.
If you use privacy tech, that shows that you have something to hide.
Im trying to extend the same principle to the idea of currency exchange.
20:12
sometimes it isn't just important to hide which money is yours, it is also important to hide the fact that you want to hide which money is yours.
21:26
Josh
Everybody wants to hide what money is theirs. That's why nobody posts their bank account balance on their twitter feed.
21:27
Banks share a lot of information with authorities, but they don't publish everybody's balance on their website.
22:13
O K
Very interesting way to think about things
Elina Kalachnyk invited Elina Kalachnyk
02:35
Amoveo DEX could be useful in all this
02:56
Mr Flintstone
didnt we figure out a way to use venmo
03:01
Eric Arsenault
Venmo is just super limited (I don’t have access to it in my country)
10:11
x
works for stablecoins only
16:47
Ben
are we now at a poin where the dex thing is working and only the UI limit us?
16:48
if yes what is the Documentation i could hand to and UI/UX DEV to get em working on a more modern UX for the DEX portion?
16:51
Zack
Point them to the page of javascript to redo
16:53
and i don't want him to have to re-engineer enverhing so would be nice to point em to the documentation of your variables etc.
16:53
Zack
The 2 dex tabs i guess.
Im going to combine them into 1 tab to make it simpler
16:53
Ben
i'm asking for the Documentation of the underlying JS
16:54
+ Documentation of how the intended step by step dex usage should be
16:54
Zack
Idk how you think programming works.
But maintaining 2 separate pages that explain each variable sounds like a nightmare. Every time i would want to change one page, i would need to change both.
16:55
Ben
means the UX guy need to reverse engineer it
16:57
Zack
Reverse engineer what?
Its just a matter of moving buttons and fields around on the page, right?
16:58
x
it seems too early to work on ux
16:58
Ben
ok, what is missing?
17:05
I was planning on amoveo being an erlang project, and the full node is in erlang.
But now the light node is so much bigger than the full node, and i spend all my time writing js.
17:16
Charles Maurice
It's a thing of wonder. I keep thinking it should help with integration with web UI of other chain apps, and upcoming migrations to wasm.
17:17
on the js ui side, an idea might be to provide short unique ids for elements, so alternate ui could be made with css only
17:17
but then I thought that could be done in js too!
17:19
Zack
I can move the elements into the html page with ids if that would help
17:19
Charles Maurice
I would say I'm not yet in a position to make any recommendations
18:37
Charles Maurice
Anyone else? My guess would be it's a trade-off between lowering the barrier to entry for some ui experimentation vs. disruption + some future workk when things change for Zack.
20:42
MM
I have a business proposal about creating an Arab community for the $Amoveo In order for your currency to be published in the whole Middle East, Who wants him to communicate with me
21:17
Mr Flintstone
not ready for ux yet until alt to alt is done imo
21:18
right now it’s just veo to alt and alt to veo
21:21
x
does it need a orderbook? should the ui look like localbitcoin, c2c trading or centralized exchange or uniswap etc ? does it need to add some currency pairs for people to select from (e.g. veo/btc veo/etc, veo
/usdt etc)?
21:40
x
if a lot of people want to buy veo , the dex make it convenient , they dont need to convert to btc or usdt first
if they want buy alts tho, they have to use btc to buy veo , then use veo to buy alts. so buying alts with veo dex can work ,but require two steps,if what they have now is btc
21:58
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
👍good questions
00:17
Ben
ok. i thought that was arleady done, then back to my cave, will try to hook up a UX guy when we are there.
00:20
Eric Arsenault
+1 to this missing link
01:14
x
if Iremember correctly, btc <-> alts trading require both parties to hold lot's of veo?
01:15
Zack
We worked out a solution where only one needed much veo at the beginning. The other a small amount.
01:17
x
what about a BTC token within veo blockchain? BTC is too slow as base currency for this kind of DEX trading, but still it's the most important one and useful tho.
01:18
Zack
We have tooling for finite stablecoins
01:38
Mr Flintstone
also you can do quasi physical btc on amoveo by changing the dex terms from delivery of btc within 2 days to delivery of btc in 30 days + mutable receipt address
so the subcurrency becomes effectively title to either physical btc or veo
01:39
Zack
But that isnt spendable, since only you can choose the address where you will receive the bitcoin.
01:39
Mr Flintstone
yeah it would need an update for anyone to choose the address
01:40
the holder of the subcurrency specifically
16:33
Zack
Maybe it makes more sense to set up crypto->crypto before making any big changes to the DEX UX.
Because once we support crypto->crypto, a much simpler interface becomes possible.
16:35
Anyone can build alternative interfaces to the same underlying data. It is likely that people will prefer different kinds of charts, depending on the market and why they are trading.
I am guessing we want to start with an interface that works well in low-volume markets.
18:01
Zack
I updated the light node.
I fixed some wording of contract explanation text as suggested by
@eric_rsno I added details about buy veo contracts to the contract.html page where the markets for available contracts are. as suggested by
@mr_flintstone I fixed how buy veo contract subcurrencies show up in the dropdown for spending subcurrencies, as suggested by
@mr_flintstone
18:14
im looking into doing the crypto->crypto DEX
18:17
here is the process for
crypto -> veo and then veo -> crypto afterwards.
Alice has 1 unit of BTC, and 0.1 units of VEO.
Bob has 1 unit of Eth, and 1 unit of VEO.
Alice makes a buy veo contract to sell her BTC.
Alice makes an offer. She wants 1.1 units of type 2, and offers 0.1 VEO.
bob chooses his address. alice delivers the money. type 2 wins.
Alice makes a sell veo contract to get the Eth.
Alice makes an offer. She wants 1.1 unit of type 1, and offers 1 veo.
bob delivers the eth. type 2 wins.
18:18
Ideally we could find a way to mix these 2 protocols so that Alice doesn't need to come online and sign something for an in-between step.
18:30
Alice has 1 unit of BTC, and 0.1 units of VEO.
Bob has 1 unit of Eth, and 1 unit of VEO.
Alice makes a buy veo contract1 to sell her BTC.
Alice makes a sell veo contract2 to get the Eth.
Alice makes an offer1. She wants 1.1 units of C1 type 2, and offers 0.1 VEO.
Alice makes an offer2. she wants 1.1 units of C2 type 1, and offers 1.1 unit of C1 type2.
Alice makes an offer3. she wants 1.09 VEO, she offers 1.1 units of C1 type 2.
(for if Bob doesn't choose a valid BTC address)
Alice makes an offer4. she wants 1.09 VEO, she offers 1.1 units of C2 type 1.
(for if Bob doesn't deliver the Eth)
bob accepts offer 1.
bob chooses his address.
alice delivers the BTC.
bob accepts offer 2.
bob delivers the eth.
alice unlocks the 1.1 veo.
18:31
so from alices perspective:
1) come online to make the offer.
2) come online to deliver the btc (you don't need the veo wallet for this step).
3) (optional) come online to unlock their VEO.
from bob's perspective:
1) come online to accept the offer and choose a bitcoin address.
2) come online accept the second swap offer, and to deliver the eth.
18:32
they each only have 2 mandatory actions where they need to come online.
18:36
im thinking I might make a 3rd DEX tab for this case, and then integrate all 3 tabs into one tab.
18:48
Maybe this new strategy isnt much if an improvement.
It looks like they both still come online twice.
The only different is whether alice needs her veo wallet the second time.
18:50
Maybe it is nice filling out the form once in the beginning, and not needing to explain the second half of your trade part way through?
18:52
Maybe there is a simplification that i am not seeing?
19:12
Zack
I think there is a way to do it if alice starts out owning more veo, and bob less.
Because that means the sell veo contract comes first, so bob can choose his bitcoin address in the same step as sending the eth.
The problem with this strategy is that it doubles the liquidity cost of leaving a trade up in the order book.
Because you need to have the veo to make the contract, as well as having the bitcoin on hand to sell for eth.
And the benefit is that bob only needs to come online once.
So there is a tradeoff. Choose one of:
* double liquidity cost for maker.
* taker needs to come online twice.
19:15
Maybe alice could be a server bot that is quoting prices, but it only publishes the offers if bob says he is interested in doing the trade.
That way alice doesnt need the lockup cost of open offers all the time, and bob still only comes online once.
19:51
Zack
I feel like there might be a way of organizing the contracts so we dont have to lock up extra liquidity, and one of them only comes online once.
Or maybe we could make another smart contract for this.
Can anyone prove it isnt possible?
19:55
Oh, i think there is a way to do it so that alice has 1 btc and 0.1 veo, and bob needs 1 eth and 2 veo.
The first veo from bob is to pay for the btc, and the 2nd veo is a potential punishment so he needs to send the eth.
This way alice doesnt need to lock up much to make an offer.
19:56
Alice still needs to come online twice, but bob only needs to come online once.
19:57
So either they both come online twice, or bob can only come online once if they are willing to lock up double.
19:59
So that is 3 alternative ways to do this.
I wonder which is best?
20:23
Zack
If alice locks up double, then bob doesnt need to lock up much veo.
And in this case, alice can reuse the same veo for multiple offers, that way she isnt wasting veo liquidity.
20:29
So it starts with alice having 1 unit of btc and 1 veo. Bob has 1 unit of eth and 0.1 veo.
Contract 1 is alice selling her veo for eth.
Contract 2 is alice using her btc to buy veo.
Alice makes an offer. She gives contract 1 type 1, and wants contract 2 type 2.
Bob accepts the offer.
Bob sends the eth.
Bob chooses his btc addess for contract 2.
Alice sends the bitcoin.
20:30
Alice can use her same veo to make offers to sell her same btc for doge or zcash. So there is no liquidity loss for her.
Bob only needed to come online once, and he doesnt need much veo.
It only uses existing smart contracts.
I think this is the version we should go with.
22:10
Zack
the way im imagining it is that there will be a smallish number of liquidity providers who are advanced users participating in many trades. and there will be a large number of less knowledgeable traders, who just want to swap currencies and leave.
22:15
we might want some open source bots for the liquidity providers.
Integrating with exchanges to re-balance your liquidity would be a great feature.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
02:54
Eric Arsenault
Yeah feels like most people won’t want to be active
03:11
Josh
The thing is most people won't have any VEO, they'll just want to swap two mainstream coins.
03:11
Zack
They need at least a little to be able to use the dex.
It is a security deposit to punish you if you dont cooperate
03:16
Eric Arsenault
I think this works
03:17
It can be more of a marketing thing, and if it’s super easy to onboard, should be ok
03:29
x
people need to buy some VEO to use the dex, bullish for veo price
03:52
Z
Cant wait to see it implementented
04:17
Mr Flintstone
it also offsets the potential of free option exercise cuz of intra trade volatility
19:22
Zack
There is a fun trick to get this to work well without requiring extra liquidity. The one contract needs to be collateralized in a subcurrency from the other contract.
Alice makes an offer to sell btc and gain eth, bob accepts.
It starts with alice having 1.1 veo, and bob having 0.1 veo.
Contract 1 is a sell veo contract, where alice is buying eth.
Contract 2 is a buy veo contract where alice is selling btc.
Alice should only have an incentive to send her btc once she has already received the eth.
So contract 2 should be priced in contract 1 type 2, which are only valuable if the btc has already been delivered.
This is a feature that was necessary for futarchy, it is cool how useful it is here as well for reducing liquidity costs.
Alice's first swap offer is that she send 1 veo if she receives 1.2 contract1 type 1.
The second is that she sends 0.1 veo if she receives 1.2 contract2 type2.
To accept this offer, bob needs a big multitx to create both contracts, deposit 1.2 veo into contract 1, deposit 1.2 of contract 1 type 2 into contract 2, then he can accept the swap offers to refund his 1.1 veo with the flash loan.
19:24
We included this feature because it was necessary for liquidity efficient futarchy applications.
It is cool to see it solving liquidity problems here as well.
19:25
Bob has the option to accept the first of alices contracts without the second.
In that case, bob is buying eth for veo, and not using btc. Bob is paying a bad price, because of the free option protection that doesnt get refunded.
00:38
Zack
we also should consider the case if bob takes the second offer without the first.
So bob would put 1.2 veo into the first contract, then invest contract 1 type 2 into the second contract.
In that case, Alice would have no obligation to send her btc, and she gets the 0.1 veo for free.
07:43
Exp Dev
Hello, I hope you are safe with this pandemic. I am expertise in full stack and blockchain development and I am looking for a new opportunity as developer in a crypto project. I would like to discuss with you.
Best Regards,
07:45
Exp Dev
can we discuss more? do you have any role that I can participate?
Patrick Lee invited Patrick Lee
07:46
Zack
if you can make the crosschain DEX user interface better, that would help.
07:47
Exp Dev
yes, I am familiar with frontend development for blockchain also
07:47
Zack
or you could make a page for doing binary bets, but without making the market.
18:58
Zack
You get so much flexibility from being able to combine txs into a multi-tx with flash loans.
Smart contracts and transactions are like legos that you can stick together to create.
It is a non-turing complete layer that gives a lot of control when making tools, it protects you from making a lot of mistakes, because you are using tested and understood parts. It is easier to audit, because the parts are good, you just need to check how they link up. And it is a great level of abstraction for looking at the space of possible financial tools, without wasting time on things that can't work at scale.
19:03
Every time we come up with a new smart contract, like the scalar contract or the buy veo contract, it becomes another word we can put into multi-txs.
19:06
Z
Saw the tweet where Warren was following you 😂 amazing
19:12
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
That's pretty weird
23:01
smarter than she seems I guess
23:06
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
She is probably secretly an accelerationist agorist who looks up to Zack for inspiration
04:31
Z
Unicef accepts donations in bitcoin - verified
04:34
Big project about to go down with one of the big exchanges
09:34
Zack
There is a big problem with terrorists/cartels/gangs in many parts of the world. The politicians and military often secretly cooperate with them for mutual benefit.
I was thinking about that plan for using prediction markets to solve the reproducibility crisis in science.
I think we can use the same strategy to solve the terrorism problem.
There can be a market: "If there is an investigation of politician/military leader X, we will find that they are cooperating with the terrorists."
And by looking at the prices in these markets, we can know which politicians should be investigated.
06:38
Z
Best to focus on a proper roadmap, specific measurable actionable relevant time based development of the project
Define a short / medium / long term strategy of your plan and stick to it
(bearing in mind the Golden Rule of adaptability, see what works and what doesn’t as you progress)
Increase media relevance crosschannel, update reddit twitter and focus on attracting people in telegram or discord (imho better medium for your “lair”)
Get the exchange function proper and shiny, get the betting up so normal Joe can log on and stake a wager on the next football or tennis game
06:38
You have many great ideas, do one at a time
09:53
O K
Much less fun than discovering which politicians cooperate with terrorists
07:29
Zack
Is it possible to combine the continuous-auction property of Harberger taxes, with the ability to express value of combinations of goods from combinatorial auctions?
It is hard to imagine decentralized land ownership if there is no decentralized way to subdivide the land.
17:03
Zack
What would it look like to add subcurrencies to amoveo? like erc20.
One way is if the smart contract wouldn't have any way to end and pay out.
The smart contract has a Merkle root of account balances. Making a payment involves providing a proof of your balance and a signed message with a nonce saying you want to make the transfer. you also need a merkle root of who you are sending to.
The smart contract calculates the new merkle root after making that transfer, and creates a child smart contract based on the new merkle root.
This is a very general way to design any smart contract, and the main chain stays stateless.
The merklized database of accounts data can be stored in a layer 2 network specialized for this subcurrency.
Keeping the main chain stateless means we don't need to touch the hard drive to process blocks. Touching the hard drive is the slowest part, so skipping this makes it fast.
17:05
Another way to allow for subcurrencies would be to let contracts have an option where they prevent any more deposits. So you can't convert veo to the subcurrency any more.
This strategy has the benefit that your subcurrency works with the Automatic Market Makers, and the currency-swap transaction types.
but it has the drawback that you can't program any other rules into it. It is just a subcurrency.
17:15
These combinatorial markets suffer the problem that it is very computationally difficult to calculate what the price of trading should be.
So the harberger version probably will have the same limitation.
Gnosis innovated around this kind of auction. Their strategy was to let users propose prices, and have a rule to know which proposal is nearer to ideal.
I guess the harberger version would have lots of people make bids, and there is a tx type where you could propose swapping out ownership of some land, and the blockchain would check if more taxes are being paid before or after the change of ownership.
So this tx type that is changing who owns which land, it could involve subdividing or combining plots.
17:17
If a new system of land ownership is significantly more efficient than existing systems, it might build up some economic momentum and grow.
17:29
The main element I am not sure how to solve is how to change the tax rate fairly.
R = (The value of the land)/(the productive capacity of the land);
(percentage of land you own) = (R) / (R+T);
So changing the tax rate is equivalent to confiscating a portion of the land, or confiscating a portion of the currency.
It also isn't clear if a single global tax rate is best, or if it should vary by region.
17:41
If we just assume the laffer curve exists, then maybe we can let futarchy optimize to maximize the value of the currency.
So it will choose a tax rate that optimizes profits.
17:43
Maybe there is a way to target the location on the laffer curve where the derivative is 2.
So the taxes charge something like 1/3rd as much as what would optimize revenue.
17:45
Maybe there is a moral imperitive to maximize revenue so that more collateral is available for contracts?
Or maybe it is necessary to charge something less, to undercut competing land registry systems?
17:52
maybe maximizing revenue is important, because if there is a competition between land registries, the one with more profit has more value to use for competing.
17:55
I wonder what competition between decentralized land registries would look like?
For participants, switching land registries can mean losing or gaining ownership of some land. So there is a easy way to profit, if you can influence which land registry is choosen.
17:57
Maybe regional authorities just choose which registry they will use for enforcing land ownership disputes.
17:58
Coin holders benefit from having more land in their system, because it gives more collateral for contracts.
land holders don't really care which currency they need to pay taxes in, since fluctuations in the price of that currency do not impact the amount of taxes they need to pay.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Dean Costa invited Dean Costa
Deleted invited Deleted Account
18:03
I didn't know it was so easy to attack some of the most popular blockchains
18:34
mr x
satoshi would turn in his cryopod seeing his name used in this context
18:36
Zack
Having 1/3rd of the hashpower freeze the network is not an effective attack.
They dont even steal any money, and you know who to punish.
Pos has much more interesting vulnerabilities.
20:51
Topab
I think this is a also another vulnerable point, though not comparable with others where money can be lost
20:55
Zack
Why would they destoy all their stake to temporarily freeze the network?
Destroying such a significant amount of coins would make the rest more valuable, by deflation.
Its not an attack.
Unless there is some big smart contract that depends on the network not getting temporarily frozen.
10:47
Topab
You are right. I forgot they would slash your coins if you collude
Amber xt invited Amber xt
14:06
Amber xt
I am Amber, listing manager from
XT.com exchange.I have a good listing proposal for you.Could you please tell me who I can talk with？
Deleted invited Deleted Account
01:21
K
Why haven't you attacked one of the POS chains yet if they're vulnerable?
03:18
Z
Just because one can do something it doesn’t mean one should do something....
21:40
O K
Sometimes it makes for good publicity though
Full Stack invited Full Stack
04:05
Full Stack
Hi All
I am a Senior Blockchain and Full Stack Developer with core expertise in Frontend, Smart Contract development, DEX, DAPP, NFT, setting up ICOs as well as developing wallet applications and trading bots. I am expertise in React, Vue, Web3.js, Ether.js, Solidity, Rust and Blockchain fundamentals, I can help you with most of the crypto-related tasks and bot-related tasks, setting up blockchain explorer, generating your own currency, or writing smart contracts for token and swap development.
If you are currently hiring a Blockchain Developer or Full Stack Developer, please let me know.
Tiger Dev invited Tiger Dev
00:50
Ilmu Somebody
Hahahaha
00:51
Literally most common realization in the industry (substitute Erlang for whatever)
20:48
Zack
ive been thinking about what this dex would look like in use.
For onboarding new users it might make sense to use a specialized centralized exchange. Since almost all users want to on-board directly from centralized exchanges that do not support veo.
To onboard, they need to get their initial seed veo. From this seed veo they can use the dex to trustlessly sell other currencies to add veo to their account. The seed can grow by at least 10x each time you use the DEX, so if you only trust the centralized tool with 0.01% of the funds you want to be able to pass through the DEX, it only takes 3 rounds of the DEX to get the rest of your funds on.
Your liquidity limit for the DEX is around 10x bigger than the amount of VEO you own.
To get this seed veo, I am imagining a centralized service that you send a little of some other currency to, and they deposit the initial veo in your account.
00:27
Jože j
seeing how this chat is slow af:
is amoveo fork of btc?
could amoveo be used in game design? ( nft?, mybe some shitcoin ingame currency creation? )
i am a game developer with a game thats been on hold for a year now(2 years of development put in), while my game is on hold i am working (employed) with a major blockchain project. In a few months my employment will be at an end and i will continue with my own game development.
@zack_amoveo do you see your project capable of existing in a gaming environment?
00:59
Zack
Amoveo is not a fork, it is custom software.
Yes, Amoveo can be used with games in various ways.
If you want to do nft or in-game currency, the best way might to be by creating some other piece of software that scans the amoveo txs, and interprets them in a way to decide who owns what in-game currency or nft.
By connecting ownership of the currency or nft to a token in the amoveo blockchain, you can have access to amoveo's tools, like swapping one currency for another, or using multi-tx so the swap and other actions are all atomic, or using flash loans to let your balances go negative during a single block.
There are other ways to use Amoveo with games.
* betting on whether events will come to pass in the game. like, who will win a match.
* For the parts of the game that are publicly verifiable, you can create contracts in Amoveo to enforce actions in the game. Like, to get a guild to cooperate, or offer a trustless service in an MMO.
* Using futarchy to make decisions for changing the game, or decide which version of the game is "official".
* channels for micro-payments to and from the gaming server, which is a potential way to prevent spam or bots.
Depending on what kind of game you are making, I can tell you more if Amoveo could be useful to you.
01:07
I am thinking we should set up the oracle to be able to print money. but only if someone achieves some goals, and they had made a futarchy that shows achieving these goals produces at least 2x more value than we are paying them.
01:08
That way the process of people getting paid for developing for amoveo, it could be decentralized and trustless. Not depending on a hard update each time.
01:10
It also works as a way to show that the oracle is very secure.
If someone could get the oracle to lie, they could directly print infinite money to themselves.
03:18
Josh
Why does the seed grow 10x each time?
03:20
Zack
there is a veo deposit. to prevent anyone from refusing to cooperate and forcing us to use an oracle to end it.
The size of this deposit is related to how much you think the price of veo could move during the duration of the contract.
I estimate 10% the value of the contract.
13:00
mr x
Yeahh... How is "more value than we are paying them" calculated?
15:26
Amber xt
I am Amber, listing manager from
XT.com exchange.I have a good listing proposal for you.Could you please tell me who I can talk with？
18:19
Zack
You ask futarchy if the price of veo will rise enough to cause the market cap to be high enough.
The difference in market cap before and after.
19:11
mr x
And the gold standard objective veo price measure is?
19:14
Zack
We ask futarchy for what impact the project will have on the price.
So we are comparing the price either with or without the project
19:15
mr x
yes but what is the price
19:16
Zack
Qtrade looks like around $50
19:19
mr x
easy to manipulate?
19:20
i am the manipulation midwit now
19:20
Zack
If you have a plan to manipulate the price in the future, would futarchy realize that and incorporate it?
19:20
What about the version of the future that doesnt happen?
19:21
For futarchy to realize, you need to tell people about your plan to manipulate.
But if people know your plan, they will counter-trade to profit off the manipulation
19:22
Manipulating the price in a version of the future that never comes to pass. It's like time travel.
19:26
so the last trade price at some day?
19:27
Zack
Probably some rolling average would work better. maybe the average or median price over a 24 hour period
19:27
that doesn't exist?
19:28
Zack
There is competition between futarchists too.
If you and I have different goals, we could design different futarchy experiments to try and build up evidence for our own plan.
19:29
Maybe you can make a futarchy market say that your project will help Amoveo, but your market is based on the price at one moment.
So I make a market that says if we measure the price over a 24 hour period, that your project will not help Amoveo sufficiently.
19:33
mr x
yeah.. just one more reason to use pow... it is kinda like rolling average proxy of price
19:34
Zack
We could connect futarchy to the total amount of POW done.
But if some big miner says "I will shut off my miners if we don't do plan A", that might influence the futarchy, right?
19:38
difficulty goes down incentivize others maybe
19:39
Zack
Looking at it more mathematically.
Lets say a project wont benefit Amoveo, but the builder wants us to think it will have a 0.1% benefit.
So the builder can potentially earn 0.05% of the market cap for doing the project.
As long as it costs more than 0.05% of the market cap to manipulate the price by 0.1%, then it is secure against being attacked.
22:56
Sorry I haven't been actively here recently, school is quite time consuming
22:57
I probably won't be active for several more weeks either :(
03:05
Z
Get school done first man, got a lifetime after that to do whatever 👍🏻
03:19
Živojin Mirić
1000$ daily volume
06:13
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
It is highly questionable whether a lot of what I learn at school is anywhere near as valuable as learning about and discussing what I do in this channel with Zack and others
08:10
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
The only subjects I find valuable are maths, phys and chem, but that is not to say that I find learning them *at school* worthwhile, given that I could use the same time more effectively learning them from elsewhere if I had that option
08:10
but econ, eng and history, which are mandatory for me, are I find, not at all good uses of time
08:11
Not to say that I do not find economics interesting as a topic, as I read about it outside of school via books, but the curriculum for it is keynesian trash
08:27
Zack
Public school in USA was more indoctrination than education. I didn't realize testing out of it was an option until I had already finished.
I was able to skip some of it by attending a night college.
Maybe with the pandemic there are ways to sign up for college classes through the web, and then use those credits to skip classes in the secondary school.
09:12
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I have a friend who was completely homeschooled, he said it was excellent
09:14
I kind of only realised it was a viable option a couple of years into highschool
09:14
but am currently in y11 so it probably isn't worth starting homeschooling
09:14
although it is possible
09:15
idk, I really wish I was, the rate at which I learn stuff over the holidays is much higher than during term
09:18
At least in aus it is legal to homeschool, whereas in many other authoritarian democracies such as germany and sweden, it is actually illegal
09:19
because it threatens the ability of the state to indoctrinate the population effectively
09:27
Zack
One time I was in a hostel in Latin America, and another person there was a 16 or 17 year old, who I think was from USA. We all went to a bar and they served him without questions, even though he was underage there.
He was paying his own way in the hostel, no one cared if he had an obligation to go to a school in another country or not.
He was just another foreigner, his age didn't even matter.
19:05
Zack
Robinson, what is 2+3?
19:06
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
You know you can automate this ;)
19:06
Zack
What is with the spammers putting up seed phrases though?
19:07
Do they think we will accidentally send money to that seed?
19:07
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I don't get it, maybe they have some way of scamming people who message them in response?
19:07
Seems like a very indirect route to scamming people
19:08
Gone are the good old days were they would ask you for your seed phrase lol
19:08
Mr Flintstone
probably to get you to download it thinking youre gonna take their coins
19:08
meanwhile u just dld some malware
19:09
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
That would require them to send you link to the wallet... Yeah maybe it relies on you messaging them
19:11
Zack
oh right. this makes sense.
21:32
O K
The seed phrase scams are loaded with (usually fake value but sometimes real value) ERC20 tokens, but no ETH to move them.
Then they have scripts to detect when someone deposits ETH to try to "steal" the tokens so they can retrieve the ETH first.
21:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
lol yeah I have read about this before
21:45
Mr Flintstone
haha you can do it with a smart contract iirc
Deleted invited Deleted Account
05:21
Beer
is my investment still safe
07:46
Zack
Your investments, possibly are the only things that are safe
08:05
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I think the problem of dex users requiring a small veo deposit can be solved by there being a reputation mechanism that allows them to trust that certain users/LPs with reputation will not exploit the free option
08:06
maybe I am thinking the wrong way about it, but this works for example in the atomic swap paradigm
08:06
since only one side of the contract has the ability to exploit the free option, iirc
08:06
and so you make that side the side with a reputation
08:08
I am not sure whether that is also the case in the amoveo dex design
08:08
yeah actually it definitely could be
08:08
not sure whether it is atm
08:08
Zack
Reputation can be an alternative to owning veo. But the person without veo is unlikely to have reputation.
08:09
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I am suggesting that you could design it in such a way so as to only allow the FO to be available to a single side of the contract
08:10
Like basically the side who sends the funds first
08:10
is the side without a reputation
08:10
so they are committing
08:10
Zack
The seed veo can be really small.
I think we can have it be a trusted exchange to get your first veo.
Some centralized service.
08:11
Some simple page where you input your amoveo address, and they give you a address to deposit your doge
08:12
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
hmm yeah I agree that that is one solution, although tbh I haven't considered it very deeply yet, but what do you think of the aforementioned reputation design? :) Maybe I am not explaining it very well
08:12
does it make sense/seem reasonable that only one side of a trade could have the ability to exploit a free option?
08:13
or do you see it as unavoidable that both sides necessarily have the ability to do so?
08:13
Zack
I think we are talking about the same mechanism here
08:13
Zack
The seed veo, you buy them at a bad price. So the centralized service is making good profit.
08:14
And at any one point in time, the amount of funds they can steal is low. Because each seed is small.
08:15
There is a free option, but it is almost worthless, because you are purposefully buying the seed at a bad price. The probability of the price moving far enough for it to be cheaper than the market rate, it is very unlikely.
08:15
Oh, the centralized market can issue a refund in that case.
08:15
So it isnt a free option
18:32
Josh
The problem with centralized exchanges is they're very hard to use because of regulations.
18:33
It would be better to do centralized reputation and then use that.
18:33
Zack
I think only the ones with connections to fiat are tough.
As long as it is only crypto to crypto, there are regions where regulations are manageable.
18:34
Yeah, a new tool is probably a good idea too.
18:36
Maybe integrating with an exchange makes sense. So you can get paid instantly in lots of different currencies from inside that exchange.
18:58
Josh
No this is changing. Particularly for US residents.
18:59
Zack
is the resident being blocked from joining exchanges, or do the exchanges need to block them?
18:59
Josh
The exchanges need to block them.
18:59
Zack
What is the US going to do against foreign exchange operators?
18:59
Josh
Put them in jail.
19:00
Zack
There is probably some jurisdiction that wont put them in jail, and then all the exchanges would be hosted from there
19:04
Imagine, cloning a github and launching the software being a extraditable offense.
So some kid in Cambodia who has never even heard English before, is somehow expected to be aware of USA law, or face extradition for cloning a github.
Has anything like that been enforced before? like does US jail foreigners who host illegal gambling websites?
19:21
Josh
There have been a bunch of examples of people being extradited for things like this. The kid in Cambodia will be fine until he make millions of dollars and then he'll become a target.
19:22
Exchanges around the world are tightening up their AMLKYC now, even for crypto-to-crypto.
19:26
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah I think at least that such exchanges can be operated in a black market manner, even if they are illegal. Whereas fiat<>crypto exchanges that interface with the fiat monetary system can not operate in a black market manner as they need to comply with regs in order to gain access to the monetary system.
19:28
I don't think it is a binary thing
19:28
As JA is probably useful to some extent for crypto<>crypto exchanges
19:28
But they may still have to combine it with other black market tech, in order to be viable
19:28
Such as onion routing
19:29
Basically I don't think it is sound to assume there will always be some friendly states
19:29
But there may be some that enforce the ban more and less effectively than others
19:29
Therefore allowing black market exchanges to more effectively operate there
19:32
But I basically agree with your conclusion, which is that crypto<>crypto exchanges will always exist in an unregulated state
19:32
Zack
The way I am setting up the DEX, there needs to be some central server that is hosting the off-chain smart contract state.
but anyone can run this software, and they have an API you can clone the contracts from one to another, so it is decentralized in a sense.
I wonder if this is enough to not worry about KYC enforcement.
19:33
also, the person hosting the contract state, they are not financially involved at all. they never have customer funds, it doesn't cost them anything to run this server.
19:34
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In the short run I don't think it is an issue, but in the long term I do not think any solution requiring non-anonymous central points of failure is viable. So either your server becomes a Tor hidden service or you substitute it with a p2p network
19:34
Zack
ever individual bitcoin node is centralized.
As long as there are lots of amoveo contract nodes with duplicated state, it is a decentralized p2p network in the sense that bitcoin is.
19:35
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
What doesn't matter is whether according to current regulations they fit a certain set of criteria for liability, but whether they are in a position to be coerced by the state as they ramp up their war on crypto
19:36
Yeah I think though that btc nodes will eventually all need to be running over various obfuscation networks
19:37
Zack
so then, our system of contract state nodes could go through the same obfuscation process, if needed
19:37
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
A good way of thinking about the necessary adversariality is if you replace any node/crypto website/exchange operator with a dark net market host. What op sec do they require?
19:37
And I think that will also be the fate of centralized crypto<>crypto exchanges
19:41
Btw Zack I think you will like the book cryptoeconomics
19:41
You would know a v large amount of the material in it
19:41
But it comes at it from a very worthwhile route, which is that Bitcoin and cryptocurrency is fundamentally black market technology and must be analysed from that perspective
19:43
The jurisdictional arbitrage fallacy I posted above originates from it
19:45
Zack
looks interesting
19:49
It is also written in a similar style to your GitHub repo, each argument/principle/fallacy is elucdiated on in its own self-contained section in a couple of pages
20:01
Josh
There seems to be some level of granularity that the state can fight. They've totally failed in the war on drugs but they've brought down plenty of kingpins.
20:02
Same thing with file sharing.
20:37
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah it is a consequence of the market not being the supplier, but consisting of many, redundant suppliers.
20:38
I actually don't think that there is a fundamental reason why Tor is able to guarantee recipient anonymity via hidden services whereas it can't be achieved via physical transmission of goods
20:38
There is actually nothing fundamentally different once you think about it
20:42
I think both Tor and such a onion routed shipping network would rely on regulatory arbitrage though, to some degree at least, as if all onion routes/shipments were domestic then they could all easily be targeted by the state and shut down
20:45
I don't think though that the encryption that Tor is able to take advantage of, due to it involing the transmission of information rather than matter, and which isn't available to onion shipping, is actually fundamentally important to its operation
20:46
At least it is only as important as the ability to package illicit goods in such a way as to make them hard to detect
20:46
But it is no more important than that
20:47
Sorry if these thoughts aren't the most lucid and don't come with much context, it is just something I have been interested in for a long time
20:47
Namely how to achieve recipient anonymity in shipping
20:47
Josh
Yeah I thought about the onion shipping as well. Drug dealers probably do this a lot.
20:48
It's kinda off topic here but feel free to dm me.
20:49
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah true, it was a tangent I went on in my thoughts on whether dark net websites (such as centralized crypto<>crypto exchanges) are fundamentally more secure against state coercion than black markets involving the movement of physical goods (such as drugs).
20:50
I will be able to talk about this tomorrow afternoon but unfortunately now I am quite time restricted
Deleted invited Deleted Account
00:43
Ilmu Somebody
Drug dealers use similar opsec to secret services
00:44
It's a bit harder (imo) to translate that model into reliable server maintenance
00:45
I think rogue states are a stopgap for miners but eventually we'll need the public to get involved like with torrents
00:46
Zack
if you are delivering a physical good, it seems like you always need trust in at least one direction.
Like, the recipient at the last minute can choose the drop location, or the vendor at the last minute can choose the drop location.
Whoever chooses the drop location can set up a camera or some kind of honey pot to trap the other.
00:47
Ilmu Somebody
Monero has an interesting solution with the malware and hidden mining
00:47
Yeah so best use street people and small quantities
00:49
For the end user that is.. the street people need to earn trust to get fed by the support netw
00:49
Zack
if you pseudo-anonymously post a contract offer to a decentralized network, I think neither side needs to trust the other.
00:58
oh, I get it. in this analogy, the street dealer is equivalent to whoever is running full nodes for the network.
They are too small of an economic actor for enforcement to be cost effective.
04:54
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I actually don't think this is the case
04:54
Although it is something I had assumed to be correct for the last year or so
04:55
Because you can onion route a package through many intermediary senders
04:55
Where each one only knows the next step in the route
04:55
As long as one of them isn't compromised
04:56
Then a malicious sender of a package, say a compromised dnm vendor, won't be able to determine the recipient's location
04:57
Or course you can send cops to each one sequentially and coerce them to give up the location of the next hop by decrypting their layer of the parcel
04:57
But that is also possible in Tor
04:57
It is not something unique to onion shipping
04:58
Yet we don't see it happening in Tor
04:58
So either Tor is insecure and is vulnerable to state control, or onion shipping networks are secure
05:00
Ilmu Somebody
Tor /is/ insecure and vulnerable to state control
05:01
And hidden services don't work as they are currently implementef
05:01
Zack
A dropped packet in tor is cheaper to replace than a lost package
05:02
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
It is also more valuable to its sender and receiver than a dropped packet
05:03
Hence they will be willing to spend more