Amoveo ♥🧿
6 May 2021
Z
19:59
Zack
Maybe contributors shouldn't be treated symmetrically?
19:59
so if the public good has a smaller value to you, there is a bigger chance that you get a full refund, even if the public good is constructed
20:00
like, what if we take all the money from charlie, and half from bob. and give alice a full refund?
20:00
so Zoe still gets his $1000
20:02
or maybe instead of treating them symmetric by how much they contribute, we would want each to have equal profit?

We raised $1500, but only needed $1000. So the $500 could be split up 4 ways between Alice, Bob, Charlie, and Zoe?
20:03
In reply to this message
I think this wouldn't work because it is vulnerable to syble attacks.
20:05
In reply to this message
this seems vulnerable to syble too. Why would Charlie say a higher number when he could have said a lower number more times?
20:06
so maybe we want the reverse.
Alice and Bob pay full amounts, and charlie is refunded $500. That way people who participate are incentivized to participate with the largest amount they can
ᴅ
20:07
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
or it would just result in people depositing together
Z
20:07
Zack
is that a bad thing?
ᴅ
20:07
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
well not necessarily, but also not really a good thing either
20:07
it is neutral
20:08
so therefore incentivising large deposits has a neutral impact
20:08
on the incentive compatibility
20:08
it would just result in deposits being on average larger, but also fewer
Z
20:09
Zack
if we don't treat donations symmetrically, the only sybil resistant strategy is to reward bigger donations at a cost to smaller.
ᴅ
20:10
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
well both are sybil resistant kind of
Z
20:10
Zack
Charlie could have done 750 donations of $1 each
20:11
we don't want to incentivize spam
ᴅ
20:11
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
yeah but charlie could also collude with alice to make their donation seem bigger
20:11
which is kind of like an anti sybil attack
20:11
so it is not resistant to anti sybil attacks
20:11
but yeah I suppose it will cause less spam, but higher administration/coordination costs on the part of donors
20:11
since they will need to find other people to donate with
Z
20:13
Zack
if people collude to donate in groups, that is solving part of the DAC.
As your equation showed, people who benefit more from the public good are easier to incentivize to pay for it.
So if people have an incentive to pool their participation in the DAC, it should be easier to incentivize them to donate more to the DAC.
20:14
Alice + Bob are more likely to be pivotal, if they participate together
ᴅ
20:16
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
but alice still choses whether she wants to join bob
20:16
so it doesn't affect her decision
20:16
it just pushes it back one step
20:16
to when she decides whether to join bob @zack_amoveo
20:19
the issue is that: making people have to pay in a single tx "nominally" doesn't actually get rid of the fact that they are two distinct individuals
20:19
and they can make decisions independently of each other
Z
20:20
Zack
yeah, maybe we do need to treat them symmetrically for what portion of money is refunded.

But there is more to it than that.
We have a pool of $1500. we use some of this money for refunds. We use the rest of the money as shares in the 2 outcomes of the smart contract.
How should these shares be divided up among doners?
20:21
does it make sense to over-compensate bigger donations, in the case where the public good is not created?
ᴅ
20:25
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I think all that is doing is again incentivising larger deposits...
20:25
which will have the affect of making deposits larger on average
20:25
but fewer in quantity
20:25
I do not see why it would incentivise anything else, although I could be missing something
Z
20:29
Zack
Maybe we should make a 2
by 4 nash square, and try to find numbers to put in the 8 slots that could solve this.

Either the public good is created, or not. and in each case, we need to distribute the $1500 to the 4 participants.
if it gets created, the builder loses $1000 of building costs.
if it gets created, Alice, Bob, and Charlie get $250, $500, and $750 of benefits.
20:29
What if you are personally harmed by the public good? would it make sense to report a negative number?
20:37
the reason second-price auctions incentivize revealing your true subjective value, is because it keeps getting more profitable to pay a larger amount, up until that point.
I feel like rewarding people for donating a larger amount could be an important part of dac too.
ᴅ
20:43
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Hmm I admitantly am not very familiar with using nash squares, but wouldn't it need to be 3d in order to incoporate a dimension for whether or not each participant choses to donate?
20:44
if it doesn't incorporate such a dimension then I do not think it can be used to determine whether the nash equilibrium is for them to donate or not
20:47
maybe an idea could be that the latest donors are not refunded
20:47
while the first donors are refunded
Z
20:47
Zack
it isn't just a matter of getting them to donate.
We need the donation to reveal how much they would subjectively benefit from the public good
ᴅ
20:47
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
if there is excess donations
20:47
in order to incentivise earlier donation
20:47
I am v tired, I should go to sleep I think
Z
20:47
Zack
oh, that is an interesting idea. discriminate based on time of donation
ᴅ
20:47
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
anyway it has been good talking zack 👌 Enjoyed it
20:48
In reply to this message
yeah maybe it could be...
20:49
Good night
Z
21:25
Zack
Lets consider the case where a public good is going to create 3x more value than the cost of building it.

An entrepreneur, he offers to pay people 2x as much as they contribute, if it is not built.

Alice stands to earn $2000 if it is built, so if she buys $1000 of shares, she is totally hedged, and ends up $1000 richer whether it is built or not.

If everyone who stands to benefit buys up insurance this way, the entrepreneur ends up raising 1.5x as much money as is needed to build it, and putting at risk up to 1.5x of his own funds.
He uses 1x to pay the builder, and keeps the other 0.5x as profit for his risk.


If Alice's strategy is purely maximizing profit, she would only participate if she thinks the public good has less than 50% chance of being created, and in that case she would participate with far more than $1000, depending on how much funds she has available, according to the Kelly criterion.

But if Alice's strategy is minimizing risk, she would participate with $1000 no matter how likely the public good is to be created.

If the entrepreneur is maximizing profit, he would participate as long as there is a >75% chance that the public good gets created.

So if Alice is maximizing profit, the fact that the entrepreneur is offering the contract is enough information for Alice to know that she should not participate. It is a net loss to participate.

So the effectiveness of DAC, it is heavily dependent on how risk adverse are the people who could potentially benefit from the existence of the public good.

If you had to choose between receiving $1000 in a month, or a 75% chance to get $2000 in a month, which would you choose?

It depends on how efficiently they can use windfall money, and how much planning their investments require.
21:35
The kind of people who would participate in DAC are weird.
They need to be rich enough so that their assets would appreciate a lot from the existence of the public good.
But they need to be poor enough to be risk adverse, so they actually want to buy the insurance.

Maybe the kind of person who would participate, their investments are very concentrated in something that will benefit from the public good.
21:44
In reply to this message
looks like there are a lot of risk adverse people.
SS
21:46
Steve Steve
How has our VEO been restricted so far and hasn't become popular?
Z
21:48
Zack
https://twitter.com/zack_bitcoin/status/1390302226300608518?s=20 here is a version of the poll that selects for veo holders, and is scaled by how much veo you have.
21:49
In reply to this message
good question
SS
21:50
Steve Steve
Is it technology? Or propaganda? Or capital?
21:50
I don’t think there is a big problem with the basic technology
21:51
Whether to launch DeFi and DEX
21:52
Amoveo has emerged far beyond the "AE real body" design, and has three project functions "REP+MKR+DXDY"
Amoveo (VEO) is a highly scalable PoW (Proof of Work) blockchain, promoted by the community, aimed at predicting markets, investment and insurance contracts, and various derivatives such as stablecoins.
The VEO project is hailed by the market as the "real body of AE". VEO inherits the decentralized encrypted P2P technology in AE and uses state channels for execution. This means that the cost is very low, almost instantaneous, and can support global users.
However, we even more agree with the view that VEO has surpassed the original AE design. VEO already has three project functions: "REP+MKR+DXDY":
For standard REP, VEO has futarchy-based oracle technology, which will always be customized and improved according to the needs and needs of users. The community also plays an indispensable role in the governance of VEO, which can be reflected in the block size, miner rewards and other variables that can be modified using Futarchy, VEO's betting governance mechanism. In this way, VEO will always maintain the best adjustments to produce the best results.
What is commendable is that VEO has gone out of the limitation of one coin, one vote, and the concept is advanced. Just as Mr. Pan Pan of Small World Capital London gave an example: "For example, there are 438 people in our group. Everyone says to choose the group leader. Two choose one, one person, one vote, or one coin, one vote. This is the election of most pos. Everyone. The result of the voting is over. VEO voting means that if everyone has one vote, the right voter stays in the group, and the wrong voter will be kicked. If one vote for one vote, all the wrong people will lose to the right voter. People, net birth. But you can not vote, nothing will happen to you if you do not vote", this may be the biggest killer of VEO.
For benchmarking MKR, VEO does not support Ethereum-like Aixiou, but there are various derivatives, including stablecoins.
Benchmarking DXDY, the project builds an open source agreement for decentralized margin trading and derivatives.
21:53
项目评价


1、VEO是矿币的大白马，站在巨人肩膀上。
创始人Zack是REP的共同创始人，也是AE的首任CTO。可以说VEO从其出生开始就是站在了AE的肩上，Zack在重新构建VEO的时候，吸收AE的各种优点，优化其不足，并且VEO又结合了预测市场REP，还包括了MKR稳定币的功能。
2、VEO 其创始人是技术鬼才，当然是不撸代码不舒服。
可以说这又是VEO另一个巨大优势，打开Zack 的github页面，我们就可以看到，虽然其项目在去年3月份就主网上线了。但是前几天他们都还在更新，这勤奋的小编自愧不如：当然，说到鬼才就不得不提到Zack“一根筋”的性格，运营推广更多需要社区自发去推动。
3、VEO海外社区相当成熟，在矿币大热的今天，VEO如蒙尘的珠子。
VEO海外社区本身十分成熟，在中文社区也已有不少大咖看好，并开始自发推广。项目已经上线高质量原创币交易平台Qtrade，近期获得Hitbtc发文推荐，随着中文社区的壮大和逐步上线中文交易所，拥有强大技术实力的VEO如蒙尘的珍珠，很快将会大放光彩。
21:54
Project evaluation


1. VEO is the big white horse of mining coins, standing on the shoulders of giants.
Founder Zack is the co-founder of REP and the first CTO of AE. It can be said that VEO has stood on the shoulders of AE since its birth. When Zack rebuilt VEO, it absorbed the various advantages of AE and optimized its shortcomings. In addition, VEO combined with the prediction market REP, and also included MKR stablecoins. Function.
2. The founder of VEO is a technical ghost, of course, it is uncomfortable not to code.
It can be said that this is another huge advantage of VEO. Open Zack's github page and we can see that although its project went live on the mainnet in March last year. But they were still updating a few days ago. This diligent editor is not ashamed: Of course, when it comes to ghosts, you have to mention Zack's "single stick" character, and more operations and promotion need to be spontaneously promoted by the community.
3. The overseas community of VEO is quite mature. Today, when the mining currency is hot, VEO is like a dusty bead.
The overseas VEO community itself is very mature, and many big names in the Chinese community are optimistic about it and have begun to promote it spontaneously. The project has launched a high-quality original currency trading platform Qtrade, and has recently been recommended by Hitbtc. With the growth of the Chinese community and the gradual launch of the Chinese exchange, VEO with strong technical strength, like a dusted pearl, will soon shine.
21:54
These are all non-trumpet comments on our Veo, very high!
21:55
What are we missing in the end?
IS
21:56
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
Ment to respond,
If you have an epoch based cryptocurrency like the lottery game you described once then you could do something like thia.
SS
21:59
Steve Steve
I think VEO is that we don’t have a good MLM
21:59
@zack_amoveo Do you think so?
Z
22:06
Zack
I think the most important goal for now is to get regular users of some Amoveo tool
SS
22:07
Steve Steve
It's better to be able to trade at gate.io
Z
22:07
Zack
In reply to this message
oh yeah, the lottery would work well with this, since occasionally there is one person owning a lot. Too bad the lottery scalability plan didn't work. It was vulnerable to data availability problems
SS
22:08
Steve Steve
I see a lot of bad news on the internet for the exchange of hitbtc
Z
22:11
Zack
I think qtrade.io works better than hitbtc for trading VEO
ᴅ
22:12
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
btw @zack_amoveo the equation simplifies to benefit*pivotalProb - donation
IS
22:12
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
What about 'linear money' a bit like utxo over the whole currency so it changes types per epoch
22:13
I guess that's chainsplitting
ᴅ
22:13
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
if you don't include the d/f for probability
22:13
which is just a lot more intuitive
22:13
Like it is the risk adjusted benefit minus the cost
22:13
but yeah it only applies if the dac succeeds
Z
22:14
Zack
it looks like there are a lot of very risk adverse people who are potential participants in DAC
22:15
it kind of makes sense, in that people are all in competition. So we need to allocate all of our capital as efficiently as possible to stay competitive, so there isn't leftover appetite for risk.
22:15
In reply to this message
I don't understand.
ᴅ
22:16
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
they could always just swap out one risky investment for another...
22:16
if it has a better returns profile
Z
22:17
Zack
https://twitter.com/zack_bitcoin/status/1390297404071563272?s=20 more than half of people seem really risk adverse
IS
22:17
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
Yeah sorry I'm thinking about sth else
Z
22:17
Zack
including more than half of veo holders https://twitter.com/zack_bitcoin/status/1390302226300608518?s=20
SS
22:19
Steve Steve
Or try to log in to UNI
ᴅ
22:26
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
s=probability of dac success
i=insurance payout (e.g value of 2 means they pay double your capital)
b=benefit from public good
d=donation amount
p=probability of being pivotal conditional on dac succeeding

expected profit=s(pb-d) + i(1-s)
22:26
@zack_amoveo
x
22:29
x
In reply to this message
is this google translate?
Z
22:30
Zack
= i(1-s) - ds(1-p)
the second part needs to be negative, so maybe write it this way
ᴅ
22:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Why is that?
22:31
The second part is the benefit from the insurance payout
Z
22:31
Zack
p-1 is less than 0. s and d are positive.
22:31
i(1-s) is the insurance payout, right?
ᴅ
22:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yes
22:32
Oh sorry yeah I thought you were referring to that
22:32
Ha I am tired
22:32
It is 1 here 😅
SS
22:32
Steve Steve
In reply to this message
yes
ᴅ
22:32
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
It is surprisingly high quality I must say
22:33
In reply to this message
No I think both should be positive
22:33
Both are payouts
22:34
pb-d is the expected benefit if the dac succeeds
22:34
So it should be positive
Z
22:34
Zack
pb-d is negative if you expected profit is less than the cost of building the public good
ᴅ
22:34
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Right but it shouldn't have a negative sign infront of it
22:35
If it is negative, it will be negative :)
x
22:35
x
In reply to this message
what is MLM
Z
22:35
Zack
I think we really need to take into account the law of diminishing returns with money here.
100% chance of $5000 is worth more than 75% of $10 000 for many people
22:35
In reply to this message
multi-level marketing.
ᴅ
22:36
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I suppose it is just subjective, like sometimes there are diminishing returns, sometimes increasing. It just depends on the desired risk profile of an individual
SS
22:36
Steve Steve
Promotion
ᴅ
22:36
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
But I don't think such things are easily factored into an equation so best that we calculated numerical expected values and then consider the affects of subjective preferences afterwards
Z
22:36
Zack
it seems like DAC is only going to work for contributors who have a fairly strong diminishing returns of money.
It seems like there are enough of them to raise the money we need.
SS
22:37
Steve Steve
Spread sales
Z
22:38
Zack
insurance is an expected loss.
No one is going to sell you fire insurance if they are expected to lose money. The insurance company needs to cancel their risk and make a net profit on these insurance contracts.
22:38
DAC is similar
ᴅ
22:38
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Sorry I just realized I made an error in this equation, but fixed it
22:38
It have been what was causing you confusion about the sign of terms in it
22:39
I put d where b is supposed to be in pb-d
22:39
Fixed it
22:41
If probability of being pivotal=d/f then:

s=probability of dac success
i=insurance payout (e.g value of 2 means they pay double your capital)
b=benefit from public good
d=donation amount
f=funding target

expected profit=s((d/f)b-d) + i(1-s)
22:41
Which doesn't really simplify
22:41
So not that Interesting to analyze
22:41
Anyway
22:42
In reply to this message
Yeah exactly, people often agree to contracts, such as insurance, that have a negative expected value
22:42
Because they don't value all dollars equally at all times and in all directions (profit/loss)
x
22:47
x
In reply to this message
nothing is missing
ᴅ
22:47
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
So Zack would you agree that DACs really don't allow for public goods to be funded when costs<benefits, but when that condition is met to a great enough degree and also when the risk preferences and subjective values of consumers align in such a way as to make it an attractive investment to them?
BS
22:55
Bo Smubo
Where to trade veo? The best place is hitbtc?
Ritvars invited ED
I
22:59
Instinct
In reply to this message
qtrade
Z
23:38
Zack
In reply to this message
It seems like dac dont work very often.
Like what if there was an upgrade that made amoveo only 1% more valuable.

1% is a lot nearer to most peoples risk tolerances, and they probably dont think it is worth the effort to buy insurance.

So, is there a better way to do it? How can we avoid the free rider problem?
Maybe something with futarchy?
23:41
Maybe @eric_rsno is right. We should use futarchy to find out if an update is good, and inflate the currency to pay for it.
23:42
But maybe with some big security margin.
Like, the benefit needs to be 3x or 5x bigger than the cost.
EA
23:43
Eric Arsenault
😁 let's do it!
ᴅ
23:44
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
DACs will always work with a large enough insurance amount... It is just a question of whether it is profitable for the builder.
23:44
I think I need to do some more analyse on the above equations
23:44
To see whether the bounds of profitability can be reasonable
7 May 2021
mx
06:35
mr x
In reply to this message
futarchy controlled money printing yeahh
06:35
would be differentiating feature
EA
08:06
Eric Arsenault
We should try at least, would be a cool experiment
Z
08:32
Zack
What if the dac is funded from new veo?
So if they dont produce the public good in time, some of their veo is burned.
EA
08:58
Eric Arsenault
Risk free building
08:59
but I guess we need to determine which DAC is worth doing this for
08:59
and how much
ᴅ
13:03
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah also maybe the protocol can subsidise liquidity for the pm?
13:03
But then how do you know which PMs to subsidize liquidity for?
13:04
Maybe that is best left to individuals, if they can earn fees by providing liquidity
CM
16:34
Charles Maurice
I haven't a concrete model of the above discussions, but they look like variations on demand revealing referenda.
16:35
In the example, the tax could be an inflation, perhaps.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Z
20:28
Zack
In reply to this message
I think that is a bad idea, because a mechanism like that could be exploited to inflate the supply of money without limit. I think there is no secure way to do it.

And anyway, for any proposal there will be someone who will benefit if that proposal passes. The builder who receives funding to build their project.
They should provide the liquidity to show that their project is worth doing.
They are also the most knowledgeable about their plan, and so they are the most capable to set the initial price of the market accurately.
8 May 2021
Erik Kwok invited Erik Kwok
E
02:35
Erik Kwok
Hello
JT
03:32
Jehan Tremback
In reply to this message
the risk is on the builder, isn't it?
Z
03:32
Zack
In reply to this message
The builder can team up with an entrepreneur who takes on the risk.
03:33
In the simple version the builder and entrepreneur are the same.
ᴅ
08:12
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I agree that is isn't a good idea to fund liquidity using inflation 👍
08:12
Esp considering that other actors have the incentive to do so as you mentioned
08:13
Btw I was thinking about DACs a bit more
08:14
And the incentives relating to them when considering the insurance payout
Z
08:15
Zack
great
ᴅ
08:16
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And it seems that the presence of the insurance payout causes the expected profitability of investing in a dac to vary depending on how many levels ahead you think...
08:17
As in if the oracle is likely to succeed at the moment, unless pb-d is >0 for you, which it generally won't be
08:17
You won't find it profitable to invest
08:17
But then you may consider
08:17
That that will also apply to most other people
08:17
Potentially meaning that the oracle will actually fail
08:17
Which will make it profitable to invest
08:17
Ad infinitum
Z
08:17
Zack
maybe it works out to be a probabilistic mixed solution then?
08:18
like 25% one strategy, 75% the other
08:18
some games have those kinds of solutions
ᴅ
08:18
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I don't understand how to reason about it
08:18
Like if the ideal strategy just depends on how many levels you think about of the game
08:19
If I had an option to invest in such a thing I'd probably just not invest as it would be too unpredictable and hard to reason about
08:19
And even if there was a precedent for dacs resolving in a certain way, you still wouldn't be able to use that as a basis for any decision
08:20
Because of the anti-reflexive nature of dacs as I described above
08:20
(antireflexive, as opposed to non reflexive)
Z
08:20
Zack
if 2/3rds of attempts tend to fail, then the person raising funds would need to account for that in how much money they plan to use for the fundraiser.
ᴅ
08:23
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
But even then, the precedent is not important
08:25
Because it only contributes to the cycle of oscillating expected outcomes
08:25
Just as any other piece of information would
08:33
Any price of information that should be useful in determining the outcome of a dac will not be useful
Z
08:34
Zack
It is like there is a gambling game.
There is a time limit for people to play, and if there are fewer player than some limit, then you all win 10%.
but if there are too many players, you all lose everything, and get some open source software as a consolation prize.
ᴅ
08:34
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah pretty much lol
08:35
But I do not see how that analogy helps in understanding how to reason about the outcome
Z
08:36
Zack
it just feels weird that the better situation for them is the one where the project fails.
ᴅ
08:37
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Them being the investors?
Z
08:37
Zack
right
ᴅ
08:37
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah
Z
08:37
Zack
I guess you are betting a small amount, relative to how much the public good will benefit you
ᴅ
08:38
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Well that is the thing that we are trying to determine the answer to
08:40
It seems to me that there you always incur a loss if it succeeds unless you have invested so much that the PB (pivotalProb*benefit) is greater than your investment
08:40
So therefore the only factor that should be important is the expected probability that the dac succeeds
08:41
As you only profit if it fails
08:41
In reply to this message
Fixed a typo in this: I meant greater than instead of less than
08:43
In reply to this message
But since everyone else is thinking the same thing and probably using similar heuristics to what you are using in order to estimate the probability of success, it is extremely anti-reflexive
Z
08:43
Zack
The more I think about it, the more I think something like the futarchy idea is going to work a lot better.

Force everyone who benefits to pay, but only if futarchy shows that their individual benefits significantly outweigh their individual costs.
ᴅ
08:43
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
So if you think you know the success probability, you probably don't since others probably have come to a similar conclusion, causing it to no longer be accurate.
Z
08:44
Zack
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Farol_Bar_problem DAC is like this problem from game theory, right?
08:46
Which I think is a more than 2 player version of this simpler problem from game theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_sexes_(game_theory)
ᴅ
08:48
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Interesting I haven't heard of either, reading about them now
08:48
It seems that the ideal strategy in the first link is one that isn't rational for each individual
08:48
Which is not very helpful for us
08:48
As that is the issue we are trying to solve in the first place
08:49
But yeah it definitely looks similar to this problem
Z
08:49
Zack
I think they describe a stochastic solution, where each player plays one way or the other with some probability
ᴅ
08:50
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah
08:51
But is that a stable Nash equilibrium (I think I am using this terminology right.. 😅)
08:51
As in if everyone did that, could one player benefit by adopting another strategy?
Z
08:52
Zack
I would think that different proposals we raise money for could have different subjective values for different investors. So it isn't a repeated game, where people can feel out how they fit into a community.
ᴅ
08:54
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Even if they could though, what would the impact of that be?
Z
08:55
Zack
they would settle into a nash equilibrium
ŽM
08:55
Živojin Mirić
Why is heart in amoveo group name if no one loves it
Z
08:55
Zack
the rate of successful crowdfundings would become more consistent, and the probability would be more calculable.
08:56
In reply to this message
amo is the latin root for love.
ŽM
08:57
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
No sir
08:57
If love then big price
08:57
Not true
ᴅ
09:03
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
But if the probability became more consistent then it would change
09:14
equation for profitability:
p=probability of being pivotal
s=probability of success
i=payout on failure
d=deposit amount
b=benefit from pub good

profit=s(pb-d)+i(1-s)

If everyone is investing the same amount and derives tbe same benefit from the good then it won't ever settle on a consistent probability of success
09:15
Or maybe it more accurate to say that any information that could be used to determine the success of future dacs including the success of past dacs, if known by enough people, is useless...
09:19
Hmm
09:19
Wait
09:19
This is confusing me...I need to think more about this
Z
09:20
Zack
I think in these kinds of situations, each person chooses some randomness, based on how much the public good is worth to them. and they invest or not with that randomness.
So whether it is a good idea for one person to invest, it kind of depends on all the random numbers that everyone else is calculating.
ᴅ
09:20
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I think the i(1-s) should be replaced with id(1-s) in the equation
Z
09:21
Zack
we could always run some simulations
09:22
Anyway, I think we should explore the futarchy plan more first, because the DAC seems pretty limited.
It is disappointing though, because the DAC seems to be much more widely applicable than futarchy. It isn't clear how we would use futarchy for anything besides improving that same blockchain that hosts the futarchy. Because inflating the money supply can only be used to extract payment from the holders of that currency.
ᴅ
09:23
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah agreed
09:23
It is disappointing
Z
09:23
Zack
It would be nice if we could find a more general tool, like we were hoping the dac would be
ᴅ
09:23
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I hope thst I am wrong about DACs, I might message its creator, Alex, and ask him what he thinks of this argument
Z
09:25
Zack
I think there are some other versions of dac, that weren't optimized for blockchain.

where you have a fixed list of people who you want to invest, and you choose how much you think each of them should invest.

First you visit each one and get them to agree to the plan, as long as everyone else also agrees.
09:26
So it is an all-or-nothing deal. Everyone on the list has to sign up. So they are all pivotal
ᴅ
09:26
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah yeah I have thought of this, but it is only pushing it back one step
09:26
It doesn't solve the problem
Z
09:27
Zack
if you are 100% sure that you are pivotal, why wouldn't you agree to participate?
09:28
you don't lose anything if you sign up and it doesn't pass, and the amount you are required to pay is less than the value of the public good to you.
No matter whether it succeeds or not, you are still better off having participated.
ᴅ
09:28
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm actually I was thinking of something else
09:29
Yeah I suppose one issue may be whether you can trust them to not attempt to restart it without you
09:29
Or that someone else may do it
09:29
And not include you in the list
09:29
If you don't agree this round
ŽM
09:29
Živojin Mirić
Wtf
ᴅ
09:29
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And if it is profitable to do, even without you, then that is hard to guarentee
ŽM
09:30
Živojin Mirić
You are our of space out of place, you don't have touch with reality, you will perish in the unknowing
ᴅ
09:30
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Unless it is the case that only a single person can foreseeably be the entrepreneur
ŽM
09:30
Živojin Mirić
Rekt as shit
ᴅ
09:30
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And that they have agreed to never attempt it again without you
Z
09:30
Zack
that kind of dac isn't really useful for blockchains. It only works for public goods that benefit a small number of people a lot.
ŽM
09:30
Živojin Mirić
You are circlejerking your own dicks
ᴅ
09:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
This is related to amoveo @ShakaRAMa
ŽM
09:31
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
Very related
09:31
Most related it ever was
ᴅ
09:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In that it has caused Zack to conclude that futarchy based funding is necessary
09:31
And that DACs aren't as useful as he initially thought they were
ŽM
09:32
Živojin Mirić
Are you Zacks alt?
09:32
It seems like it
ᴅ
09:32
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hah no I am not
09:32
😆
ŽM
09:33
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
This is like Zack 101
09:33
Not very convincing
09:34
Zack as fuck
ᴅ
09:34
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
You can believe that I am Zack's alt if you want to, there is nothing I can do to change your mind
ŽM
09:34
Živojin Mirić
Ok
09:34
Whatever
ᴅ
09:51
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
But yeah I agree that futarchy+inflation should probably be used to fund amoveo projects
09:52
There would need to be some metric though for determining whether a pm is liquid enough to be reliable
09:53
Some liquidity metric that isn't able to be tampered with
09:54
Total open interest is, I think, easy to manipulate since an attacker could just hold both yes and no shares
09:54
And trading volume is also easy to manipulate as an attacker can trade with themselves
Z
09:54
Zack
In reply to this message
If it isnt liquid enough, then it is cheap for others to move the price around. If the price moves around, adding liquidity is profitable.
ŽM
09:55
Živojin Mirić
You are overthinking EVERYTHING
09:55
It's fucking bull market
09:55
WHAT THE FUCK ARE YOU DOING
ᴅ
09:56
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
What do you suggest?
ŽM
09:56
Živojin Mirić
You are making a product for the pleb
09:56
LISTEN TO THE PLEB MOFOS
ᴅ
09:56
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Hmm but illiquid PMs do exist
ŽM
09:56
Živojin Mirić
You overestimate your customers
ᴅ
09:57
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Doesn't that mean that there must be an error in your argument? Or am I missing something?
ŽM
09:57
Živojin Mirić
Embrace capitalism OR DIE
Z
09:57
Zack
In reply to this message
In amoveo anyone can add liquidity. They are like uniswap markets.
09:57
In reply to this message
Even if individuals dont understand why one kind of airplane is more fuel efficient than another, they still tend to use the more efficient ones.
ŽM
09:57
Živojin Mirić
This bull is your only chance
09:57
Take it
09:58
In reply to this message
Full of shit as always
09:58
You don't live in reality
09:58
Take your head out of your ass
09:58
@zack_amoveo
09:59
I'm still here
mx
09:59
mr x
In reply to this message
This would give veo the best tokenomics ever. Use the native token to control money printing. Very fun game. All the blockchains are anyway first and foremost obsessed with themselves.
Z
09:59
Zack
In reply to this message
Maybe some liquidity in proportion to the amount of money they want to raise makes sense
ᴅ
09:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Exactly
ŽM
09:59
Živojin Mirić
Another worthless acolyte
10:00
ASCEND
10:00
Maybe maybe SHIT
ᴅ
10:00
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah but how would that be measured in such a way that isn't able to be faked? As in in such a way that actually proves that the attacker has provided an incentive for others to come in and correct the price
ŽM
10:00
Živojin Mirić
Circlejerking yourselves to death
10:00
Is not the answer
ᴅ
10:00
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
If he figures out how to only trade with himself then it isn't useful what the current price is
10:01
But maybe that isn't an issue considering lmsr
ŽM
10:01
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
Maybe maybe shit
Z
10:01
Zack
In reply to this message
We dont have any lmsr currently. It is all constant product
ᴅ
10:01
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah ok well I suppose that works as well
10:02
So the liquidity pool is a tamper proof metric for liquidity
ŽM
10:02
Živojin Mirić
It's all constant bullshit and the sooner you understand it the better
Z
10:02
Zack
In reply to this message
If the price keeps jumping around, then we know it doesnt have enough liquidity.
ᴅ
10:02
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
That can be used to automatically determine whether the outcome of a pm is reliable
ŽM
10:02
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
The price wont jump
Z
10:02
Zack
In reply to this message
We are talking about the price in the prediction market.
ŽM
10:03
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
Whatever
10:03
You understand me but you can't accept it
10:03
Even though you know I'm right
10:03
This will be your demise
10:03
(not sure about spelling :D)
ᴅ
10:04
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
You are criticising a lot but aren't offering any suggestions for what to do.
ŽM
10:04
Živojin Mirić
The truth is in the deep waters
10:04
In reply to this message
You are full of shit
10:04
What about that?
10:04
1000 old woman = shit baby
ᴅ
10:05
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
🤔
ŽM
10:05
Živojin Mirić
Yes very deep
10:05
He he
10:05
But Zack understands
10:06
He cannot accept it, but there's a single drop of truth in it
10:06
And you can't escape it with your shenanigans
10:06
You are dancing around the truth
10:06
Convincing yourselves
10:06
With lies
10:07
Truth is simple
10:07
It's been going on for years
10:07
Stop fucking around
10:08
You are afraid of the truth and the truth is in the deep waters
Z
10:12
Zack
I would rather have a small chance of building the currency than wins, instead of a bigger chance to make something that is popular for a few years.
ŽM
10:13
Živojin Mirić
Continue to lie to yourself
10:13
It's been the same for years
10:13
GROW THE FUCK UP
10:13
You are like a genius baby
10:13
Glass cannon
10:15
Take life by its throat, give it all you got, stop circlejerking with smart people without balls and without courage and vision
10:15
You have a golden egg in your lap
10:15
Fucking do something with it
10:16
ASCEND
10:16
ASCEND MOFO
10:16
You live in the gutter with potential to live in the stars
10:19
The engineering part is important but not the only thing important, the way is to develop live with all your might and with all real life problems of the product, you live in a bubble, there is a reason why almost NO ONE uses Amoveo through all these years
10:20
It's clear as day to anyone but yourself and your acolytes
ᴅ
10:20
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
What we were discussing is a solution to the problem of lack of price appreciation and adoption
10:20
It is potentially one of the most critical subjects to discuss
ŽM
10:20
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
What I'm talking about is not related to the current topic
10:21
You are talking shit to defuse the truth
10:21
The shit you're talking about (with good will and with smarts) is not really benefiting amoveo
10:22
It's dragging it down
10:22
ASCEND
ᴅ
10:22
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Why not?
ŽM
10:22
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
If you ask WHY
10:22
You simply do not understand
10:23
It should be obvious
10:23
Not everything is 1 and 0
10:23
You will learn this sooner or later, I hope Zack will learn it sooner
10:24
Life is not rational and engineered, start acting like it's not and it will be fucking great
10:31
Amoveo is a neutered griffin
10:31
Could be THE SHIT
10:31
But is 0
10:32
Circlejerk over and out
ᴅ
10:35
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
@zack_amoveo do you think all futarchy decisions should require a HF in order to be implemented after a pm has determined that they are likely to cause the long run price/hashrate to increase?
10:36
Or if the modification that the futarchy pm says will he beneficial is only for an amount of new coins to be allocated to a certain address, could it be implemented without a HF?
10:37
As in the protocol could automatically recognize such PMs and allow their outcome to cause inflation to occur if it satisfied certain criteria
10:38
Similar to the way that DAOs on ethereum implement changes without hfing the contract
Z
10:38
Zack
Since we do hard forks with futarchy anyway, it seems like the right strategy for now.

If the number of projects raising funds gets overwhelming, i guess we would automate stuff at that point.
ᴅ
10:39
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
What do you mean by amoveo already does hard forks "with futarchy"?
Z
10:39
Zack
If you want to do a controversial change to amoveo, you can use the futarchy mechanism in the light node to show that it is beneficial, and we will add it to amoveo.
ᴅ
10:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah right I see
10:41
Has that mechanism ever been employed before?
Z
10:41
Zack
The current version hasnt been used in futarchy for amoveo yet. I tested it on futarchy related to the pandemic and masks.
10:42
We used older versions for making decisions about the block reward.
ᴅ
10:42
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Interesting ok
10:42
I think a key to this being more useful is a better ux for the pm
10:42
Even if that only actually means a better UI
Z
10:42
Zack
It actually has 3 pm in it
10:43
And each of the 3 has 3 uniswap markets inside
ᴅ
10:45
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Interesting ok
mx
10:46
mr x
Automating stuff is super important imo. Onhcain hashrate futarchy money printer go brrr gives something really cool i think.
Z
10:46
Zack
We want to measure the conditional impact the decision has on the price
ᴅ
10:46
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Does exantech plan on creating a UI in their wallet for amoveo PMs?
10:46
In reply to this message
Yeah I kind of agree ;)
Z
10:46
Zack
I think they dont have plans now. But if the price rose a bunch it would become worth it for them again
ᴅ
10:47
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Interesting
Z
10:48
Zack
Having 3 uniswaps per pm makes it a lot more efficient. If you want to deposit your money as liquidity in the market, and dont want to be left holding risk other than what you started with, and you dont want to change the prices, this is possible.
ᴅ
10:49
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
So no impermanent loss?
10:49
Interesting
10:49
Tbh I still don't completely get impermanent loss
Z
10:49
Zack
It still has impermanent loss
MF
10:50
Mr Flintstone
one interesting experiment would be to use futarchy to see if giving veo to prominent people would increase the veo price
Z
10:50
Zack
Buying liquidity in a constant product pm is a bet that the price will jiggle back and forth a lot, but end up near where it started.
If it instead moves far in one direction without retracing, you end up losing money.
10:50
In reply to this message
Yeah
MF
10:50
Mr Flintstone
kind of like the blockchain is paying for marketing
ᴅ
10:51
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah that aligns with my understanding
10:52
I think the main impediment though to futarchy currently in amoveo is the ux
10:52
To bootstrap it I think it does need to be very easy to use
Z
10:53
Zack
The swap tool lets you switch between any pair of currencies, and it uses all the markets and contracts it needs to to find you the best possible price for the swap.
10:53
With a uniswap interface.
ᴅ
10:53
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Tbh I haven't actually used veo PMs before so I can't offer many helpful suggestions on the design/functionality side besides probably a better UI
Z
10:54
Zack
So you can buy stake in any pm with one simple interface.
ᴅ
10:54
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Really?
Z
10:54
Zack
Yeah, i used floodfill to find the paths between the assets, and a gradient descent algorithm to find the best combination of the paths.
ᴅ
10:55
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Nice!
10:55
That is very cool
mx
10:58
mr x
Blockchain with money printing could hire promoters, give out loans, sue people, hire mercenaries... anything you can imagine. It would be proper agent on its own right.
TG
10:58
Toby Ganger
the real question is…did you make my 3 year old VEO bags worth more? 😉
ᴅ
10:58
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Exactly
10:58
And they will have a significantly higher IQ than the room temperature iq voting-based daos
mx
10:59
mr x
100%
10:59
It is solution to decentralized governance
MF
11:00
Mr Flintstone
an oracle transaction type that gives an arbitrary account an arbitrary amount if it results in true would make this flexible
Z
11:01
Zack
In reply to this message
Yeah, that sounds like it might work
MF
11:01
Mr Flintstone
you could hire promoters seamlessly
mx
11:01
mr x
yeah
ᴅ
11:02
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Nice
11:02
Good idea
mx
11:02
mr x
and they could be just used to reward "prosocial" deeds instead of hire
ᴅ
11:04
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm should the address receive the amount before or after they do the deed?
11:04
Because if it is before then they could lie
MF
11:04
Mr Flintstone
the only threshold it needs is that a market says “true” resolution will make veo price higher
mx
11:04
mr x
yes
ᴅ
11:04
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And if it is after then they would need to already have enough capital to actually carry out the deed
mx
11:04
mr x
you can do both ways
Z
11:06
Zack
In reply to this message
Maybe want to incorporate the dac strategy that way. So the builder is betting against the blockchain on whether they will build it.

They are taking up someone else's chance to build the same thing.
MF
11:07
Mr Flintstone
In reply to this message
I think you need something to manage risk of ruin as well. because a strategy that 10% of the time does -100% to veo price but 90% of the time does +200% would show a higher price in a simple market. i cant imagine many situations where this is relevant but it just has to happen once
ᴅ
11:08
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I think it should be something like:

The pm topic is:
Will the avg price of veo and total hashrate between 1 and 2 years in the future be higher if x is funded than if it weren't funded?

And the funds should only be allocated if the difference in price between yes and no is greater than 20% (for example) and there is a large enough amount of liquidity
Z
11:09
Zack
In reply to this message
Haha, yes that makes sense
mx
11:09
mr x
In reply to this message
xD
11:09
maybe not problem in practice
ᴅ
11:09
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
That's a good point
11:10
Especially if it involves printing a large amount of veo or changing the veo consensus mechanism (although ofc that would require a HF)
11:12
In reply to this message
This relates to the Kelly criterion
11:15
In that according to the Kelly criterion you should only allocate a certain % of your portfolio to a bet that has a certain risk of succeeding and a certain payout
11:15
Even if it has a positive expected value
11:16
It isn't the best to allocate all of your portfolio to it, and will in the long run result in sub optimal returns
Z
11:16
Zack
In reply to this message
Yes, very cool.
I wonder if we can optimize that way.
Wouldn't we need the entire probability function over the possible prices that could result from a decision?
ᴅ
11:17
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Well often the KC is not useful because it just isn't possible to get accurate enough prob distributions of the payout possibilities
11:17
GIGO
11:18
(garbage in garbage out)
11:18
Maybe this is one such case
11:20
I think though that a good approximation for the maximum damage that can be inflicted on amoveo's price from funding a project is simply the % inflation it causes
11:20
Unless the thing being funded actively causes damage to amoveo
11:20
Such as a smear campaign or a 51% attack
11:21
I suppose though that they can't be ruled out in an adversarial environment
Z
11:21
Zack
There is one blockchain hiring people, and a pool of people who want to work.
So maybe the price of wages will be nearer to how much the worker values their labor, instead of how much the blockchain would improve.
ᴅ
11:21
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
...
11:22
In reply to this message
Well working for a blockchain has an opportunity cost which is not being able to work for someone else
11:23
It is just like any other employer in the employment market
Z
11:23
Zack
So it seems like more of a supply and demand situation than a kelly criterion situation where you can double your investment in a worker and expect twice the results from them.
ᴅ
11:33
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah Kelly is probably not very important as long as the risk of ruin remains low due to the inflation being low as a percent of total supply
11:33
If a proposal asked for like 50% of the supply of amoveo in funding
11:34
Then that would have a significant risk of ruin, especially if multiple were allowed
11:35
But I think the answer to this is to just restrict the amount of funding that can be allocated via pms
11:38
And to make all protocol changes a hf
11:38
So that they aren't implemented automatically
11:40
So if futarchy funding is to be automated as mr x for example described, maybe there could be a monthly budget
11:49
It just seems like if funding is to be automated there needs to be some kind of limit in order to avoid it resulting in potentially ruinous amounts of inflation that have a positive expected return
11:56
Maybe the solution is to place a cap on the maximum funding allocated to a single project?
11:57
Obviously not perfect but it is probably a good enough compromise
11:58
Thoughts?
11:59
If automated futarchy funding is to be implemented it is probably simpler to place a funding cap on each project than e.g a global funding cap for each month
12:13
It still potentially leaves amoveo open to unlimited inflation
mx
14:20
mr x
Hmm. Also curious how one would implement futarchy fully onchcain. How do you actually go from market activity to automated decision?
mx
14:46
mr x
brrr oracle with some upper limit maybe not too broken as a nice start
ᴅ
14:51
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
You would need to make the decision at a certain point in time, and it would be hardest to manipulate if it were to be based on the average price of the shares weighted by liquidity over the last [time period]
14:52
And then at that point in time if total liquidity*time is greater than a certain amount and the price is in favour of funding the project then the coins will be created and sent to the address
mx
14:53
mr x
yes thank you
ᴅ
14:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
The reason ofc for relying on averages and mandating minimum liquidity*time values is because if such things weren't mandated then it would be vulnerable to cheap manipulation
14:59
because an attacker could manipulate the price and liquidity just at the last minute
14:59
to make them seem impressive/satisfactory
15:00
without anyone having time to respond by profiting from the incorrect price by trading against it
15:03
@zack_amoveo if the pm operates on statechannel, will it be possible to verify/gain access such criteria as the above onchain?
mx
15:08
mr x
In reply to this message
wash trading though?
ᴅ
15:09
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
yeah that was one of my original concerns, but it actually isn't an issue due to liquidity!=volume. Liquidity is not manipulatable as anyone can always trade against it
15:10
liquidity is the capital in the uniswap pool
15:10
so it can't be faked
15:10
because people can't be excluded from trading against it
15:11
liquidity represents the price slippage of executing a trade, and so therefore how accurate the market should be
mx
15:11
mr x
nice
ᴅ
15:11
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
because the less slippage there is, the more accurate the market price will be because it is easier and more profitable for people to correct it if it is wrong
15:12
because they can make bigger trades without moving the price as much
15:12
and so therefore have more of an incentive to contribute their information to the market price
Z
18:36
Zack
In reply to this message
That is how the oracle mechanism already works. It needs to stay in one state long enough.
18:37
In reply to this message
Amoveo contracts arent based on state channels like they used to be.
You can still make state channels, but it isnt a requirement of all smart contracts.
ᴅ
18:38
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Ah I see, so it is onchain?
Z
18:52
Zack
In reply to this message
not totally.
We have a very unique smart contract system.
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/design/smart_contracts.md this document walks through the reasoning of why we couldn't do it all with state channels.
they are too capital inefficient.
ᴅ
18:52
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Awesome thanks Zack
Z
18:53
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/design/smart_contracts_as_derivatives.md this document talks about design decisions we needed to take for the smart contracts to preserve scalability.
18:53
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/design/shareable_contracts_implementation.md this one is more specific about the implementation we are using.
18:54
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/design/transaction_types.md this is all the transaction types in Amoveo. A lot are related to smart contracts.
18:55
We keep our smart contracts off-chain as much as possible. We use a merklized abstract syntax tree (MAST), so that only the part of the contract that gets executed ever needs to go on-chain.
18:55
and the smart contract itself is never saved in consensus state.
We store a hash of the smart contract in consensus state, and the result after the contract is run.
18:57
Each individual smart contract is immutable, but one way to resolve a smart contract is that it creates a new smart contract and ownership in the first contract gets converted into the second.
So if you want to mutate the smart contract code, the way to do that in Amoveo is by creating a new smart contract.

This has scalability benefits, and it means the ID of a contract is determined by the code of that contract.
19:02
Blockchain smart contracts are a lot like any kind of computer program in a distributed network.
The program can be any 2 of: mutable, shareable, and scalable.

So it needs one of these three drawbacks.
* either it is not scalable (an unacceptable drawback for our smart contracts, we don't allow this.)
* it is immutable. So you can't change the smart contract code.
* it is unshareable. There is some finite list of participants, and new people can't join.

I tried to optimize it so that unshareable contracts and immutable contracts can be converted into each other as cheaply and easily as possible.
19:07
I wrote the hard update for the new tx type. contract_timeout_tx2.
and the tests are passing.
im thinking I want to also update it so that contract_simplify_tx and contract_winnings_tx can all be included in the same block.
I want to do it all in a single hard update, because I think we need all this stuff for the offers to buy veo in the DAC to work nicely.
Z
19:47
Zack
Im hoping we wont need more hard updates before we can get this feature working.

But these updates arent specific to this smart contract. They make the smart contract system as a whole much more versatile.
ᴅ
19:50
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
What are these tx types and what do they do?
Z
19:55
Zack
contract_timeout_tx2 is nearly the same thing as contract_timeout_tx.
The difference is that if the contract ends by creating a child contract, you need to write the contract ID of that child into contract_timeout_tx2.

this contract ID is calculated from the hash of the smart contract code.

The problem with the old strategy is that we couldn't know the content of the child contract until we had finished calculating the parent contract, so we couldn't parallelize processing of the txs.
With the new strategy we can do the txs in parallel.
19:57
well, more specifically, we couldn't know what merkle proof we needed for the child contract until we knew the contract id of the child contract.
So it wasn't possible to build the merkle proofs for the tx unless we had already processed that tx.
SS
21:23
Steve Steve
Is the chia coin technology very strong?
Z
21:24
Zack
In reply to this message
how does this relate to Amoveo?
SS
21:26
Steve Steve
There are relationships! You can refer to their marketing
ᴅ
21:27
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Isn't chia a proof of capacity based chain?
yu zhou invited yu zhou
9 May 2021
MF
02:11
Mr Flintstone
i think that if we make the rules of the game: any bet that has not matched for X amount of time where the bet is on the price of veo increasing as a result of some address being printed VEO. this is sufficient justification for printing veo to that address
02:11
any attempt to exploit this makes it more robust
02:11
deciding on X is kind of arbitrary but it should be something reasonable like a day or something
02:12
In reply to this message
we dont necessarily need any complex on chain function though an on chain market can be justification per this
mx
04:17
mr x
Yeah
MF
06:30
Mr Flintstone
it also kind of proves if the oracle works. if you think that someone with money can force an oracle outcome, now instead of just win some bet they actually lost, they can actually print themselves any amount of veo at any time
mx
06:51
mr x
steelman design helps attacker to construct the strongest form of attack
Z
08:30
Zack
the futarchy tool has interesting behavior when it resolves.
As one side of the binary contract becomes more likely to win, the other side's value approaches zero.
So the scalar contract collateralized by the loser's side of the binary contract, it is worth almost nothing.
So the market has almost no liquidity.
So the price doesn't work.

To read the result of a resolved futarchy market, you just look at which side of the binary contract won.
To read the state of a futarchy market in progress, you can compare the scalar PMs to get an estimate for how much the plan impacts what we want to maximize for.
08:36
Does that work?
It seems like you might need the history of the markets to verify that a futarchy decision was done correctly. You can't tell from the final consensus state of the blockchain.
08:42
Maybe each market should have it's own chain of headers, a header for every tx that changes it. So you could have a light node sync the history of the markets it is interested in, without syncing the full blocks.
MF
08:59
Mr Flintstone
why cant you just do all the betting off chain
09:00
it is easy to know if a bet has not been taken i think
Z
09:00
Zack
the result of the futarchy seems like it needs to be in consensus state somehow.

You can make an expired bet after-the-fact
09:01
maybe the PoW is enough evidence?
MF
09:01
Mr Flintstone
the oracle result is evidence as well
09:01
yeah thats related to the pow i guess
09:06
i feel like an expired bet created after the fact cannot have been seen by anyone participating in the futarchy so it would not hold any weight
09:07
it is not good evidence
Z
09:07
Zack
we don't want syncing the blockchain to require having had a node on-line while the blockchain was built.
Z
09:25
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/use-cases-and-ideas/dominant_assurance_contract.md
Distbit helped me come up with a new design for dominant assurance contracts.
It works for any community raising money, not just a cryptocurrency community.
ᴅ
09:28
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
💪
P invited P
Leon invited Leon
10 May 2021
JT
07:39
Jehan Tremback
how did you help him if youre his alt
OK
08:55
O K
In reply to this message
Not possible
ᴅ
15:58
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
🤷‍♂️
ᴅ
16:29
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Looks like a monero fork
C
18:08
Coyle
NFT boom in 2021 = ICO boom 2017
18:08
Deleted Account
In reply to this message
ICOs definitely died out lol, everyone knows they were cash cows for the teams only
Z
18:09
Zack
hello new members typing at insane speed. are you here for Amoveo or for spam?
C
18:09
Coyle
is conversation an option
Z
18:09
Zack
this is a channel to talk about Amoveo
C
18:09
Coyle
😂
18:10
Deleted Account
no wonder your shitty groups dead
18:10
cant even have convoes
18:10
without being attacked for it
ᴅ
18:11
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
We have great conversations here, about things related to amoveo
KL
18:57
Karlis L
mby its time to rename AMOVEO into smth dog-related?
seems to be working great: 2 of the top 20 by market cap right now :D
Z
19:35
Zack
labradoodle coin
KL
19:57
Karlis L
how did you come up with the name AMOVEO originally btw?
19:58
google suggest "steal" as one of the meanings from latin :D
ᴅ
19:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I think the amo part means "to love" and the veo part has something to do with seeing?
19:59
not totally sure
ŽM
20:30
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
alt account as fuck lol
Z
20:31
Zack
My roommate from college suggested it
ᴅ
20:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
lol
Z
20:31
Zack
Seemed easy enough to pronounce, and at the time google search wasnt turning up the weird stuff it does now.
20:40
At the time i was considering the names plasmodial and flying fox
ᴅ
20:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah yeah I recall flying fox being mentioned quite a bit on the Bitcoin hivemind forums
KL
21:30
Karlis L
eh...see, if it was FOX from the beginning, we would be top 20 now :P
B
21:51
Ben
lets renome to fox.dex
21:51
fox.finance
21:51
easy top 10 coin
Z
22:27
Zack
Flying foxes are adorable like doges too
T
22:44
Tromp
Hahahaha fox.finance doesnt sound bad
11 May 2021
JT
00:22
Jehan Tremback
yea this will solve our problems boys
EA
00:23
Eric Arsenault
lol
Z
20:25
Zack
An early worry in distributed prediction market technology was assassination markets.
But we realized they dont work, because the victim can pretend to be killed to steal the money from the market.

Since then, we have developed a lot more technology. It is now possible to make contracts that reference oracles, and the oracle text is secret until and unless it is needed to enforce the contract.
So if an assassination contract exists, it might be impossible for the victim to realize. So he wont know to pretend to be dead.
20:27
In most cases, the oracle text is never revealed, so we would never know that an assassination contract had existed.
20:28
Is there some way to prevent this from happening?
ᴅ
20:29
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Doesn't sztorc have a different argument for why AMs won't work on PMs?
J
20:41
Josh
Seems like a good point. If AM's actually work, there would be a lot of money to be made betting that they work.
Z
20:53
Zack
In reply to this message
He is talking about prediction markets.
Amoveo now enables one on one private contracts as well as prediction markets.
20:54
Direct private contracts seem like better tech for this all around.
PM have the problem that people other than the assassin can take the assassins side of the contract and reduce how much they can get paid.
ᴅ
20:55
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah ok yeah I will need to think about this more then. I admittedly haven't actually got to the end of the above paper, and probably should in order to have a better foundation when considering this
Z
20:56
Zack
One strategy we can use is to declare "bad question" as the result of any oracle question that involves a person getting hurt or dying.

But amoveos oracle is based on pow. If market forces say that the version of amoveo with assassin contracts is more valuable, then it is out of our control.
ᴅ
20:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
If there is value in the assassination market use case then you probably can't expect it to resolve to bad question
20:59
It is not as AMs being allowed impedes on the utility of it for other markets
21:00
It would only be out of altruism that people would use a chain that doesn't allow them imo
Z
21:00
Zack
If AMs are occurring, some people might refuse to hold veo or program for veo for moral reasons.
21:01
But then, it is easy enough for an AM enabled version to copy tech from the AM disabled version.
ᴅ
21:02
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah exactly
21:02
Possible, but it could be empirically outweighed by the demand and value in AMs
21:02
Can't really know it advance
21:03
Especially if AMs have ambiguous morality due to being used to kill govt agents as well as innocent individuals ;)
Z
21:03
Zack
They arent assassin markets. It is a 2 party private contract. Not an open market.
21:03
Assassin contracts
ᴅ
21:04
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah true, but it can still add value to amoveo by creating demand for the coin
21:04
(maybe, but of course this is also an open question)
21:04
As we discussed previously
Z
21:04
Zack
Plenty of weapons manufacturers are morally questionable, while being legal and important for military
ᴅ
21:06
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah people are often very opportunistic about their moral condemnations, especially when something is supported by the state (which ACs wouldn't be).... But people may still be opportunistic about their moral condemnation due to the over-riding financial incentives to participate in amoveo and not boycott it
Z
21:07
Zack
Its not an AM. Its an AC
ᴅ
21:07
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah true
Z
21:08
Zack
I think the us legal code has something about authorizing congress to make letters of marque
ᴅ
21:09
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I think my equivocation of the terms is due to my unfamiliarity with the implications of the differences in each. Like I get it at a v high level that AMs allow for front running of the Assassin but I haven't considered how that would play out with ACs
21:11
In reply to this message
I'm sure. The president has that power to some degree as well
21:13
And they pass legislation which have the same effect, such as no knock raids, the war on drugs etc
21:13
Not to mentioned foreign intervention
21:13
Gtg sleep
21:13
Good night
12 May 2021
EA
07:03
Eric Arsenault
@zack_amoveo any thoughts on when it'll be possible to go BTC > VEO via the DEX?
JS
11:29
Jon Snow
Check out who the author is
EA
12:24
Eric Arsenault
Super interesting
CM
15:57
Charles Maurice
everlasting optioin: https://twitter.com/_Dave__White_/status/1392183717930541057
G
23:48
Gregory
Hey Zack, any gay people around?
Z
23:50
Zack
In reply to this message
I think your translation might be wrong.
It isn't clear how that relates to Amoveo.
G
23:52
Gregory
casper started trading. they have literally nothing. much less than you have. but guess what? their mcap is 10 billion
13 May 2021
IS
00:06
Ilmu Somebody
https://github.com/nervosnetwork/force-bridge-eth/

What do you guys think of this?
ŽM
00:06
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
that's not important!
00:06
Amoveo is not about making money!
Z
00:08
Zack
In reply to this message
I think bridges are a bad strategy, because they depend on a trusted team of validators.
IS
00:08
Ilmu Somebody
well apparently this bridge depends only on the miners in each respective network
ŽM
00:09
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
isn't veo futarchy dependant on it's community (as in people) as validators?
I
00:10
Instinct
In reply to this message
Spend money on marketing VEO if u want
Z
00:11
Zack
In reply to this message
Oh yeah. It looks like both blockchains are light nodes of each other. That sounds like a good strategy.
00:11
In reply to this message
Futarchy doesnt have the game theoretic weaknesses that voting has.
Additionally, futarchy doesnt depend on locking up stake the way validators need to.
G
00:12
Gregory
In reply to this message
i did spend, turned out money in the trash
I
00:14
Instinct
In reply to this message
I think once we have the crosschain dex compatible with privacy coins that would be the time tbh
ŽM
00:19
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
thx, but I'll respond when I get really drunk as usual when I write something here
00:19
busy now :S
JT
00:23
Jehan Tremback
In reply to this message
Seems like a lot of wasted effort once eth moves to pos
IS
00:24
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
%s/once/if/g don't think vitalik has enough pull to force it through the miners.
JT
00:25
Jehan Tremback
who cares about the miners
IS
01:38
Ilmu Somebody
people who want their networks to stay online
JT
01:51
Jehan Tremback
lol what? No switch to PoS will ever be endorsed by miners. Nobody is going to try to "force it through", and switchover plans do not include their cooperation
01:52
whether all the users, apps, and services on Ethereum will coordinate well enough to pull off a switch is a different question
01:54
but the miners will have their own coordination problem as well, since they will need to execute a hard fork because of the difficulty bomb
01:54
i'm guessing the PoS proponents will time their move over accordingly
IS
01:59
Ilmu Somebody
yeah my choice of words is dumb you are right
02:01
the sentiment was roughly:
-> lots of people will want ethereum to stay PoW
-> who will need to rename?
-> I'm betting PoS side
02:04
but they already did I guess with the "2.0"
SS
15:45
Steve Steve
@zack_amoveo Hello zach
acrylix invited acrylix
a
17:24
acrylix
Hi, I'm a senior Full stack/blockChain expert and hope to get a job here. Please let me know CTO/CEO.
ŽM
17:25
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
hahahhahaha
17:25
this is sticker pack material right there
M
18:57
Minieep21
In reply to this message
Create a market for your employment
14 May 2021
OK
00:24
O K
In reply to this message
Maybe we can hire him to make sticker packs
B
13:21
Ben
you can also hire me to make sticker packs 😛
13:21
i would even do it for free if i would see an benefit in it.
13:22
but in current state nothing it would be worth to do marketing for
15 May 2021
TG
14:33
Toby Ganger
it’s rather sad that 3 years later and we’re missing out on this entire bull market also
14:33
woe to the bagholders
M
19:14
Minieep21
@zack_amoveo any thoughts on the resurfaced PoW environmental concerns? Elon's 180 turn has brought that back in force
Z
19:38
Zack
In reply to this message
Electricity is expensive to store. Cryptocurrency is cheap to store.
Converting value from electricity form into cryptocurrency form is a good way to store your value for latter.

Is converting grapes into wine a waste of grapes?
Z
20:10
Zack
The key misunderstanding is that people think of pow as the cost to secure txs.
In reality, pow is the process of converting value from electricity form to cryptocurrency form, and we get security as a free side-effect.
M
20:12
Minieep21
I think it'll take a very long time for that to be understood by non-crypto people
20:13
environmentally friendly is the hot topic
Z
20:14
Zack
Im no expert on propaganda
20:16
But it is important to keep in mind that cryptocurrency is antifragile.
If you attack it, it adapts and gets stronger.
Every attack it survives gives it more legitimacy.

The quickest path to cryptocurrency dominance is probably the one with the most resistance.
M
20:38
Minieep21
Interesting
D
22:48
Devender
In reply to this message
Very interesting point
16 May 2021
IS
00:25
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
which is why we need to start rocking the boat... attacks on PoS is a great goal but to get there we need to start building trust in the oracle
00:25
can we do small bets to motivate propaganda?
00:32
first identify channels:
- podcasts: debate, swiss road, solana, zk, uncommon core, non-crypto
- forums: reddit, hackernews, crypto-specific
- twitter personalities, blog sites, ...

then make targeted attacks:
- X$ that there won't be a blogpost on HN frontpage about amoveo

once we manage to get the first feature we can follow it immediately by placing a bunch of bets that there won't be a mention in a podcast or by a personality (here these cartesian oracles for betting on specific subsets would be nice).

this will be easy money for people who have power to influence these channels and if they've clicked through from HN they will maybe see the bets.

then we can start doing bets that there won't be feature pull requests for FE for example. if we optimize for activity then some of it will be signal and the noise will help us find vulnerabilities in the oracles.
00:34
first we need fox.finance I guess.
00:35
we should have a very clean web UI for the kind of bets that we are optimizing for at that moment. propaganda being the first type that is interesting.
Z
00:39
Zack
In reply to this message
sounds like a plan we can test out.
00:40
In reply to this message
changing name seems risky.
Debates about changing name can be a huge drain on the energy of a community.
IS
00:41
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
yep, definitely don't debate it! do-ocracy, amoveo is foss.. just buy a domain and make a business
00:41
I think I'll try my hand at a shapeshift from monero to veo this summer
00:52
now I'm wondering:
- RSS/Atom feeds of oracles?
- Hook into fediverse?
- Organize oracles into tags?
Z
01:19
Zack
In reply to this message
We have a page that displays recent oracles.
Tags might be useful, but i think we need some kind of activity before we know how to organize it.
IS
01:20
Ilmu Somebody
visiting that page is overhead, it's easier to follow it in your mastodon or add it to your RSS reader.
01:20
agree w.r.t. organizing tags.
01:21
there's even a way to get RSS to telegram (if you don't mind being harvested for data: @rss2tg_bot)
OK
01:22
O K
In reply to this message
Is dual-branding instead of rebranding something that is possible? Has it been done before in crypto? Would that just be too much maintenance overhead?
01:22
I wonder if anyone would even push back against rebranding at this point honestly
IS
01:23
Ilmu Somebody
the way I see it: every single thing like fixedfloat.com or whatever is infrastructure for certain projects
01:23
so it's not affiliated with anything in particular
01:23
amoveo is kind of similar, even if you use the amoveo network you can be whatever kind of webstie
01:24
so basically; if someone makes fox.finance, a website that uses amoveo for some financial services but also offers other services at a cost... then is that dual-branding? or rebranding? or just a random company with a website (making a amoveo-protocol ~ http analogue)
Z
01:28
Zack
In reply to this message
Maybe we can reuse the code from that page to make your rss or telegram bot.
01:29
In reply to this message
A/b testing is normal for startups
IS
01:29
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
there's probably a feed generator in erlang
01:29
you just need a .rss page in your sitemap
01:29
then you can register the rss stream with a tg bot or whatever
01:29
change it into email notifications
Z
01:30
Zack
I havent used rss before, but i can learn
01:30
In reply to this message
That sounds good
IS
01:31
Ilmu Somebody
it's a standard format that is defined in XML, there are feed generators in most programming languages that have some API and create this XML file, then you just need to put the XML file in some canonical location on the website
Deleted invited Deleted Account
17 May 2021
ᴅ
00:19
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
https://mobile.twitter.com/fnietom/status/1392878640640274432
00:19
@zack_amoveo interesting conversation on pow security model
Z
00:22
Zack
Fernando has a lot of good ideas. He tends to answer question too if you dm him
mx
00:52
mr x
and hence hash rate should be as high as possible
B
02:34
Ben
re-branding is not a big issues, since amoveo did no marketing at all
02:34
actually the brand is shriniking anyway, the group here had 1200+ people at peak if i remeber correctly
02:35
so maybe a new fancy name an webpage can attract new people
Z
02:36
Zack
Are they real people?
I feel like the actual number of people here is less than 10.
ŽM
02:36
Živojin Mirić
What are you talking about Ben
02:36
Making money with amoveo is irrelevant
02:37
Only Zack does that
Z
02:37
Zack
I havent sold any veo
I
02:40
Instinct
In reply to this message
😂
R
03:22
Ric
In reply to this message
👋😃
ŽM
03:52
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
ok, sry
03:52
then no one makes money with amoveo, it's irrelevant
03:52
amoveo perma bear market
03:53
it has aura of no-pump
I
03:53
Instinct
In reply to this message
Good
OK
04:35
O K
We have at least 14 or 15 people
M
05:35
Minieep21
16*
D
05:35
Devender
Attendance please!
T
09:09
Topab
Interesting fight going on due to the Elon Musk support for Doge. Maybe it's positive for people to know more about the technical aspects of crypto
09:09
Here Adam back comments on why block size it's important
09:10
What's Amoveo block size?
Z
14:31
Zack
Around half a megabyte i think
T
15:26
Topab
Thanks Zack
Z
15:44
Zack
http://159.89.87.58:8080/lookup.html
looks like it is 0.132 megabytes
Z
19:05
Zack
This is the announcement for hard update 51, which will activate on block 165250, in about a week. Full nodes need to update.

Here are the same updating instructions as always: https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master//getting-started/updating.md

There was a problem in the crosschain DEX where we needed to wait around a full block period, just to provide the address where you want to get paid. This update fixes that problem.

More specifically, this update adds the feature that a smart contract can resolve into a child contract, we can use that child contract, all in the same block.
18 May 2021
B
00:07
Ben
sounds like a step to get the DEX working
Z
00:09
Zack
yeah. it is important for our long term scalability goals too. to make sure that the txs can be processed in parallel.
It also makes the smart contract system more powerful. Anything you want to do with smart contracts, now you can do it all in a single block. You don't need to wait.
R
00:17
Ric
In reply to this message
Nice one!
EA
04:32
Eric Arsenault
nice
IS
08:22
Ilmu Somebody
https://youtu.be/DY6H9aUDpB0
08:23
this is a very interesting analysis
ᴅ
10:49
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah yeah it has been refuted I think...
10:49
Well at least I believe it has
10:50
Basically miners can pay miners for mining ontop of their block
10:50
Enough so that other miners find it less profitable to reorg it than to mine ontop of it and collect the accompanying compensation/bribe for doing so
10:50
Since reorging has a cost associated with it which is that your chain will be shorter
J
17:12
Josh
@distbit do you have a link to a rebuttal?
17:12
Here's the original paper
Z
17:14
Zack
The way miner bribe each other not to ignore blocks, they dont use all the txs in the mempool.
ᴅ
17:19
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah that's also a possibility
17:19
True
17:20
In reply to this message
I have a link to a Twitter thread in which this was briefly discussed, and also there is a github page written by Zack that briefly summarizes this argument but I do not know of any material on it
Z
17:20
Zack
Or if there is one tx with a massive fee, as a kind of attack, the first pool can take that tx, and build another tx that depends on the first tx existence, and the next tx pays 95% of the fee, or whatever portion is optimal.
ᴅ
17:21
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah this is what i was referring to by my reference to a direct bribe
J
17:24
Josh
But when you're building the block you don't know when the next block will come out so I could see it leading to chaotic situations.
Z
17:25
Zack
Another factor.
I doubt a zero block reward would ever be optimal. As long as the economy is growing, the demand for currency will grow.
17:25
In reply to this message
Why would variable block time matter?
J
17:26
Josh
If the next block doesn't come out for a while you might not have to bribe as much because the miner will get a lot of fees.
Z
17:28
Zack
it is all probabilistic.
There is a chance your pool will find 10 blocks in 20 seconds, and you could have cleared out the entire mempool of txs without worrying about people ignoring your blocks.
17:29
The idea is that miners will go with the strategy that is most profitable in the long term. even if it seems regretful in some small instances.
17:29
if your pool has 10% of the hashpower, and the block time is 10 minutes, then you have some expectation that it will take around 140 minutes for you to find your next block.
17:30
in equilibrium, I guess the amount of tx fees a miner would want to include in their block would be the same as the amount of tx fee that users make over a 10 minute period.
J
17:31
Josh
I think it's more complicated than that, block time is very variable
17:32
Sometimes you can't include any fees in your block since the block comes very fast after the previous one.
ᴅ
17:32
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
A miner doesn't know that they are going to mine a block unusually quickly until they do, and the moment they do so, they can no longer chose whether to re-org. So miners have to mine with the assumption that they will mine the next block with an average delay after the previous block
Z
17:33
Zack
the idea is that the mempool at any time, it would have something like 50x as many tx fees sitting in it in comparison to how many fees a miner is actually incentivized to include in their block.
17:33
each miner only includes 2% of the mempool
ᴅ
17:33
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
And miners will put a bribe for the next block that will make it profitable to mine on top of for a block that arrives at the expected average time
17:34
In reply to this message
But you don't know this until you have mined the block, and then you can't go and change what block you are mining ontop of in order to reorg. As a potential miner of next block, you just have to assume you will mine it on average 10 mins after the last block
17:34
Since you only learn otherwise after it is too late to act on such knowledge
J
17:42
Josh
This is plausible but there's a complex new game here so we have to prove there's a dominant equilibrium. I have to look back at the paper to see if they discussed this.
Z
17:44
Zack
if you think you might have broken bitcoin, there is a big incentive to get a paper out and get evidence with your name on it.
But if you find out an attack doesn't work, it isn't so important, and the memes travel more in our oral traditions.
ŽM
17:46
Živojin Mirić
Omg triple alt convo
J
18:59
Josh
In reply to this message
True but that doesn't mean this isn't a problem.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
IS
23:38
Ilmu Somebody
the guy who made avalanche has a good question in the end about redoing the analysis where you factor in the exchange rate of the currency (and make the simulation assume that it is correlated with latency - which foreshadows his decision to focus on latency in the avalanche network but I digress)... I don't know if anyone did redo the analysis with that assumption factored in but the reason I shared this was more about the technique of his analysis than the result of it. The link between game theory and machine learning is pretty obvious but I feel the work that has gone into machine learning in the last decade hasn't been exploited nearly enough by the cryptocurrency world for building simulators for game theories
19 May 2021
Tian invited Tian
T
02:51
Tian
Hi Gents. Hope you are doing well. I am a full stack blockchain developer with 10 years of experience dev experience and would like to participate in a cool crypto project.

Frontend : Vue, React, Angular
Backend : Laravel, Django, Spring, ASP.NET
Blockchain : Ethereum, Solidity, Go, C++, Dapps, Ripple, Geth, Remix IDE, Mist, Ganache CLI, Solium, Ether Scripter,
Embark, Metamask, Blockchain TestNet, Truffle

If anyone interested, please let me know
Thanks
EA
02:54
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
do you DAC?
JT
03:06
Jehan Tremback
Do You Even DAC Bro
EA
03:36
Eric Arsenault
lol
user2432615184 invited user2432615184
18:50
I made a document about funding development with futarchy and hard updates https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/use-cases-and-ideas/funding_development.md
T
19:14
Topab
A big steal due to oracle issues https://twitter.com/FrankResearcher/status/1394900186435096578?s=19
I
19:17
Instinct
In reply to this message
It wasn’t really due to oracle issues, just illiquid assets
Z
22:32
Zack
In reply to this message
Hahaha
20 May 2021
. . invited . .
JT
00:58
Jehan Tremback
that's what this telegram channel is for
IS
08:20
Ilmu Somebody
sorry it has a lot of interesting links out
08:25
this david siska guy has very nice entry level explanations of derivatives and option pricing
08:30
it was not an endorsement of some PoS thing .. but the research and other resources are legit.
08:35
Igh why am I explaining when you also deleted your chastisement..
Z
08:40
Zack
If you want to share a link, explain how it relates to amoveo.
And it is better to share a link to a single article, or single paragraph in an article, instead of sharing a list of links to a bunch of articles.
IS
08:48
Ilmu Somebody
Respectfully disagree with your second point but I have no intention of breaking any rules.
Ajda Achmed invited Ajda Achmed
BB
22:22
Bundy Bunsen
what's next for Amoveo? holding since 2019
Z
22:39
Zack
Crosschain dex is still in progress. It has the potential to be a lot cheaper and more secure than alternatives.
21 May 2021
AK
03:27
A K
Zack, have you reviewed ThorChain?
EA
03:37
Eric Arsenault
he has yes
JT
04:30
Jehan Tremback
amoveo has a smart contract language, right?
04:34
Chalang vm was rewritten into javascript and chicken scheme too.
04:34
It has multiple compilers. And the forth like compiler was rewritten into javascript.
04:35
Tough crowd. I was expecting the parallelized smart contract idea to be popular. https://twitter.com/zack_bitcoin/status/1395394633367269378?s=19
EA
04:37
Eric Arsenault
implications of that were over my head tbh
04:37
but sounds cool
04:37
just waiting for something usable wrt amoveo...
Z
04:37
Zack
People are excited about layer 2, but disappointed because evm is single threaded and wont scale
04:38
Here is a way to do smart contracts that can scale for optimistic rollup or zkrollup or whatever layer 2.
04:40
Ethereum fees are too high, right?
If we want smart contracts for 10 billion users, then they need to be parallelizable.
EA
04:40
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
do you consider Matic as layer 2? Assuming you are talking about zk, opimism, etc
Z
04:40
Zack
I dont know matic
EA
04:40
Eric Arsenault
polygon
04:41
or binance smart chain
04:41
evm chain but more centralized
Z
04:45
Zack
I looked at matic's website. I Still dont know what they are doing.

Centralization is more expensive, you need to pay someone to not rob you.
04:47
Polygon looks like a library for ethereum like blockchains to have embedded light nodes of each other.
04:48
Making lots of little blockchains that talk to each other isnt going to work, because the security isnt scaling.

If you split a blovkchain into 100 little blockchains, each one is 100x cheaper to attack than if it was one big one.
04:51
Evm is single threaded.
You cant process one tx until you first process all proceding txs. You cant process the txs in parallel.

The memoryless full node design and amoveos smart contract strategy is already compatible with running different smart contracts in parallel. Our limitation was that each individual smart contract is single threaded.

Hard update 51 breaks this limit. Now individual smart contracts can be multi threaded.
04:54
Single threaded evm is a huge limitation. It means even if you are willing to spend 100x more on hardware for your full node, it still couldnt process txs faster.

By parallelizing tx processing and smart contract processing, we can allow for infinite scalability. By spending 2x more on a full node, that full node can process txs twice as fast.
The full node might be a bunch of computers working together though.
04:56
So we dont need more blockchains. We can have one blockchain with gigabyte blocks and fit the whole planet's txs into it.
ᴅ
05:28
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Interesting! What kind of security model exists for users who don't value full node security more than the cost of running one? Are spv proofs used?
Z
05:29
Zack
In reply to this message
You can run a light node sure.
It is memoryless full nodes. So if you are running a full node, you can choose whatever slice of the consensus state that you want to keep track of.
05:31
If you ignore part of the consensus state, and dont want to share blocks, you can delete the blocks after downloading, and only download the part of the block related to the part of the consensus state that you are following.
05:32
That would make you a full node for part of the consensus state, and a light node for the rest
05:33
Im not sure if that has any benefit over a normal light node though.
ᴅ
05:34
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Ha pk I do not have an intuition for how that works tbh. If you only validate part of the state, what guarentees do you have about the correctness of the state you don't validate?

How is the consensus state divided? What does it mean to only verify part of it? Does that mean to only validate a certain type of block, or a certain part of the data in each block? Btw I am only replying slowly due to slow mode being enabled 👍
Z
05:34
Zack
Slow mode?
Maybe some other mod changed the rules?
ᴅ
05:35
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah fixed 👍
Z
05:35
Zack
I never knew about slow mode before. I just turned it off
05:36
A partly full mode could potentially only download the txs related to the part of consensus state they care about.
But the more i think about it, the more i think that isnt giving anything a normal light node doesnt already have.
ᴅ
05:37
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Cool yeah it significantly lowers the throughput of conversations imo.. maybe it has some benefits, I do not have much experience with it
05:37
In reply to this message
Yeah that was also my conclusion
05:37
Because they don't have a guarentee that the stage is correct
05:38
So potentially could be tricked by a 51% miner into following an invalid most-pow chain
05:39
Maybe using forks as a fraud proof heuristic could be helpful in increasing their security
Z
05:39
Zack
Light nodes still verify the normal pow.
ᴅ
05:39
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Like if a block is detected that conflicts with a block in their longest chain, then they validate the block it is competing with
Z
05:40
Zack
Yes. Only checking blocks that fork can make syncing a lot faster.
ᴅ
05:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
As it being mined is an indication that a miner may be disputing the validity of the original block
05:40
In reply to this message
👍
05:40
This is an idea I borrowed from Ruben somsen
05:41
His softchains proposal specifically
05:41
Which is a proposal to use this to validate sidechains, with its own security trade-offs ofc
Z
05:41
Zack
Syncing up history isnt really a bottleneck for any part of the blockchain though
05:41
we can sync blocks in reverse order
05:43
The bottlenecks are more for when mining pools are collecting txs to build the next block, and when mining pools are verifying a single block shared by other pools, so they can start mining a block on top of it.
05:44
Mining pools need to spend less than around 10% of their time verifying that block.
That way they spend more than 90% of their time doing useful work trying to find the next block.
05:45
And mining pools need to be able to process txs faster than the txs are created, so that the txs can actually be included in a block.
ᴅ
05:46
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I was more thinking this could be useful for improvise the security of otherwise fully light clients, rather than improving the efficiency of otherwise full nodes 👍
05:46
As in like an spv++ mode
Z
05:47
Zack
Yeah, it would be nice if spv nodes didnt follow a higher difficulty chain that has a invalid block in its history
ᴅ
05:48
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Makes sense 👍
05:49
In reply to this message
Yeah because most of the concern surrounding spv security is that miners may mine invalid blocks if there are an enough spv clients available to be tricked
05:49
So the longest chain may actually be invalid
05:49
But this allows for spv clients to not be susceptible to this attack, as long as they wait long enough for a fork block to arrive
05:50
E.g if only 10% of miners are honest, then a disputing block will take on avg 10 blocks before it is mined disputing the first invalid block
05:50
So depending on the spv clients assumption of how many miners are honest, they will need to wait a certain amount to time in order to have sufficient guarentees
Z
05:55
Zack
Another way to get this security is to have the spv nodes all freeze if some full nodes in their list have forked.
05:56
The light node could check the full nodes for the mining pools and for exchanges and the explorers
05:57
It is pretty convenient having the light node in javascript.
But rewriting the full node in javascript would be a lot of work.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
23 May 2021
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Z
20:06
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/design/memoryless_full_node.md I wrote about memoryless full nodes, and tried to calculate how much more scalable they can be, and how much a full node would cost.
Z
21:30
Zack
In reply to this message
I made another draft.
ᴅ
21:49
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah nice
21:49
So it allows for "storage sharding"
21:50
But not "bandwidth/computation sharding"
Z
21:51
Zack
a fiber optic cable can have 100 terabytes per second, so I feel like bandwidth isn't the bottleneck
ᴅ
21:51
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Although maybe light client + fraud proofs could allow for " bandwidth/computation sharding"
Z
21:51
Zack
and the computation is all parallelizable, plus CPU are just so fast. I don't see that being the bottleneck either.
ᴅ
21:52
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah it definitely isn't a global bottleneck, but may be a bottleneck for individual users who are not able to afford full node security due to bandwidth costs

But maybe they can just use spv++ (spv+fraud proofs)
Z
21:56
Zack
verifying merkle proofs is lots of sha256.
Most of the tx processing is verifying the signature.
All of that can be moved to GPU.
ᴅ
21:57
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
What do you think the security level will be of most amoveo users in a future in which amoveo has day a billion users?
Z
21:58
Zack
we want everything to be level 2 or 1
ᴅ
21:58
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
👍
21:59
I wonder if miner double spending will be level 3 or level 1... I guess it depends on whether coordination against double spends is effective enough
Z
22:00
Zack
Maybe we will get some better crypto eventually, and have something shorter or faster than sha256 merkle proofs.
22:00
In reply to this message
like, by rebuilding some history?
ᴅ
22:00
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yes 👍
22:02
In reply to this message
Also what the security would be for miners double spending against spv clients by mining an invalid longest chain that prints new coins to defraud spv nodes into accepting them
22:02
In reply to this message
if the spv nodes notice a fork, they can either freeze, or do the spv++ thing you suggested. so it is level 1.
ᴅ
22:03
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Interesting yeah true
22:04
Hmm I need to go to sleep now but I will be thinking some more about pow security over the next few days and will continue our convo re: pow security soon as well.
22:04
Sorry have been a bit busy recently with school
22:05
And also have been reading a lot about optimistic rollups
22:05
Too many things to learn about, not enough time! :)
22:06
Btw is your article comparing state channels to OR still up to date? Does it take into account the capital efficiency concerns wrt state channels that you mentioned? Or am I misunderstanding something?
Z
22:07
Zack
we dropped the pure state channel plan because of capital inefficiency reasons. probably that doc should be erased. where is it?
22:11
It doesn't explicitly mention capital efficency as a consideration so maybe it is technically still accurate... Maybe you can add that as another consideration/efficiency metric? Up to you ofc 👍
Z
22:12
Zack
our new smart contract system preserves a lot of the benefits of state channels
24 May 2021
Z
04:47
Zack
I made a new version of the same doc. This time adding more comparisons to ethereum.
Mickel Phils invited Mickel Phils
T
16:45
Topab
Perhaps easy to do in Amoveo?
25 May 2021
Z
21:28
Zack
hard update 51 activated. I updated the light node to use the new contract type.
I updated the crosschain dex tool so now when you choose your bitcoin address where you want to get paid, it simultaneously does the contract_timeout_tx2 to end the parent contract at that point and create the child contract.

Next up, we need the bitcoin address to be displayed in the browser of the person buying veo, so they can know where to send the bitcoin to.
21:29
The smart contract system is a lot more powerful now. We can mutate the state of a contract more than once in a single block.
26 May 2021
EA
01:30
Eric Arsenault
sounds great, looking forward to this!
R A invited R A
RA
03:33
R A
I Have a business proposal about creating an Arabic telegram community for (VEO)
WHO should i pm?
EA
04:22
Eric Arsenault
we have no leader
D
04:42
Devender
Futurachy is the leader
OK
04:50
O K
Why do all the Arabic chat creators use the same copy paste with the caps WHO
EA
05:39
Eric Arsenault
😂 lazy I guess
James Walter invited James Walter
28 May 2021
JT
00:01
Jehan Tremback
World Health Organization
馨馨 核酸ig invited 馨馨 核酸ig
Josh invited Josh
Deleted invited Deleted Account
30 May 2021
Z
22:42
Zack
I'm feeling concerned about assassination contracts.
22:45
I guess the biggest question to answer is why they haven't started happening yet.
22:46
Maybe there is some factor I don't know about that prevents them from occurring.
Or maybe it is because the popular oracle platforms aren't powerful enough.
Or maybe there is a disconnect between the cultures that use cryptocurrencies and the cultures that use violence.
31 May 2021
Arthur Morgan invited Arthur Morgan
mx
01:34
mr x
be the change you want to see in the world
R
04:22
Ric
In reply to this message
How much reason/evidence is there to think they’d be solving a problem for assassins?
Z
08:47
Zack
In reply to this message
Have you seen "slaughterbots" on youtube?
Seems like specialized tools for killing are getting better. But there is a separation between the people who have the ability to use these tools, and the people who have the political motivation to want assassinations to occur.

Trustless assassination contracts are the missing link.

Assassinations have always been a problem, but if they could be anonymously and trustlessly financed, it would be a bigger problem.
Z
09:44
Zack
One scenario im looking at.
Imagine famous people had fear of the assassinations, so they all started pre-emptively faking their own deaths, that way they can live safely.

We wouldnt be able to tell the difference between famous people faking their deaths, or famous people being assassinated, so we couldnt know how big the assassination problem has become, which causes more people to fake their deaths because of the possibility it is a big problem.
ᴅ
10:49
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
An AC could just resolve like 5 years after the date that the assassination was supposed to take place by in order to make faking of it very difficult
10:50
The more time there is, the easier it is to come to a consensus on the truth and the less likely it is that a lie would not be discovered
10:52
That slaughterbot concept is pretty discomforting... I wonder what defenses are possible
10:53
I suppose if you are indoors then having wire mesh on all windows will prevent them from entering
10:53
But yeah it you are outdoors then you are probably screwed
Fauts invited Fauts
Z
18:33
Zack
In reply to this message
If it does end up working that way, it would be a major stabilizer to the price of the currency.
If participants need to lock their coins into the system for more than a year, that would reduce volatility significantly.
18:35
In reply to this message
would a wire mesh even work?
Some drones can specialize in busting open a hole to give entry to others.
18:36
In reply to this message
a drawback is that money locked up so long loses value by the interest rate.
But the participants in the contract, they have an incentive to end the contract early and get their money out.
Or the way amoveo works now, they could even sell their side of the contract to a third party who is willing to wait the 5 years.
18:37
Maybe we can identify some feature that is necessary for assassination contracts, and remove that feature from Amoveo to help stop this from happening.
18:37
ideally it would be a feature that isn't important for other use cases.
ᴅ
19:55
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Perhaps defensive drones could be employed that have the same cost (so security level 2.5-3) that deploy a shaped charge into the aggressing drones
19:57
In reply to this message
Yeah it would be expensive, especially if veo is volatile, although could be hedged by shorting veo by the arbitrageurs
19:58
So maybe it would only be as expensive as a few multiples of the originary interest rate
20:00
I think they would only have an incentive to end the contract early if both participants agreed on the reported outcome
20:01
But assuming that celebrities are engaging in misreporting of their own deaths, this may be something which is unlikely to occur
20:01
Until the contract reaches near its finalisation date
20:02
As then they will have higher certainty that any lies would have had enough time to surface
Z
20:05
Zack
In reply to this message
defensive drones seems like they would depend more on communication and visual information about the situation, and so are more vulnerable to jamming and smoke screens. An aggressive swarm doesn't need to adapt the plan much, if they already have a map of where they are attacking.
20:08
In reply to this message
you can sell early to a third party. So even if the counterparty doesn't agree, anyone with insider info can profit.
20:08
As long as there is someone who knows the truth, that person can profit by buying the winning side of the contract at a discount
ᴅ
20:13
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Wouldn't they be fairly autonomous if able to differentiate other defensive drones from aggressing drones via image recognition of other means, and therefore able to be deployed in a set and forget manner for a particular situation once an attack has been detected
20:14
In reply to this message
Yeah this is what I was getting at, but you would still need to sell at a discount from $1 due to interest costs
20:14
But I don't think currency/veo volatility would play much of a role in determining the arbitrageur premium
20:15
As it can be hedged by shorting veo, which only requires the ability to borrow it
20:21
Maybe the aggressor drone cameras could be saturated by having lasers fired at them that track the movement of the drone
20:21
Preventing them from identifying their targets
20:25
If the laser beam is wide and bright enough, and isn't able to be blocked out by the drone, then this could be a very effective vector
20:26
Monochromatic lasers are probably not that hard to filter though
20:26
I think there are glasses for pilots that filter out all common laser frequencies
Z
20:52
Zack
You can just make smoke right. So the air doesnt transmit light directly.
Idk if there is smoke that works for all frequencies though.
20:53
In reply to this message
Even a 80% discount could be a serious improvement over other ways to make the contract.
ᴅ
21:30
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yeah that is very true
21:31
If there isn't a smoke that works for all frequencies, many can be combined
21:31
In reply to this message
Yeah agreed
Z
22:25
Zack
Maybe they can set up big fans or air filters for smoke
22:27
I have a feeling drone defense isnt going to be more drones.
It seems like some computer aided guns would work better.
B
23:36
Ben
In reply to this message
they happen just not in public.
1 June 2021
Z
00:13
Zack
In reply to this message
that is a possibility, but if they were common we would see an oracle reference whether someone is alive, right?
ᴅ
11:01
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
"x committed suicide before being discovered by police with two gun shots in the back of his head"
11:03
In reply to this message
Hmm possibly, although guns are risky to use as defense in crowded places due to the risk of hitting bystanders, especially when tracking highly agile drones
11:03
I like the smoke idea though, especially if it could be rapidly deployed when needed to quickly fill an entire room with non-toxic smoke
11:05
But that still wouldn't solve the problem of how to disarm the drones once they have been made temporarily ineffectual due to smoke
2 June 2021
Z
18:12
Zack
A new way to use the light node.
github hosts the same code that is currently in the github repository.
https://zack-bitcoin.github.io/light-node-amoveo/src/js/home.html
18:18
the only drawback of this new version is that it takes longer to do updates. I have to wait for github to internally refresh the website.
Z
18:52
Zack
not all pages are working in the new version still
Z
19:29
Zack
seems like when I use the light node in this format, it refuses to call any http requests.
It requires everything to be https.
19:31
it is annoying.
We are using the blockchain and merkle proofs to verify the security of data from the api.
There is no benefit to also requiring https.
And it seems like the browser is not giving any way to contact an api without https.
19:33
oh, I see how to enable it. google come has a little picture of a lock next to the URL
19:41
I still can't get it to work on my phone
EW
20:02
Eli W
@zack_amoveo Zack what amoveo using cases are we trying now ?🙌 and you think potentially promising 😁
Z
20:05
Zack
In reply to this message
I set it up to display a warning if you are using the github version. it tells you instructions for chrome, links to a website for other browsers, and gives a link to the version served by my full node in case you don't need that much security.
20:06
In reply to this message
im still working on the crosschain DEX, it seems promising because it will be less expensive and more secure than the alternatives.
20:06
the current step is for the person who is buying veo to send their bitcoin. The light node needs to look up the address where they are supposed to send the bitcoin.
EW
20:31
Eli W
In reply to this message
How about Thorchain or some project on polkadot like Polkaswap , so you mean we are better by less costly and more secure ? And more scalable and easy to program too I guess.. but given so many options , my question is how many x we are better to let them use us instead of others options
OK
20:44
O K
In reply to this message
Not everyone can read the backend JavaScript, so https provides some assurance that a MITM attack is not taking place and the code is coming from the source they expect.

It also protects people who live in areas where cryptocurrency use could raise red flags with their government.
Z
21:06
Zack
In reply to this message
the gov can still see you are sending messages to a full node, right?
seems like the content doesn't matter much in that case.
OK
21:07
O K
In reply to this message
Weren't you talking about a light wallet hosted on github's servers
Z
21:08
Zack
In reply to this message
yes. the light node is downloading headers from a full node. that is what it is currently using http for.
21:08
github doesn't host a full node. it is hosting the light node html and javascript.
Z
21:26
Zack
In reply to this message
the cost of using amoveo's dex would be (the amount of value you are transforming into another currency) * 2 * (interest rate of veo) * (amoveo block time + block times of the other 2 cryptocurrencies)

This cost comes from the fact that while your money is being exchanged, you cannot simultaneously use it for something else. So you waste the interest rate on your money for the duration of the exchange.

plugging in some estimates.
If you are transfering $10k of value, and the interest rate is 10% annual, and the block times are 10 minutes.
it ends up costing $0.02.
So, the transaction fees for having the txs included in a block would be the majority of the cost.
in amoveo the offers to trade are off-chain, so if your trade isn't accepted, it is free. You can leave the trade offer up for years, and it is free.


In comparison, something like Thorchain.
With thorchain you are still losing value based on the interest for the duration of the swap, but you are also losing value for the duration of time that your money is inside the thorchain market can can't be used for anthing else.
You need to pay the trusted thorchain nodes enough of a fee so that it is not in their interest to steal your money. the long term expected profit of these fees needs to exceed the short term expected profit of stealing your money. this costs as much as the interest rate on your money.
You also need to pay the trusted thorchain bridge to maintain their money locked in the bridge. this costs as much as the interest rate on your money, times a multiplier based on how much of the bridge is being used. if it is only 1/Nth full, then you need to pay Nx more.
The thorchain bridge has that limited volume in their markets, so if it is almost full, then you need to pay more than other people who want to use the thorchain bridge.
Thorchain also has full nodes in a PoS system who are enforcing that the bridge nodes work correctly. they have more money locked up in their bonds. you need to pay them the interest rate of those bonds, which is more expensive than the money locked in the bridge based on a safety factor programmed into thorchain.

Lets plug in some estimates.
Lets say it takes 1 day for your trade to get matched.
That means you are paying interest for 1 day instead of 10 minutes, so that would cost 144x more.
lets assume the bridge is running at full efficiency, so you only lose 2x to pay for the bridge nodes to lock up money in the bridge. lets assume a 3x safety factor for the pos full nodes, so that along with the bridge cost means 5x more expensive.
5*144 is 720x.

So even if we are being very generous to thorchain, they are still costing 720 fold more than Amoveo's DEX. Instead of $0.02 to make the $10k swap, it would cost around $14.
And this is a very generous estimate for thorchain, if any of the parts aren't operating at full efficiency, it could cost a lot more.

Part of thorchains cost can temporarily be covered by speculators buying up their tokens, but eventually there will be an equilibrium where the users need to cover all these costs.
EW
21:32
Eli W
In reply to this message
Thanks , I now understand more why amoveo is more efficient design 👍🏻👍🏻👍🏻
Z
21:32
Zack
Thorchain can only be used to make trades between currencies.
Amoveo can be used to bet on anything.

if you wanted to use thorchain to bet on a sporting event, we would also need to include the cost of using an oracle.

Amoveo's oracle is free.

if we used Augur for example, and Augur was running at 100% efficiency, you would need to pay 7-fold more than the interest rate on that money for the duration of the bet, more than doubling the cost.

Something like chainlink is even more expensive than augur.
3 June 2021
Ясмин Андреюшкина invited Ясмин Андреюшкина
4 June 2021
LBZ TRADING invited LBZ TRADING
Z
22:03
Zack
alive
MF
22:59
Mr Flintstone
?
Z
23:17
Zack
I answered a question, and then the question was deleted
5 June 2021
zlion invited zlion
z
02:42
zlion
Hi there.

I'm fullstack web & blockchain engineer and looking for new opportunity.
Could anyone please bring me to existing projects or introduce clients who want to build something?

Thanks
Z
02:43
Zack
In reply to this message
you can help amoveo. make a proposal of what you want to build, and how much you will charge. We will use futarchy to see if the benefit outweighs the cost.
7 June 2021
Deleted invited Deleted Account
8 June 2021
Роман prisyajnaya invited Роман prisyajnaya
9 June 2021
Aleksey +Egorov joined group by link from Group
Z
17:51
Zack
im working on the crosschain DEX. The part where you can make an offer to sell veo. The part where you look up the address where you need to send your bitcoin to in order to get the veo.

The only place this address is written is in some bytecode embedded in the contract_evidence_tx.

The strategy I am looking at is that the light node should request all the contract_evidence_txs that exist and are related to this contract. It should run them in it's virtual machine, and it should identify which one results in the contract updating the way the blockchain says it has been updated.
We extract the address from that evidence tx.

Does that seem reasonable?

If we display the wrong address to send your bitcoin to, that would be a very bad error.

Running smart contracts inside the light node for this feels weird. It seems slow, and difficult to maintain, and prone to code rot. It feels like there should be a better way.

One way we could get this security without running the light node is if every contract_evidence_tx, it's txid was stored in consensus space. So if someone provides a contract_evidence_tx to you, you can be certain it was a tx in a block. And also, every contract_evidence_tx which results in trying to create a child contract from the parent contract, we would require the contract_evidence_tx to have the child contracts ID written in the tx.
This would give a trustless way to identify the relevant tx, without needing to run any smart contracts.

Would that strategy be better?

Im thinking that for now I will run the smart contract, just so we can have something that works sooner. And later on we can do the hard update and simplify the light node code.
Z
22:16
Zack
Thinking about this more, it seems like the explorer giving a signed tx just cant be made secure. Even if that tx was valid, what if a different valid tx was posted first?

So it seems like we really need another hard update.

It seems like a really clean way to do this is if the consensus state part of each smart contract, it could contain a hash of the evidence that is being used to settle that contract.

It looks like the contract object is storing 256 bits of "result" which can potentially be a merkle root. Maybe we can get the extra info into this merkle root, so that we dont need to make a new merkle tree or transaction type.
Z
22:40
Zack
Sorry for all the delays guys.
But the smart contract system is getting a lot more powerful each time.
And unlike evm, we are keeping it parallelizable with these upgrades.
10 June 2021
EA
02:11
Eric Arsenault
👍 slow and steady wins the race (?)
Z
03:40
Zack
Thinking about this more. I think we dont need a hard update.
The id of the child contract, it can only be produced if you provide the correct bitcoin address.
As long as the correct child contract id is produced, you dont care what happened with any evidence txs.

So we do need to run a smart contract and produce the child id, and if we do the hard update, we wont need to run the smart contract in the light node.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
11 June 2021
Spectrum360 invited Spectrum360
Z
18:43
Zack
I got the smart contract to run in the light node and produce the correct child contract's id.
18:48
So, what is left to do:
We need the button so that after receiving the bitcoin, you can release your veo.

The tests so far have only done the case where we go through this entire process in a single block. It is getting data from the zeroth confirmation txs.
If we want to take longer than one block to do this process, we need to get the txs a little differently. So we need to test that case and modify the code a bit for that.