Amoveo ♥🧿
27 January 2021
Z
05:44
Zack
I made a tx for a AMM market so other people can bet on our game live
05:44
it is in the mempool still
05:58
The market is ready. Here is the page for the price chart
http://159.89.87.58:8080/contract_explorer.html?cid=dD76riHgEABZxODlZHgy74/3V8In7gk+xoPjUieUB2M=
EA
06:01
Eric Arsenault
oh, nice!
06:01
I like the use case
06:02
There are probably more mainstream games we could target for this sort of thing
06:02
(not that chess isn't mainstream or anything..)
Z
06:06
Zack
I need to buy some shares in the contract in order to make the limit order swap offer with Rico for the direct bet we will have between each other.
This is a place we can improve the UX.

I think that when Rico accepts my limit order, the interface should realize that he doesn't have enough of the required subcurrency. it should do a flash mint to simultaniously accept my bet and do a contract_use_tx.

That way we don't have to wait around for the contract_use_tx to get into a block before I can send the bet offer.
06:16
In reply to this message
looking at the javascript code, maybe I already created this optimization
OK
07:06
O K
In reply to this message
It's definitely hype right now
07:07
I like the idea but I worry about cheating in chess, especially in correspondence and especially with money on the line
Z
08:05
Zack
http://159.89.87.58:8080/contract_explorer.html?cid=dD76riHgEABZxODlZHgy74/3V8In7gk+xoPjUieUB2M=
looks like someone deposited liquidity. still no traders
08:06
we are 4 moves in, and the market still thinks I have a 40% chance
Z
08:32
Zack
uh oh, now I only have a 20% chance to win
08:33
I guess I did something wrong
MF
08:34
Mr Flintstone
lol
Z
08:36
Zack
lichess says I can't use software or books or advice from people to help me.
But it doesn't say anything about futarchy.
I can make a futarchy markets to find the best move to play.
08:37
I really regret saying "Zack wins" in the oracle instead of "Zack loses".
because that means if there is a tie, I lose the bet
08:41
BOnCHOqw/vE9qHuJi5iPJUg50ApD7YMO/3L3HR6pdecojRywvFm76W3wrUfAHwzCCGqxNR9MgZBjZ54jKnqCY9s=
Whoever BonCHOq is. They think I am bad at chess.
Bone Chalk.
OK
09:07
O K
In reply to this message
😂 it's true
09:07
In reply to this message
Lmfao
EA
09:36
Eric Arsenault
Lol
09:42
I was talking to Zack about an interesting use case: basically using oracles for fiat <> crypto on-ramp / off ramp. For example, I could bet against receiving a certain amount of fiat in my bank account. If someone sends it, they get the VEO. You could imagine applying this model to basically all derivatives...sort of like a local bitcoins, but for anything. Only problem is there might not be a way to actually prove fiat was transferred (?) thoughts?
OK
11:00
O K
In reply to this message
I really like the spirit of this idea, awesome thinking!
MF
11:01
Mr Flintstone
venmo is a public database
11:02
anyone can see who transferred to whom provided neither sender nor receiver is private. though im not sure if that has changed in the last few years
OK
11:02
O K
... really? Interesting.
11:02
Other factors to consider: time allotted for charge-backs
11:04
i suppose venmo administrators could do charge backs but im not sure if regular users can? idk
EA
11:04
Eric Arsenault
We should try it
OK
11:05
O K
In reply to this message
Ultimately it is tied to a traditional bank account though right?
11:05
Charge backs can happen at any point down the food chain, depending on the bank/ card issuer.
11:06
Finality/scammers has been a problem for all traditional payment platforms
11:06
And seeing as no service is rendered in this case...
MF
11:07
Mr Flintstone
i dont think chargebacks on venmo are as easy as something like paypal
11:07
think you would really need to be up the food chain. but im not a venmo expert lol
OK
11:07
O K
Well, I'm intrigued for sure
11:11
In reply to this message
I haven't checked in awhile, but I don't remember venmo being used in typical p2p markets like bisq.
OK
11:13
O K
In reply to this message
I think it's definitely worth trying, we just need to make sure our time frame is long enough for payout
x
11:13
x
satoshi had an escrow idea but didn' have time to implement it ^
EA
11:15
Eric Arsenault
venmo isn't international either, so maybe not ideal
OK
11:15
O K
In reply to this message
Insightful
EA
11:18
Eric Arsenault
I wonder if SWIFT has public info
J
16:18
Josh
Might be able to submit proof that a document came from a bank via TLS: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3372297.3417239
Z
17:37
Zack
In reply to this message
https://www.thecut.com/2019/03/addictive-stalk-people-on-venmo-money-app.html
Looks like venmo integration would be easy enough.

A lot of countries have mobile banking systems that are popular for people who don't have bank accounts. Maybe in some cases it would be easier to integrate in to these kinds of systems instead of directly with banks.
17:48
Another way to do this might be by paying bills.
Lets say I have a water bill for my residence.
The water utility must have some way for people to look up if that bill has already been paid.
So we can make an Amoveo oracle to bet on whether that bill has been paid or not.

So for me it would be like I am paying my water bill directly with VEO, and for someone else, it is like they are exchanging some fiat for VEO.
17:49
Although if they don't pay my water bill, eventually I guess I will find some other way to pay it.
And the water utility wont record the date at which the bill had been paid.
So maybe that doesn't work.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Z
18:17
Zack
In Brazil there is a system called "boleto bancario". And there is this website where you can look up an individual payment request.
http://www.veloso.adm.br/checkboleto/#/
It isn't clear to me if you can see whether it was already paid or not.

Brazil has good bitcoin exchanges, but it also has a lot of unbanked people who could benefit from alternative ways to buy cryptocurrency. It might be a good place to start the fiat to crypto on-ramp.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
mx
22:27
mr x
oh god c6 and rug pull while im sleeping
22:28
not sketchy at all
EA
22:30
Eric Arsenault
lol
mx
22:31
mr x
lol
Z
22:33
Zack
Bone Chalk, here is your chance to bet against me with much better odds
28 January 2021
Lawrence invited Lawrence
Martina Lorenzo invited Martina Lorenzo
C
07:08
ChonkyPanda
Hey guys. A lot of gigabrains and gigabrain stuff going on here
07:09
Is there anyone that can dumb it down for someone like me? Haha
Z
07:10
Zack
did you look at the github and the white paper?
C
07:15
ChonkyPanda
I just did sir
07:15
Pretty insane
Z
07:15
Zack
do you have any questions?
C
07:16
ChonkyPanda
Sir with all this defi stuff going on, how do you think veo is placing itself in the market
07:17
Idk if this defi thing is just a cycle and will slowly die out later on and POW and other consensus will shine again
Z
07:18
Zack
We are still in the process of searching for product market fit.
what does "defi" mean to you?
I thought defi meant blockchain powered financial derivatives.
financial derivatives are one of the most popular applications of currency, so they will continue to be one of the most popular applications of cryptocurrency.
C
07:19
ChonkyPanda
I’m a fan of Veo. And I’ve heard a lot of people I respect in the crypto community talk highly of you sir. They said you’re one of the smartest devs to ever be in the field
07:29
I saw defi as a hype, kinda like how POW, POS, POD, and the other different consensus that had their time of the light
Z
07:31
Zack
hype is always changing.
but financial derivatives have been consistently popular since before written history.
C
07:34
ChonkyPanda
I knew about the hype part
07:34
But as far as financial derivatives, I never knew that
07:36
I found Veo back in 2019 and didn’t really get it then. People were saying “it’ll pump due to it being an oracle, and oracles only pump”
07:38
But CryptoMaestro is one of the reasons why I kept Veo on my watchlist. He’s one of the smartest people I know, and if he trusts you, then there’s no reason for me to say otherwise. I trust you Zack and this project
07:38
I can’t wait for the time when VEO gets the attention it deserves
小馒头 invited 小馒头
OK
08:58
O K
In reply to this message
It's kinda nuts how cheap VEO is tbqh. This was easily one of the most interesting and unique projects during the bear market.
EA
09:39
Eric Arsenault
Not too surprised, that happens when there is ~0 marketing and shilling
09:40
Although we are getting close to finding cool use cases, so that should attract buyers I would think
09:40
Product needs to look sexy too
C
09:45
ChonkyPanda
In reply to this message
Wasn’t ATH like $150?
OK
09:46
O K
Like 800
C
09:46
ChonkyPanda
Looks like this is gonna be a long hold
09:46
In reply to this message
Really?!?! Oh wow
Victor Roa invited Victor Roa
Daniel Smith invited Daniel Smith
x
22:48
x
the highest is
22:48
191 on coinmarketcap
22:48
?
OK
22:51
O K
CMC isn't god and doesn't include OTC days
x
22:51
x
oh right, coinpaprika has more complete price data
OK
23:02
O K
Remember that amoveo was OTC for quite awhile, as exchange listings were completely organic
x
23:05
x
I found that price data in coinpaprika and qtrade are different , probably one of them is not correct,
OK
23:08
O K
Graviex used to mess up cmc data pretty badly
29 January 2021
M
20:07
Minieep21
Is there any OTC trading now?
20:08
Discord is dead
Z
20:09
Zack
In reply to this message
Thinking more about the fiat onramp.
Maybe the way to start is with a bitcoin onramp.

I could make a contract saying "bitcoin address A received less than X amount of btc before bitcoin block number N"
And i could make a limit order betting on true.

So someone could take the other side of my limit order, then send the bitcoin to that address.
20:10
To trustlessly exchange bitcoin for veo without depending on any third party.
20:11
It would work even better if we swapped btc for synthetic btc on amoveo. To avoid the free option problem
x
20:28
x
that's actually useful, we do need to trade veo with btc
EA
23:54
Eric Arsenault
yeah, starting with BTC and ETH might be the best way
23:55
(or any other really)
23:55
been looking into fiat options, but no slam dunk
Z
23:56
Zack
In reply to this message
Venmo doesnt work?
EA
23:56
Eric Arsenault
we could for example just target the US and use venmo since they have public records
23:56
yeah, only in the states
23:56
(which might be enough to show some traction though)
30 January 2021
Z
03:18
Zack
I saw that venmo has a way to make your history private.
It is important that users have a way to prove that they made a payment to another user.
MF
03:23
Mr Flintstone
are you sure it isnt just privacy going forward?
Z
03:27
Zack
Maybe someone with venmo can answer
03:34
I wonder if people would pay more for veo if they didnt have to sign up with qtrade and de-anonymize themselves.
03:34
Does qtrade charge much for trading or withdraw or deposit fees?
Abbas Abdallah invited Abbas Abdallah
Z
03:51
Zack
We could do a trustless swap for a bunch of different blockchains, and then make announcements like "The Amoveo<>Dogecoin decentralized exchange is live and processing swaps"
03:52
and all the doge-hodlers will share the announcement
EA
03:56
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
I really like that
03:56
it basically allows us to be a cross-chain platform
Z
03:57
Zack
it is a really easy integration for new blockchains too. No programming at all, you just think up how to word the oracle question.
EA
03:58
Eric Arsenault
yup
03:58
just need to think about what those markets would want exposure to
Z
03:58
Zack
I wonder if there is any situation where Amoveo could be the easiest or cheapest way to move value between 2 other blockchains.
03:59
Maybe for blockchains that get delisted after 51% attacks
04:01
or for people who are located in places that are excluded from exchanges. Iranian citizens.
EA
04:01
Eric Arsenault
We should probably just start with one
04:02
and give them access to something they want
Z
04:02
Zack
so, some small blockchain that isn't on any exchange and bitcoin?
EA
04:03
Eric Arsenault
maybe we can just give those people leverage. problem is, who would take other side of the bet?
04:04
I feel like a lot of people want to open shorts on some tokens
04:04
still not easy to do
Z
05:55
Zack
Im updating the light node to support the new format for limit orders.
I had forgotten something I had programmed in here.
You can do limit orders for contracts that do not yet exist. It will automatically create the contract as a part of accepting the limit order.
05:56
So you can make swap offers to buy BTC with a short expiration, and every time you rewrite the swap offer, you can change the price that you want to buy BTC at, and it doesn't cost anything.

or you can make a tx to cancel your old swap offer, and then make a new one, and you don't have to pay for creating any contract.
EA
05:58
Eric Arsenault
nice
05:58
In reply to this message
I think this could be possible
05:58
but need to probably get one working good first
Z
08:41
Zack
Unfortunately there is a delay to updating for the new kind of limit orders.
08:43
but I got the p2p derivative tool set up, and made an api in the full node, and I wrote most of the update in the light node.
So once the full node operators do the patch, we will be very near.
08:44
I want to activate the new limit orders before starting to experiment with the decentralized exchange, because the old limit orders are connected to your account nonce, so it is easy to accidentally update your nonce and cancel an order.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
Z
19:23
Zack
A limitation with the Amoveo DEX.
You can only create orders to sell veo.
You can't make an order to sell BTC for VEO, you have to match with someone who wants to sell VEO.
19:23
is this an important limitation?
is there any workaround?
x
20:16
x
but you can make a request in the DEX, then someone want to sell veo will create an order. I think the most important thing is to make it easy to create that order, e.g to the users, it should look like trading, the user does not need to know what it is , how it works
Z
20:38
Zack
Selling veo works a lot like local bitcoins.

For example
Lets say i want to sell veo to mr x, and he is paying me btc.
I could lock my veo in a limit order to buy btc, then go offline.

Mr x matches my limit order, sends me the btc, and then goes offline.

When i come online again, i can release the veo.
If i dont release the veo, mr x can request an oracle to enforce the outcome.

So it is a trustless asynchronous 2 step protocol, followed by an enforcement mechanism.


Now an example of the reverse. I am selling btc to sy for veo.

First, i publish the request somewhere.
The sy sees my request, so he locks his veo in a limit order to buy btc.
At this point sy is trusting that i acually want to buy btc. He is locking up his veo, but i havent paid anything. Maybe i am tricking him into locking up veo for nothing.
The rest continues like normal.

So it is a 3 step protocol, followed by enforcement, and there is some trust involved.
x
21:13
x
how high is the cost of locking up his veo tho?
x
21:37
x
is there a benefit for doing this kind of escrow with amoveo?
Z
21:38
Zack
In reply to this message
you can buy veo without using any centralized exchange, or giving your personal information to anyone.
21:39
In reply to this message
pretty low, but if it kept happening, eventually the cost adds up.
x
21:39
x
I mean benefit compared to other blockchains
Z
21:40
Zack
In reply to this message
we integrate with all blockchains automatically, you don't need to do any programming.
21:40
the limit order is off chain, so if your trade isn't matched, it is free.
x
21:46
x
augur and gnosis etc can do the same? does this require the best oracle?
x
21:48
x
In reply to this message
But this can be useful even if other blockchains have it. it need to compared with other solutions e.g. atomic swaps, cosmos, ren protocol, etc.
ᴅ
21:49
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Probably as well as things such as local.bitcoin.com, local bitcoins, localcrypto, bisq, hodlhodl etc
x
21:52
x
with localbitcoins you need to trust a 3rd party. nowadays i use huobi,okex, binance for otc, which are much easier to use, and ton more options.

I don't know how bisq works , probably similar to bisq in some way
Z
21:55
Zack
In reply to this message
in amoveo we don't make the oracle until the enforcement step, in most cases the DEX won't require actually creating the oracle. Only if they refuse to release the veo.
And the person who refuses to release is the one paying to make the oracle.

and our oracles are far cheaper. this would be cost prohibitive in augur.
21:57
We can wrap up creating the oracle, and reporting in it all in a single multi-tx.
So it is only one signature, and you only write your pubkey once.
It is a small tx.

in something like augur there are lots of oracle reporters who are each signing and reporting separately, and there needs to be enough fees to pay them all to do it.

I think gnosis has different oracles, im not up to date on them all.
21:59
bisq is the only 'dex' that support fiat /btc trading
22:00
never tried it,
Z
22:00
Zack
In reply to this message
2 of 2 multisig is not a good solution for this.
The person on the other side of the trade can hold your money hostage unless you agree to split it with them. it is not secure.
x
22:01
x
I also dont trust TOR
I
22:02
Instinct
In reply to this message
How quick can the process be?
22:02
~ Does the Veo need to be locked for a certain amount of time?
x
22:03
x
it seems it depends on speed of bitcoin network
22:07
In reply to this message
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=750.0 is satoshi's escrow idea good? it doesn't require an oracle
22:08
In reply to this message
"This does not allow the buyer to take the money back, but it does give him the option to burn the money out of spite by never releasing it. The seller has the option to release the money back to the buyer.

While this system does not guarantee the parties against loss, it takes the profit out of cheating.
"
ᴅ
22:28
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
There are escrows in bisq iirc. I agree 2of2 is insecure without a proper reputation system due to extortion attacks
22:29
In reply to this message
No
22:29
It is only good with a very sound reputation system
22:29
But escrows still solve the problem of sellers starting off with minimal reputation
22:29
Since escrows basically act as a reputation merchant/provider
22:30
They allow you to guarantee your trades against the reputability of someone else who is trusted (the escrow)
22:30
Rather than against your own reputation
22:30
2of2 works if merchants have a reputation and if there is a good WoT reputation system in place
22:31
Otherwise it is completely vulnerable to extortion attacks
22:32
In reply to this message
Difference between things such as hodlhodl and local.bitcoin.com is that they don't have kyc and allow you to onramp/offramp from crypto to fiat as long as you trust the escrow (which is the website owner) to be reliable, which is a good assumption since they both have good reputations and wouldn't want to damage them
22:33
Of course you could be the first person who they malign
22:33
But the odds are low
22:33
And if they decide to go that route, they will very soon after go out of business and people will find out
x
22:38
x
SO their benefit compared to binance/okex otc is no KYC.

Another downside is with 3rd party service, like localbitcoins is that they need to make money, and they charge fees for transaction? I dont' remember now, but i guess so. blockchain also have fee tho, not sure which is more expensive
ᴅ
23:20
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Also slippage is a major factor to consider
31 January 2021
Z
00:32
Zack
In reply to this message
it doesn't work because we can have other blockchains that reference what happens on bitcoin. so you can still hold the money hostage. it is the same problem as a 2 of 2.
00:33
In reply to this message
you should wait for at least one or two confirmations on the other blockchain before releasing the veo.
So it depends on how fast blocks are on the other blockchain, and how many confirmations you want.
00:34
In reply to this message
the limit order is off-chain.
oh, when you match the limit order, you probably want to wait for a couple confirmations on the amoveo blockchain, to be sure that the limit order wont get un-matched.
00:36
In reply to this message
reputation isn't secure because of retirement attacks, so some extortion attacks still happen.
You need to pay people enough to convince them not to do attacks, so fees are higher.
reputation systems change where the costs are occurring, but they don't make it secure. Maybe it reduces the expected losses by a factor of 2 or something like that. Not good enough.
00:38
In reply to this message
localbitcoin does charge fees.
If the fees are lower, then the odds of them stealing the money are higher.
Less secure systems are necessarily more expensive.
00:39
In reply to this message
the Amoveo DEX can change the price of limit orders every block. even faster if you make a tx to cancel your order.
And we could increase the rate of blocks if people wanted that.
x
00:47
x
In reply to this message
good point!
IS
01:13
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
More / more vs less / less**
02:59
Deleted Account
2of2 contracts without oracles can work if parties put themselves into position of being punished by each other. They can both lock up some extra value into escrow that is returned if things go smoothly.
Z
03:03
Zack
In reply to this message
It is like a game of chicken. If one of them is more willing to throw value away to take from the other, then they can.
In game theory, they say to win a game of chicken, you have to convince the other player that you are more crazy.
In cars for example, you remove the steering wheel and hold it out the window to prove that you cant turn.
03:04
2 of 2 really does not work.
03:06
Deleted Account
How you prove that you lost access to your keys?
Z
03:19
Zack
In reply to this message
You just tell them that their only options are to give half their money to you, or else you will let all the money get burned, and stand firm.
03:23
Deleted Account
I guess. Maybe this stuff would work in practise.
EA
05:34
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
I think in the second example, there will likely be existing locked up VEO for you to make that trade with
05:37
Is there a way to make things more flexible using scalar oracles? Like for example, I could lock up a lot of VEO and accept any BTC <> VEO swap from 0.1 to 1 BTC, and the amount of VEO released depends on amount of BTC sent to some address
05:38
If we do something like that, then people will just need to pick where they want to send it since there will be a bunch of trades ready for them
ᴅ
05:52
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
But the reputation of the trusted third party is tradable in the case of local.bitcoin.com or hodlhodl so therefore wouldn't be susceptible to retirement attacks right? As in they can sell the company to someone else
Z
07:17
Zack
In reply to this message
Tradeable reputation is better than non-tradeable for that reason.
But it is still less secure and more costly than amoveos oracle.
They need to gain fees to cover the interest rate of the value of that reputation, otherwise it isnt worth it to pay to build the reputation in the first place. Or they are just selling the reputation to someone who specializes in retirement attacks.
07:18
In reply to this message
If they are picking the address after, then what was the point of locking up the veo before?
ᴅ
07:23
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Right yeah the fees would need to be greater than the interest rate multiplied by the tradable value of the reputation, or more specifically greater than the greater than the interest on the income from a retirement attack.
Z
07:41
Zack
In reply to this message
well, if the amount they could steal at any point in time were greater than the cost of re-building that reputation, then a retirement attack is profitable.
Assuming traders will limit how often they trust this mediator to prevent that from occuring, the value of the reputation is always bigger than how much they could get from a retirement attack.
So I think that means it is based on the cost of interest on that reputation, not on the cost of interest of how much they could get from a retirement attack.
EA
09:49
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
Maybe it’s incentivized with VEO rewards somehow? You are right, without some sort of financial incentive, nobody will want to just lock up capital
09:49
Could we have VEO incentives for specific types of questions?
09:49
Proportional to amount locked up or something
09:49
I dunno just brainstorming
Z
09:50
Zack
In reply to this message
No, i mean, there is no point of locking up before we know what address they are sending to. With or without incentives. It achieves nothing.
EA
10:42
Eric Arsenault
In a way, it’s just like being a liquidity provider
Z
10:49
Zack
In the other direction when you lock veo, someone can match your trade and send you bitcoin to take your veo as an exchange.

Locking up veo to try and sell bitcoin doesnt make any sense. If you dont know what bitcoin account you will be sending the bitcoin to, you cant build any oracle or contract to enforce anything useful.
There is no commitment to lock your veo into.
Z
17:02
Zack
In reply to this message
There is a mining channel in discord.
EA
17:32
Eric Arsenault
Is it possible to send VEO to a specific address if oracle resolves True, and return to person who locked VEO if oracle returns false?
Z
17:36
Zack
In reply to this message
If those 2 veo accounts own either side of a contract, and the contract resolves based on that oracle, that is how it works.
Z
21:51
Zack
In reply to this message
Thinking about this more @eric_rsno
I think erics idea does work.

To recap. We already have a plan for people to lock up veo to sell it for bitcoin.
What we want next is for people to commit to spending bitcoin to buy veo, and for this commitment to be enforced inside amoveo.

The way you do it is that the contract is kind of open ended, it doesnt say who's address will receive the bitcoin.
When someone matches the limit order, we would need some way for the smart contract to realize who had matched that limit order. Which is basically just verifying a merkle proof.
So whoever matched the limit order, they can make a second contract which does specify their bitcoin address, and the first contract settles by converting into the second contract.
IS
22:11
Ilmu Somebody
Nice, I'll buy some VEO this way if you make a contract.
Z
22:12
Zack
if I am making a contract to sell veo, we can do the simple version.
The complicated version is only for people making contracts to buy veo.
IS
22:13
Ilmu Somebody
ahh
22:13
so I can make a contract without having any VEO?
Z
22:13
Zack
you would still need veo to enforce the contract
22:14
you could increase your veo this way
IS
22:14
Ilmu Somebody
okay so, first you need to buy from someone who is selling and then you can make a contract to buy more and anyone who wants to sell can use it
Z
22:14
Zack
yeah, exactly
IS
22:15
Ilmu Somebody
Makes sense. This should be a standardized action to take (i.e. have some UI)
1 February 2021
EA
01:22
Eric Arsenault
Nice!
x
01:44
x
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/blog_posts/amoveo_breakdown.md this is someone's review? i can not find its original source
Z
01:53
Zack
In reply to this message
I think the original was about a different blockchain, but it mostly applied to Amoveo. So I updated it slightly.
01:53
cheaper than hiring writers.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
B
14:30
Ben
why is uniswap such a success? cause it is easy to use and the User who want to trad a vs b does not need to worry about liquidity cause other do that and getting fees for that, if we adopt that it could be a huge success.
User are currently suffering from high GAS Fees, if we could do it cheaper , that could be a neat usecase. (currently 15$ per Transaction)
14:31
uniswap produced in the last 30 Days 38.8M in GAS Fees
x
14:51
x
because ethereum is already famous it's very easily to market it , there are vcs behind ethereum ecosystem promoting it
x
21:05
x
@zack_amoveo is the attack on PoS really just theory that is very hard to implement?
Z
21:17
Zack
In reply to this message
I dont understand the question.

Cost and security are related. As security decreases, cost increases.
That cost can come in the form of higher fees, more severe attacks, or more frequent attacks.

Pos is less secure than pow, and so pos will cost more to use.
23:41
Could use Amoveo to bet on markets during the weekends.
2 February 2021
Z
00:01
Zack
Yeah, good point.
IS
00:23
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
Ah ok so you're drawing this distinction when you define security
00:24
In reply to this message
Then I retract this comment. I thought you meant that the cost and the security is correlated
00:24
But yes okay, a more secure platform is secure precisely because it breaks that correlation
M
04:30
Minieep21
whoever put the 350 VEO buy wall, gtfo
04:30
Haven't been able to get filled for a week now
OK
05:10
O K
Lol
Z
07:34
Zack
I confirmed the new kind of limit order is working. Hopefully this didn't cause any nodes to freeze.
07:46
http://159.89.87.58:8080/peer_scan.html
None of the servers broke!
Z
08:20
Zack
I want to try selling some veo for btc trustlessly, but the fee is like $10.
08:21
Anyone want to recommend a cryptocurrency with an easily installed wallet and low fees?
08:22
I guess bitcoin cash?
EA
08:26
Eric Arsenault
try this https://wallet.ellipticoin.org/
08:26
I'll send you some
08:26
dm me your address
08:27
(free transactions + local wallet created upon loading)
MF
08:29
Mr Flintstone
i guess eth transfers would be like $5 as well
08:30
but having a fixed fee is cheaper than an exchange for anything more than a few thousand usd
Z
08:30
Zack
i think ill go with bitcoin cash, ive already downloaded the wallet
08:30
fees are low
EA
08:31
Eric Arsenault
sounds good, but now you need someone else with bcash lol
Z
08:31
Zack
does no one here have bcash to sell for veo?
08:32
I can at least make an offer and post on twitter, and people can see that the offer exists
08:33
I think dogecoin and bcash people are more likely to share the post than btc people anyway
Z
08:53
Zack
bcash electron wallet is broken.
08:56
blockchain software is so frustrating lol
Z
09:16
Zack
looks like I got dogecoin installed
09:17
anyone want to sell me some DOGE?
such wow.
Z
09:41
Zack
oh, before I can buy DOGE I need to update the interface to allow making limit orders that can only be completely matched. that can't be partially matched.

Maybe the limit order explorer tool should also give the text of the contracts that can be traded, and a link to the contract explorer for those contracts.
Deleted invited Deleted Account
B
14:53
Ben
i have doge
B
15:56
Ben
if you are ready we can give it a try
J
17:20
Jeans
Hi, will it be possible with the perpetual stablecoin to bet on something that we do not know if it will ever be sold and for how much. For example, an oracle which estimates the price of the Mona Lisa if it is sold in 2021, or then of the Eiffel Tower. And that starts again for the following years. So anyone can own some Synthetic Mona Lisa or some Synthetic Eiffel Tower, right?
Z
17:26
Zack
In reply to this message
No, it isnt possible.
The perpetual stablecoin design being implemented, it is built up of many smaller finite stablecoin contracts that overlap in time.
We will use an auction mechanism to swap out the collateral from one finite contract to the next.

So a eiffel tower perpetual wont work, because we cant make an eiffel tower finite stablecoin.

You could pay a professional to give their opinion of the value of the tower in 2 months, and we could bet on what their opinion will be, and that could be a kind of eiffel tower stablecoin.
17:28
======================
There is a lot of hype around blockchain interoperability right now.
Amoveo DEX is automatically compatible with every blockchain. They dont need to do any programming to join our network.
I think we can get a lot of attention out of this.

Look at cosmos "starfleet" for example. And that is limited to the existing cosmos hubs.
17:30
And i think this kind of attention can be easily redirected to the oracle. We explain that this trustless interoperability is possible because of how incredible affordable our oracle design is. That everything stays offchain as long as possible. If cheating occurs, the cheater pays the cost of posting the oracle that enforces the correct outcome.
17:31
The same affordable design that prevents oracle parasites is also exactly what was needed to enable interoperability of all blockchains.
J
17:57
Jeans
In reply to this message
ok thanks i understand the limitation. But if we find a mechanism that allows us to buy a bet on the value of something, which we don't know if and when it will eventually be sold, that would be great! But maybe it will never be possible.
Z
18:10
Zack
In reply to this message
That is possible with the normal scalar bet tool.
Ask the oracle something like "The eiffel tower was sold for thisvalue in VEO", and you will create a contract that can't expire until the Eiffel tower is sold.

But I recommend having some clause for what to do if the Eiffel tower is not sold for a long time. like "The Eiffel tower was sold before 1-Jan-2022 for this value in VEO, otherwise return N"
Where N is how to divide up the value on 1-Jan-2022 if the tower was not sold.

Otherwise your money could be stuck in that contract longer than you live.
J
18:14
Jeans
ok thanks, very interesting!
18:15
Deleted Account
In reply to this message
Did it work out ?
Can you sell doge for ETH?
Z
18:16
Zack
In reply to this message
im going to update the UI to enable limit orders that need to be entirely matched. no partial matching. then we will try it out.
18:17
Deleted Account
Okay
18:17
When should an update be expected?
18:17
In reply to this message
I've got eth
ŽM
18:18
Živojin Mirić
OMG FOUNDER SELLING HIS BAG
Z
18:18
Zack
In reply to this message
within the next day I think
ŽM
18:18
Živojin Mirić
RED ALERT
Z
18:18
Zack
In reply to this message
im going to sell less than a veo, to try out the new tool
ŽM
18:18
Živojin Mirić
ok
18:19
Deleted Account
In reply to this message
Lol
Take a chill pill 🤣
Z
18:19
Zack
then ill probably use the DOGE to buy my veo again, to test the other direction
ŽM
18:19
Živojin Mirić
I thought that VEO can make a new low because of th enews
18:19
Deleted Account
In reply to this message
You should totally hire me to be on your social media team..... especially twitter
I
18:20
Instinct
In reply to this message
Lol
ŽM
18:20
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
you are new here I see
18:21
Deleted Account
In reply to this message
You think?
ŽM
18:21
Živojin Mirić
with ideas like that seems like it
18:21
ONLY FUTARCHY CAN HIRE YOU
18:21
not Zack or anyone
18:21
back to basics people
18:21
Deleted Account
In reply to this message
Someone link me up with FUTARCHY then!!!😁 Thank you
Z
18:22
Zack
We are trying to use smart contracts to pay people to do stuff for Amoveo. Im not hiring anyone directly. https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/use-cases-and-ideas/dominant_assurance_contract.md
18:22
This way Amoveo is hierarchy-less.
ŽM
18:24
Živojin Mirić
but just on paper really
18:24
Zack is Alpha and Omega
D
18:30
Devender
In reply to this message
I don't think it's clear from the document that how can someone publish his task, success criteria and expected veo.
18:31
And how can other community members and/or veo holders can approve or deny completely or partially
18:33
For example, @iKanCode wants to become community manager for Twitter or some other social media. He has success criteria to increase impressions by 200%
Z
18:33
Zack
In reply to this message
use the binary contract creation tab in wallet.html
18:33
In reply to this message
the oracle resolution process.
D
18:33
Devender
I wonder if a layman example can be added for the above use case.
18:34
I know code is getting changed quickly. But still a simple example should motivate others to use these features
ŽM
18:42
Živojin Mirić
no mister, this way Zack stays alpha and omega
18:42
stop
x
18:48
x
In reply to this message
but no one know this.
I
18:48
Instinct
Do you think there will be specialist UI’s or projects on top of Amoveo executing on these potential applications? @zack_amoveo
x
18:48
x
I centainly don't know
I
18:50
Instinct
Like how there are competing Amm’s, lending projects etc. on ethereum for example, but the thing all those projects have in common is their own token so for now greedy teams won’t want to build on Amoveo.
Z
18:50
Zack
In reply to this message
I hope to see people using dominant assurance contracts to get funding to make specialist UI.

I hope to see more people besides Exantech releasing custom forks of the light node. They can set up automatic fees inside.
I
18:51
Instinct
In reply to this message
👍
Z
18:52
Zack
the multi-tx builder in the light node is currently set up to send a developer fee to the same address that the developer rewards are being sent to.
The address can easily be changed if you make a fork of the light node.
T
18:52
Topab
In reply to this message
If it's easy to use and cheaper, yes
Z
18:53
Zack
In reply to this message
the big limitation is that you need to already have some veo in order to buy veo this way.
D
18:54
Devender
In reply to this message
Sorry I didn't understand. For someone to make a UI in return of rewards, they need to fork and create a new coin? And in this fork, they can change dev reward address?
18:56
Maybe I misunderstood forking a light node
Z
18:56
Zack
In reply to this message
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/light-node-amoveo/blob/master/src/js/multi_tx.js#L72
Change this line to your amoveo address.
Then improve the light node somehow so people will want to use your version.
You will be collecting fees every time someone uses your version of the light node.
18:57
the fee is currently about 0.5%
you could raise or lower that
D
18:59
Devender
But why should everyone build a separate version and not together as a community?
19:00
People may like to contribute in the free time and don't want to own/manage a new fork.
Z
19:00
Zack
then do a dominant assurance contract instead
D
19:02
Devender
In reply to this message
Will read doc again Thanks!
ŽM
19:02
Živojin Mirić
another one bites the dust
Z
19:13
Zack
In reply to this message
I published the offer to buy $5 of DOGE.
0.166 VEO for 150 DOGE
19:15
you can see it on this page, in "available markets"
http://159.89.87.58:8080/contracts.html
19:15
you need 0.033 VEO in order to accept my trade offer.
19:16
I need to add a way to see the text of the trade. Currently you don't know what you are buying.
19:31
I fixed it. now you can see the text of the oracle for the contract in the limit order explorer tool.
19:33
oops, I think I bought the wrong type in this contract. I should be buying type 1.
19:42
ok, all fixed
ᴅ
19:53
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Btw zack have you read about api3?
19:54
It seems to basically assume that apis can be trusted as third party data feeds due to them being legal entities
19:54
And so therefore allows them to offer their services directly and assumes that since they have other significant incentives not to do a retirement attack, they will be able to charge lower fees for data since they don't need to be compensated for not attacking
19:55
Clearly this is a risky assumption especially if the state becomes hostile to these markets
19:55
Also they have some kind of insurance mechanism in place
19:55
So that you can insure against an api provider giving bad data
19:56
And the insurance price gives you an estimate of the risk of a provider providing false data
19:56
^their whitepaper
Z
19:59
Zack
In reply to this message
there are a few problems with their strategy.
1) They are charging fees, so it is vulnerable to parasite oracles.
2) The data providers are under no obligation to publish the same data publicly as they are using for the API3 tool. So they can cheat the smart contracts without harming their existing reputation.
3) the cost of fees+insurance fees means it is cost prohibitive in comparison to an oracle like Amoveo that is free to use.
19:59
example of (2).
A weather service could publish on their website that it is raining, but they could tell API3 that it is sunny.
ᴅ
19:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah yeah somehow I completely forgot about 1)
20:00
In reply to this message
That could still cause them to be legally liable if affected parties who relied on their oracle data took legal action though right?
20:00
In reply to this message
Good point
Z
20:06
Zack
In reply to this message
if you are trusting the law system to enforce the outcome, then you need to pay them enough fees so it is not in their interest to cheat.
The law system could just as easily punish providers for not lying.
The government could decide the oracle isn't paying it's fair share to the tax system, and so should be punished to promote oracles that do pay their fair share.

In USA, if your dispute is for less than like $10k, then it is not going to be cost effective to use the legal system, making this method of enforcement useless for many important cases.
ᴅ
20:08
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yeah I agree that the legal system is not a reliable basis for enforcing trustworthyness of oraclesc
20:09
Maybe in the short term it is ok, but in any long time frames with significant capital at stake it seems fragile
20:09
That has been my general takeaway from reading about api3
20:09
I appreciate your point as well wrt the parasite oracle problem
20:09
I completely forgot about that
20:09
Thanks for commenting 👍
20:09
Had you heard about it before I mentioned it btw?
Z
20:10
Zack
In reply to this message
https://twitter.com/zack_bitcoin/status/1353289109033390080?s=20 I mentioned it in this tweet thread
ᴅ
20:13
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Interesting
20:14
I will eventually get around to reading your docs, but before I do, in the interim could you explain how, at a very high level, amoveo provides oracle data for free/with no fees?
Z
20:16
Zack
In reply to this message
remember The DAO in ethereum, and how they were able to recover the stolen funds with a hard fork?
When these conditions are met, we can recover that way:
* it is clear that someone is trying to cheat.
* the money is locked up long enough to do a hard update to prevent the theft.
* enough money is at stake for it to be worth it to do the hard update.

Amoveo's oracle is set up so that if someone tries cheating, the game causes those 3 conditions to be met.

the oracle lets people bet at 50-50 odds, and their money is locked up in the oracle until it resolves.
ᴅ
20:16
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Also what do you think of the argument that such tokens can accrue value by using various techniques to create moats and retain users? Do you think any such viable means may exist for such moats to be possible?
20:18
In reply to this message
Interesting so you remove the need to compensate oraclesc for opportunity cost of an attack, but it is still necessary to compensate for cost of data provision right?
B
20:18
Ben
hmmh that doge trade makes no sense to me
Z
20:19
Zack
In reply to this message
data wants to be free.
I torrent all the movies that I watch.
Some people pay for netflix, but I think they are paying more for the search menu and recommendations and convenience than they are paying for the actual movie content.
20:19
In reply to this message
ok, what is confusing about it?
B
20:19
Ben
i have dodge
20:19
my expectation would be i swap it somehow
ᴅ
20:20
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I also pirate all books I read ;)
B
20:20
Ben
but actually i have no clue what to do
Z
20:21
Zack
In reply to this message
expires 147

you gain up to: 16600000 of veo

you lose up to: 19800000 of contract RqZUD5N8z95dFzsKbkEEJ5qpz/tKGyUnm1tpDnLXuVI= type 1
This is the text it displays for me for the swap.


and the text for the market:
RqZUD5N8z95dFzsKbkEEJ5qpz/tKGyUnm1tpDnLXuVI=: This dogecoin address received less than 150 DOGE before 5-Feb-2021 noon GMT time DGEtKMxzAuGFxPna4G5V8nsXSh8r7SwFmG
ᴅ
20:21
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Doesn't augur also remove the need to compensate for opportunity cost of attack due to their 2% supply fork mechanism as well? Isn't that very similar to amoveo?
20:21
But oracles in augur and amoveo still presumably need to be compensated for the cost of actually finding and posting the data right?
B
20:22
Ben
i would expect either the interface guide me or there is a step by step example
ᴅ
20:22
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
So it is still some cost
Z
20:22
Zack
In reply to this message
in augur you are paying a fee for the reporters to report the outcome.
ᴅ
20:23
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Is this achieved via seigniorage in amoveo?
Z
20:24
Zack
In reply to this message
in Amoveo the oracle usually never ends up on-chain. the game theory is such that the users are incentivized to sell their losing shares for a small amount, and the winner combines the losing and winning shares to get their winnings, and the oracle never actually gets created.

If the oracle does get created, the expected process is that one person reports the outcome, and no one else disputes it. because disputing an honest report is like throwing money away.

In Augur you are paying for an entire team of people to report, and for math to be done combining all those votes and rebalancing the votecoins.
20:25
In reply to this message
this is the first test ever.
So we should talk about what is confusing for you, and I can make changes so it will be easier for the next trial.
B
20:26
Ben
ok, so i need to send my doge to an address right?
Z
20:27
Zack
right, at least 150 DOGE
20:27
DGEtKMxzAuGFxPna4G5V8nsXSh8r7SwFmG
B
20:28
Ben
ok, that 150 doge are on the way
20:28
whats next
Z
20:28
Zack
In reply to this message
im not sure what seigniorage means.
20:28
In reply to this message
you should have matched the amoveo limit order swap before sending the DOGE
ᴅ
20:28
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Inflation basically
Z
20:29
Zack
In reply to this message
no, we aren't doing that besides the block reward and developer reward.
B
20:29
Ben
the amount thing is confusing too
ᴅ
20:30
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
What is the incentive for someone to report the outcome? Is it that when an oracle gets created the parties who own the shares put up funds to pay for the oracle?
20:30
In reply to this message
👍
B
20:30
Ben
how to i actually know the exact amout of doge vs veo
Z
20:31
Zack
In reply to this message
0.166 veo, it says in the swap
B
20:32
Ben
server rejected the tx
Z
20:32
Zack
the 0.198 of type 1 will be worthless if I receive the 150 DOGE, and you will be left holding the 0.198 of type 2 that have value
worth 0.166 veo I paid you, along with the 0.032 veo you locked into the contract
20:32
In reply to this message
do you have enough veo? is your private key loaded?
B
20:32
Ben
86 veo
ŽM
20:32
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
woah we have a whale over here
B
20:33
Ben
your balance 86.33032397 VEO
20:33
should be sufficent
F
20:33
Fića
To retire...
D
20:33
Devender
🐋
F
20:34
Fića
Veo > doge
Z
20:34
Zack
In reply to this message
the server says your tx failed because it had a bad account nonce.
is your light node fully synced with headers?
B
20:34
Ben
it is your light node
Z
20:34
Zack
oh, it isn't the account nonce, it is the trade nonce
ᴅ
20:34
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
From what I understand the way augur works is that the contract creator puts up a fee that is paid to w certain party who is trusted to report the correct outcome
20:34
So it seems the difference between augur and amoveo in this area is that amoveo is more optimistic
20:36
It assumes that due to the integrity of the oracle mechanism that those who own shares will not need to actually call on the oracles in order to "agree" and trade according to the actual outcome
20:36
While augur has a default fee that is paid out to a specified party to report the outcome optimistically
20:37
Am I correct in my assessment of the distinction here?
Z
20:38
Zack
In reply to this message
what did you type in "amount to buy"?
20:38
should be 16600000
B
20:39
Ben
yeah i copy pasted it
20:39
keeps saying server rejected the T
20:39
X
Z
20:39
Zack
ok, I think it rounded down to zero somehow.
How about I refund your DOGE for now, and ill do more testing before we try again
B
20:40
Ben
sure
ᴅ
20:45
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
If a fee is put up to be paid to the oracles if a dispute occurs, who is responsible for finding this?
Z
20:47
Zack
In reply to this message
in Amoveo you are only paying for the oracle if it is needed for enforcement, and in that case the person who cheated is the one paying for it.
In Augur you always need to pay, even if you don't use the oracle.
ᴅ
20:47
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah ok I see
20:47
Very interesting
Z
20:47
Zack
In reply to this message
it is configured in the contract
ᴅ
20:48
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Isn't the price of rep not so much derived from the fees expected to be extracted from the protocol but from the fact that owning rep is necessary to report and so therefore owners can derive a return by using it to correctly dispute incorrect reports?
20:49
Or do you think that is insufficient due to the fact that in equilibrium there will not be much if any false reporting attempts
20:49
So there will not be very high returns from simply correcting false reports?
20:51
So couldn't rep have a value hypothetically due to that?
Z
20:54
Zack
im not really sure what you mean by disputes or false reporting attempts.
When I programmed the MVP for augur, it worked like this:
someone payed to create the oracle.
The cost they paid to create the oracle, it was used to pay the oracle reporters.
The oracle reporters all simultaneously report the outcome.
the oracle reporters get paid by how honest they are. and they lose rep if they are dishonest.
ᴅ
20:55
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Also I am aware that paul thinks that amoveo will not succeed in the long run due to what he sees as the inevitability that it will perpetually fork, but does he agree that truth coin won't be able to extract fees to pay oracles due to the parasite oracle problem?
Z
20:55
Zack
In reply to this message
yeah, he thinks the parasite problem is serious, but that Ethereum and any blockchain that can host parasites will fail
20:57
In reply to this message
oh, maybe you meant that augur reporters are playing a zero sum game to try and be more honest, and gain rep from the other augur reporters, and profit that way?
ᴅ
20:57
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Kind of, or more a game that is similar to the prey/predator cycle problem
20:58
Where if it works then people won't be incentived to be vigilant but if they aren't vigilant it won't work... But if it works well then there won't be much demand for rep since rep is only useful for the purpose of disputing incorrect reporting
20:59
Btw I think augur works slightly differently these days to how you described
20:59
I didn't realise btw that you created the mvp of augur
20:59
Nice
Z
21:00
Zack
In reply to this message
Augur requires that the total value of Rep is bigger than the total value of money being gambled in markets.
Otherwise the reporters can cooperate to cheat the markets, letting the rep value get destroyed so they can profit from cheating the markets.
ᴅ
21:00
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Isn't this just equivalent to thinking that the parasite problem isn't an issue because parasites will fail?
Z
21:00
Zack
so the oracle fees need to be bigger than the interest rate on that rep for augur to be sustainable
ᴅ
21:01
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Doesn't Augur also have a forking mechanism though?
21:01
To make attacks unprofitable
21:02
Similar to amoveo?
21:02
I read their whitepaper recently and this was discussed
Z
21:03
Zack
Augur can fork the entire distribution of Rep. So Rep gets duplicated, and one kind of rep is more valuable for being honest.
But Augur can't fork the Ethereum blockchain to force the Ether bets to work correctly, so the attack still succeeds for that one round.
ᴅ
21:03
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Ah interesting I see
21:05
Couldn't Augur solve this by just implementing an objective mechanism for chosing which side won and then having a mechanism in the losing contract forks that settles the markets as invalid?
Z
21:05
Zack
I don't understand your suggestion
ᴅ
21:05
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Sorry I am probably too tired and am likely making an error
21:06
It is mid night here
Z
21:06
Zack
if Augur only allowed bets to be denominated in Rep, then they could fork the rep and make it honest like Amoveo
21:07
but rep is so volatile, it wouldn't work well for more long-term bets
21:07
maybe they could use the rep as collateral for some stablecoin inside of the augur system
ᴅ
21:08
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Right but couldn't Augur implement logic for every market such as the following:

If this market has been disputed and resulted in a fork:
Settle this market as invalid if it is on the losing chain (as determined by some time for which is the losing chain such as which version of the rep tokens for each chain has the highest market price by a week after fork or something)
21:09
I suppose ofc that settling a market as invalid would still allow for attacks
21:09
Since if they caused shares to be settled at even value
21:09
Then if they were actually bought for very low values
Z
21:09
Zack
In reply to this message
there is no "losing chain" because augur forks are not forking the ethereum blockchain.
it is a fork of the augur contract inside a single ethereum history.
ᴅ
21:10
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
But couldn't you artificially contrive a mechanism for enforcing that there is a losing fork of the sc?
21:10
Like just having a suicide rule in the sc
Z
21:10
Zack
In reply to this message
it doesn't cause the shares to be settled at even value. in augur, invalid is a 3rd outcome symmetric with true and false. you can bet on "invalid" the same as on "true" or "false".
ᴅ
21:10
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
That checks if it has lost, according to some metric, in a fork
21:11
In reply to this message
Ah good point. I knew this but am tired 😴
Z
21:11
Zack
In reply to this message
the DAI being bet on the augur market, that DAI is owned by the DAI contract, which isn't forking along with Augur.
ᴅ
21:11
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
(not of this conversation, which I find very interesting, buy just because it is late here)
21:12
In reply to this message
But if it is locked in the Augur contract it could be simply given to the invalid share holders
21:12
Right?
Z
21:13
Zack
the augur reporters could still cheat in that case.
or even more simply, they could all just vote for "invalid question", when the question was actually valid
21:14
augur can only be secure if there is enough fees so it isn't in the incentive of the reporters to cheat
ᴅ
21:14
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
What if the tokens were just burned then?
21:14
So no one benefits?
Z
21:14
Zack
the DAI tokens?
ᴅ
21:14
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Yes
21:14
Just permanently locked up
Z
21:15
Zack
sometimes the question really is invalid, and we want to pay people who bet on "invalid question"
ᴅ
21:15
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
But they would still be paid, on the winning fork of augur where invalid fork was the winning option
21:16
Oh wait
21:16
I realised I am making an error
21:16
Hmmm
Z
21:16
Zack
why is someone going to go through the dispute mechanism to fork the augur protocol, if it just deletes everything? what is the incentive for them to pay to destroy it all?
and what if someone pays to destroy it all when no actual dispute is happening?
ᴅ
21:16
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yes nvm I forgot that you can't have multiple versions of the dai locked up in each fork lol
21:16
Hmmm
21:17
Yeah I see my error
21:17
I should go to sleep now, but this has been very interesting thanks
R
21:30
Rom
I did not follow everything the sale of the DOGE worked ?
Z
21:31
Zack
In reply to this message
it didn't work this time.
I think a bug in how the transaction is being written.
21:31
I think we can get the next trial in within the next 24 hours
21:32
ill do some solo testing first
R
21:34
Rom
Ok, i hope we can use this tool soon and make the project visible. thx
Z
21:34
Zack
once it is working, I think there is a lot of opportunities to make the UX better as well
R
21:36
Rom
We will have to simplify it to make it cool design if we want to attract users.
T
21:53
Topab
In reply to this message
Not only to buy or sell veo but any other coin, which is very cool. Buying veo before could be a limitation. If the veo you buy to participate could be used to provide liquidity and get rewards by it (trading fees if there are or any other types of rewards) , that could help
I
21:56
Instinct
In reply to this message
Good idea, you could have VEO holders provide the liquidity so new buyers don’t have to hold any yet
21:57
But maybe it doesn’t work idk lol
Z
22:54
Zack
In reply to this message
I think they need at least a little veo to buy more veo this way.
But each time you can grow your veo like 10x
N
23:01
Noxemo
Will the exchange be like Uniswap or something different?
Z
23:15
Zack
In reply to this message
I think it will be more like localbitcoins, but a little simpler because you don't need to discuss your banking details
x
23:31
x
In reply to this message
... most people don't know how to use DAC.
Z
23:55
Zack
In reply to this message
yet
3 February 2021
EA
00:18
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
could we somehow allow people to trade directly with the AMM? So if I want to go from DOGE to ETH, somehow the oracle / swap happens via the DOGE <> ETH AMM liquidity?
00:19
I'm not sure if that makes sense
Z
00:23
Zack
In reply to this message
the current strategy is hard coding a address for bitcoin directly into the smart contract. So it wouldn't work to use the AMM for this, because only one person's bitcoin address is being used.
x
00:26
x
In reply to this message
one of the MOST important use case, I don't know how well this will work tho,
Z
00:26
Zack
So I am trying to use the dogecoin light node, and it looks like it needs 15 hours to sync.
How can they possibly be worth $4 billion with software like this?
Why would a light node ever need 15 hours?

It just needs the headers, right?
And even if it was slow, it should be able to do the headers in reverse order and give me ability to spend my DOGE immediately.

Is this the expected level of software for blockchains?
How can Amoveo not be getting more attention? Our light node is so much better than this. It is ready for spending in seconds.
00:27
our full node is like 50x faster to sync than this light node
IS
00:30
Ilmu Somebody
Lots of people just stay in their CEX
I
00:31
Instinct
In reply to this message
😂
Z
00:36
Zack
Maybe I should do some videos of testing out Amoveo, and doing the same thing with competing tools.
So people can see side by side the difference.
IS
00:36
Ilmu Somebody
Just videos of using amoveo with explanations of what everything is would go a long way tbh
00:36
People get confused looking at the UI
J
00:39
Josh
Dogecoin is an example of pure unbridled marketing.
R
00:45
Rom
In reply to this message
Yes, in addition amoveo is not to buy in a top exchange and has no volume, it must be listed to make it known more.
x
00:57
x
I actually think it does not need a good UI, but a how to guide is definitely needed.

I prefer text only guide, it doesnt need to have screenshot.
I
00:58
Instinct
In reply to this message
+1
R
01:07
Rom
In reply to this message
Nobody takes the time to read and understand the "average" users will be more attracted by a simple and intuitive interface
Z
01:16
Zack
In reply to this message
this is limiting for our DEX, since we need some on-chain record for the oracle to look at.
People need to have coins in a light node to be able to sell them for veo in the DEX.
x
01:27
x
In reply to this message
well, only roadblock now is people will be confused, don't know how to use it
R
01:40
Rom
In reply to this message
no, let's be honest current interface looks like a scam (sorry Zack), it's like adress 159.89 ... you need a real address and a cool interface
B
01:52
Ben
if amoveo would have an interface like Uniswap, it would be a killer.
x
01:56
x
i actually don't use the url, I used the git to download & update the light node. and add that page to bookmark bar. (But sometimes it pauses at block 10000)
Z
01:58
Zack
In reply to this message
I bet it doesnt pause any more. Because it is storing the top header for future reference
x
02:04
x
oh i changed a browser it's instant
02:05
not sure why
Z
02:18
Zack
which browser is slow?
Someone else was saying Brave doesn't work sometimes.
x
02:28
x
chromium , i tried private mode, it's also instant
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵 invited BrainSpace
ᴅ
04:30
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
@zack_amoveo would amoveo still work game theoretically if there wasn't the forking mechanism? Shouldn't the threat of losing your staked coins be enough for most markets to report honestly?
04:31
Ofc it means that it is possible to carry out an attack if you own a large enough amount of tokens
04:31
But isn't that just an incrementally worse situation as it just means that oracles will be more expensive when they are used in the event of a dispute?
04:32
But it doesn't seem like it is fundamentally worse than the current solution
04:32
I am not asking this because I think amoveo should change or anything, just am interested in understanding the theory behind it
Z
04:32
Zack
In reply to this message
doesn't this answer your question?

Letting whoever is richest force oracle outcomes is not secure. it is like a game of chicken.
ᴅ
04:33
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
But if you pay them enough interest on their capital then they should have their incentives aligned to report honestly
04:33
Isn't it just a matter of it being more expensive?
MF
04:34
Mr Flintstone
even if you own 51% of the veo and try to force an oracle outcome in order to win some bet enforced by the oracle, the version of amoveo where you have coins is only in the universe where that oracle reported a lie. those veo are worthless since they cannot be used to participate in trust free derivatives
Z
04:34
Zack
Anyway, the oracle game is happening in the context of a blockchain game.
If you ignore the blockchain game when looking at the oracle, you aren't analyzing the reality of the situation.
04:35
In reply to this message
idk what you mean "pay them interest on their capital"
MF
04:35
Mr Flintstone
In reply to this message
the version of history with the correct outcome would be valued since those coins can be used to participate in trust free derivatives
ᴅ
04:35
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
If you pay then enough so that the time discounted value of their veo is worth more if they don't attack
04:36
In reply to this message
Ik, I am just interested in discussing a hypothetical though atm where there is no forking mechanism
04:36
I understand that this is a counter factual
MF
04:36
Mr Flintstone
oh
ᴅ
04:36
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
But I think counterfactuals can be useful for understanding certain ideas
MF
04:37
Mr Flintstone
i think it is impossible to prevent a blockchain from forking
04:38
even if ethereum uses centralized oracles that do not rely on forking. i bet you if enough money was going to be lost to a lie, and it was locked up for long enough, there would be a fork
ᴅ
04:38
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I agree, I just want to isolate the two concepts though
04:38
And temporarily consider what would happen if forking was not a possibility
Z
04:39
Zack
In reply to this message
if they own a larger amount and can force the outcome, with the way the oracle currently works, they would double all the money they used for reporting. and people who reported honestly would lose all the money they had used for reporting.
I still don't know what you mean by paying them enough to not attack, but since they can double their money by attacking, you would sure have to pay them a lot to not attack.

And doubling their money from reporting is profit on top of whatever profit they get from cheating the markets that depend on that oracle.
ᴅ
04:39
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm
04:39
Interesting
MF
04:40
Mr Flintstone
i think in a counterfactual situation where no fork were possible, like if you programmed amoveo as an erc20 with no forking it would be in the interest of erc20 veo holders to collude to steal as much money as they could
ᴅ
04:41
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I am referring to what Paul discusses in this presentation https://www.infoq.com/presentations/blockchain-oracle-problems wrt the oracles being paid enough to not fork
04:42
At around the 20 minute mark I think
04:44
In reply to this message
Hmm interesting
Z
04:54
Zack
In reply to this message
I listened to a bunch of his talk. I still don't know how this relates to an unforkable version of Amoveo's oracle.

Amoveo doesn't have votecoin at all. there is no team of reporter specialists. it is just an escalation mechanism until forking becomes worth it.
In amoveo people report the results of their own contracts, and they are incentivized to report honestly.
05:08
=====================
I think I got the bugs worked out. I put up another bid to purchase $5 of DOGE.
Maybe @jadefalkebtc wants to try again.
http://159.89.87.58:8080/contracts.html

This time make sure to lock in the contract on Amoveo _before_ sending the DOGE, otherwise someone can front-run you to steal the veo, or I can cancel the contract to get the DOGE for free.
IS
05:49
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
+1, well said.
08:48
I added a link to your accounts explorer where it says your pubkey.
08:49
I thought having an explorer for txs would be nice so we can more easily verify that the DEX tx executed correctly
Z
09:05
Zack
The tx explorer links to markets and contracts, but the markets and contracts dont link to their txs yet
B
13:10
Ben
trade accepted, doge send
13:11
but the trade flow is very akward
13:11
as a buyer i have not the feeling of doing a secure trade
13:12
accepted trade offer and published tx. the tx id is LRKiNTFWIG4SiXKnEerISzkgU02cziRs8L4XOanZPoM=
13:12
your balance 86.33032397 VEO, unconfirmed: -0.026036999999988097 VEO looks like the deduction for the trade worked well
13:13
btw that is also a downside, if veo rises in price the trade has the same problem like eth trade with the gas fee
Z
17:38
Zack
In reply to this message
We could build a stablecoin locked to doge inside amoveo, and swap the stable-doge for dogecoin to solve that problem.
B
17:39
Ben
the whole process is not automated enough
17:39
try uniswap for example and try to find an match in amoveo
Z
17:41
Zack
In reply to this message
Yeah, i agree.
We are still using the general purpose tools in contract.html

We should build a page specifically for the dex, to automate a lot of the parts. Like the tabs in wallet.html

I think it will be more like localbitcoin than uniswap.

The swap tab in wallet.html is supposed to be a uniswap clone.
B
17:42
Ben
okay
17:44
btw. should i have recieved the veo from the trade already?
Z
17:44
Zack
In reply to this message
You should have received some smart contract tokens from the limit order
17:44
Im heading to my computer still. Ill look into it soon.
17:45
When i confirm the doge arrived, ill unlock your veo by spending the other side of the contract to you. Then you can combine both sides back to veo.
B
17:48
Ben
okay, beside that we both try to do it for the first time, in real life with more money then for a beer i would never do it that way.
17:48
trust relation between those parties is way to manuel
17:49
but let's get it done the first time and take it from there.
B
18:12
Ben
trade worked, got the veo.
ᴅ
18:50
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Btw zack I was thinking that a potential solution to the parasitic oracle problem is to simply create enough of a moat around your platform to make the switching costs high enough to remove the incentive to use a parasite oracle
18:50
The way ofc this would require having a head start
18:51
And building up such a moat
18:51
But once a platform is established it can not things such as maybe use inflation to subsidize liquidity
18:54
In order to cause the switching costs to be very high to move to a parasitic oracle platform and therefore preventing it from being a threat due to people deciding not to both switching since they know that for the other platforms to reach a point where it is cheaper on net to use, including the costs of liquidity, it will have to be so large as to be useless due to the fact that it would have destroyed any incentives for the oracles to report accurately on the original oracle platform
18:55
I suppose there would need to be some way to ensure such liquidity subsidies are not abused
18:55
Which may be difficult
Z
19:18
Zack
https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/blog_posts/DEX_feb_2021.md
I wrote a report about our experience with the first successful trial of the Amoveo DEX.
19:19
In reply to this message
why would the moat matter?
If people like to pay for an oracle, they would also like to use that same oracle for free.
ᴅ
19:48
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
It would mean that there is a cost in using the parasitic one, in this case say lack of liquidity
19:48
So they are more incentivised to use the non parasitic one
19:48
I suspect I may be missing something... Not sure
Z
19:49
Zack
In reply to this message
liquidity doesn't come from the oracle, it comes from the market.
19:50
If good markets tie themselves to expensive oracles, that can work as a moat for the oracle, but it is a negative moat for the market.

And even if a market doesn't have much liquidity, you can still do limit orders between pairs of people who want to be on opposite sides, which is a kind of parasite.
ᴅ
19:54
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I agree that it is possible to trade on a market with low liquidity if you have someone who wants to take exactly the opposite position as you, bit generally this is not the case and often your future wants wrt selling/buying shares can't be easily anticipated beforehand so high liquidity allows you to not need to focus on such things as whether you will have someone in the future willing to trade with you exactly as you want to
19:54
Liquidity certainly reduces costs and increases the utility of a market
Z
19:54
Zack
markets and oracles are different things
ᴅ
19:56
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I am aware, did I say something that seems to be confusing the two?
Z
19:56
Zack
Why would a market sacrifice itself to give free money to a completely unnecessary oracle?
They could keep those profits for themselves.
ᴅ
19:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Well I was thinking in the context of a combined oracle and prediciton market platform such as amoveo or Augur, the platform may have some kind of subsidy to markets on it that may for example be funded via seigniorage (inflation) to subsidize liquidity on the market.

The reason for why a platform may do this is to incentivise users to trade on its markets and pay its oracles as opposed to using parasitic markets that also use the same oracles without compensation.
20:00
I suppose the question may be, why doesn't the platform just directly subsidise the oracles instead of indirectly offsetting the cost by subsidizing liquidity?
20:00
And then the question also becomes, why would someone want to own the token that is being inflated and is being used to fund these subsidies
Z
20:01
Zack
economically speaking, bundling goods is less efficient, and so you would get undercut by competitors who unbundle them.

If there is inflation on holders, then people will only want to hold for the minimum time to do their bet, which means there is less liquidity to make trades.
ᴅ
20:03
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
True
20:11
In reply to this message
On an unrelated note, are there any fundamental theoretical limitations present with ethereum smart contract based oracles? Could amoveo be implemented on top of ethereum?
20:14
Could the forking mechanism be replicated without the need for a pow consensus algo?
Z
20:15
Zack
In reply to this message
if you created a new subcurrency in ethereum, and only allowed betting in that new currency, then it should be possible. because you can fork that currency when the oracle gets forked.
ᴅ
20:15
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Makes sense 👍
20:15
That's what I thought based on my understanding
20:16
What do you think of the costs/benefits of amoveo being on its own chain vs it being on ethereum?

I suppose one benefit of it being on ethereum would be composability with other applications/platforms there
Z
20:16
Zack
Besides parasite oracles there also exists something like parasite markets.
If some big liquid market giving a good price exists, you can copy their price and have a tighter spread.
ᴅ
20:18
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
But this would still require capital right, for liquidity provision on the parasite market?
Z
20:19
Zack
In reply to this message
Being on it's own chain means we can optimize a lot of things for the specific goals of Amoveo.
Ethereum is a very general. Every tx and every contract is turing complete, so they need a lot of restrictions.
We have those restrictions on contract_evidence_txs, but can bypass them for all the other tx types.

Like in ethereum, if you run out of gas, you still need to pay the tx fee even though your tx isn't processed. In Amoveo that only applies for contract_evidence_txs.
20:20
Another example is that Ethereum's uniswap is very expensive.
But in Amoveo it is one of the cheapest kinds of txs you can do.
20:20
Because each Amoveo tx type is so specific and limited, it makes it trivial for us to do the memoryless full node scaling strategy. So we can sync blocks in parallel, and sync blocks in reverse.
20:22
Because uniswap and buying shares in contracts are so cheap in Amoveo, and they fit into flash minting, we can combine them both in ways that doubles the effective liquidity of our uniswap markets.
ᴅ
20:22
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm interesting I see, so it's an efficiency/generality trade-off that allows amoveo to be more efficient due to its limited need for completely general smart contracts
Z
20:23
Zack
Because flash minting in amoveo is at the protocol level, not in a smart contract, we can prune a lot of repeated data inside flash mints. you only sign the entire thing once for example, and you only put your pubkey once.
So we can combine lots of uniswap txs into a single flash loan, and it is very cheap.
This means we can use the optimal set of uniswap markets, instead of being forced to take the shortest path.
I think this about doubles the effective liquidity of our uniswap markets a second time.
20:26
In reply to this message
I think composibility would not give us any meaningful benefits, since the markets on ethereum would be restricted to only that one new currency.

A benefit we would get from ethereum is more hashpower, but they seem to be switching to PoS, so that wont last.
20:26
Another benefit of having a dedicated blockchain is that we can optimize things like block reward and block time for our one dedicated application.
ᴅ
20:27
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
All good points
20:27
Interesting
20:28
Are there any other oracles that are being implemented that you know of which are not susceptible to the parasitic oracle problem except for amoveo?
Z
20:30
Zack
none that I am aware of.
ᴅ
20:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And the reason why you mentioned in the tweet you posted above that you think the tokens associated with all existing oracles will eventually go to zero is due to them being susceptible to parasitic oracles
20:32
So in theory they could improve and then their tokens wouldn't be doomed?
Z
20:33
Zack
Being cost-free is one of the necessary properties for an oracle to be secure.

Those projects all had a token who's supposed value comes from collecting fees from people using the oracle. If they didn't collect fees from using the oracle, then the tokens would be worthless.
So they could save the oracle, but the token is still doomed.

They could re-purpose the token to get it's value in some other way, like it if was used as collateral for making bets.
ᴅ
20:35
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Right, what if they say repurposed it to be collateral necessary for oracles to stake on outcomes?
20:35
Would that also work?
Z
20:40
Zack
i think that doesn't give value to the coin. since the oracle isn't collecting fees, staking is a zero sum game.
As long as the oracle works, there is no dispute, so there is no profit from holing the coin, and the value keeps falling.
Eventually it would get too low to enforce the oracle to have a good outcome, even if 100% was used as stake in an oracle report.
At that point the oracle is giving bad outcomes, so people would stop using it, and the oracle coin would be worthless because it isn't used for anything.

But I guess it depends on context. I would need to see a full proposal of this oracle mechanism to answer accurately.
ᴅ
20:42
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
If it was a zero sum game, why could oracles be expected to partake in reporting at all? Doesn't the fact that they are expected to want to report imply they it is beneficial to them/that they derive value from doing so?
20:43
Although I think I agree generally with what you are saying
20:43
Which is that it is not the best design
Z
20:45
Zack
derivatives are a zero sum game, and people participate in those
ᴅ
20:46
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I guess it depends on how you define zero sum
20:46
Derivatives can often be positive sum insofar as that people benefit from them even if they make a loss, due to using them to hedge for example
Z
20:46
Zack
in Amoveo people make oracle reports because they are personally using a contract that depends on that oracle, and they want the contract to resolve.
ᴅ
20:46
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Like farmers hedging against crop prices etc
20:47
In reply to this message
Interesting ok I will read the docs to better understand the reporting mechanism 👍
B
21:14
Ben
what happens if you bail out after i send the doge, can i retrieve the veo without your interaction?
Z
21:38
Zack
In reply to this message
Yeah, but it takes a week to resolve the oracle.
21:39
You do it from the contracts.html page
B
21:39
Ben
hmmh that is also a red flag to me
Z
21:39
Zack
It takes at least that long if they refuse to unlock your bitcoin in localbitcoin.
B
21:40
Ben
localbitcoin is one of the worst solutions in the market, i don't think we should aim for it.
21:40
but maybe my expectation is to high
Z
21:41
Zack
Another option is that you can sell your winning shares to someone who is willing to wait a week.
For like 99% of the value.
21:41
That is quicker.
21:41
You can use another limit order, so people could even partially match it.
B
21:41
Ben
that makes it even more complicated
Z
21:42
Zack
We could automate it to a single button
B
21:42
Ben
maybe pressure test the solution with like 2-3 people and see what they are saying.
21:42
maybe my expectation is to high
Z
21:42
Zack
The person purchasing for 99% could be a bot
B
21:48
Ben
but someone would need to fund that bot
Z
21:48
Zack
The bot profits 1% weekly. That is like 100% annual yield with compounding
EA
23:36
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
this is super mvp
23:36
just proving a concept really
B
23:37
Ben
In reply to this message
yeah maybe i got to excited.
Z
23:38
Zack
im thinking ill make another tab in wallet.html for swapping between blockchains. what should I call it?
DEX?
a lot of the tools are exchanges, and it is all decentralized since it is on a blockchain.
B
23:38
Ben
fair call i guess
Z
23:38
Zack
"inter-chain swapping"?
23:39
I guess ill start with that
x
23:39
x
crosschain seem more commonly used
Z
23:39
Zack
ok
x
23:40
x
I don't know
23:40
all fine
Z
23:40
Zack
I can have a more detailed explanation inside the tab anyway
x
23:40
x
cross chain DEX
23:41
OTC is also ok
4 February 2021
Z
01:48
Zack
im working on a interface for the DEX.
It has several parts:
1) a form to fill out to make an offer to sell some veo to buy some other coin.
2) a list of open orders you have made, with a button next to each one so you can cancel them.
3) a list of orders you have made that have been matched. with a button next to each one so you can release the veo once you have received the other currency.
4) I you are trying to buy veo, and you match a contract, and they haven't release the veo yet, then the contract is in this list. and each one has a "dispute" button, which is just to make an offer to sell your winning shares for 99% of their value.
5) once your veo have been release, then your contract appears in this list, and there is a button to combine the 2 kinds of shares you own back into veo.
MF
01:48
Mr Flintstone
what about for people who want to accept the 99% offer?
Z
01:49
Zack
Maybe (6) could be to see a list of valid offers where people are trying to sell veo.
01:49
In reply to this message
they can use contracts.html
im thinking those are more advanced users who need to use the settle oracle interfaces anyway
MF
01:49
Mr Flintstone
yeah
Z
01:50
Zack
numbers 2-5 can all be invisible, unless there is something in the list worth displaying. so the initial tool can be very simple
EA
02:16
Eric Arsenault
:D
ᴅ
04:39
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Am reading your amoveo docs atm
04:39
Very interesting
04:39
And very concise on each point
EA
04:55
Eric Arsenault
I think once we have synthetics, this swapping feature will be killer
04:55
then you can just go from (any blockchain) to synthetic (anything)
Z
05:04
Zack
we have finite synthetics
Z
06:08
Zack
In reply to this message
http://159.89.87.58:8080/wallet.html
I added the crosschain swap tab. so far it only has part 1 out of the 5.
but I think part 1 was the biggest one.
EA
06:11
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
yeah, infinite would be a big addition though
x
09:22
x
finte?
09:23
what is not good about that?
EA
09:27
Eric Arsenault
What is finte
MF
09:40
Mr Flintstone
perpetual vs with a maturity date
Z
17:36
Zack
im implementing the trade cancel button, and I found a bug in the tx type.
it looks like you can't cancel a trade until it is at least partially matched.
because if it hasn't been matched at all, there is no trade id in the consensus state. and the blockchain is programmed to expects the trade id to exist when processing this tx.

It is a pretty small hard update, but it will take a week to activate, and we can't cancel crosschain swap offers until then.
17:42
I guess as a hack for now I could have it create a new trade offer that reuses the same trade id, you could match it against yourself, then there would be a trade id for you to cancel.
B
17:51
Ben
1 week is ok to have it live, not that we have millions of trades currently 😉
Z
17:52
Zack
with the DEX we have less dependence on exchanges, so I am less nervous about doing quick hard updates that could annoy them.
18:02
This is the announcement for hard update 45.
It will activate at block 152000, around February 13th.
The purpose of this update is to allow for cancelling limit order trade offers, even if the trade id does not yet exist in the consensus state.
Here is documentation for the normal process for updating https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master/getting-started/updating.md
ᴅ
18:27
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
@zack_amoveo do you know of a good explanation for why inflation only occurs when there isn't a high cost involved in the printing process?
18:27
I have seen this stated by both you and also Eric Voskuil, but I am yet to understand why it is the case
18:27
Despite spending several hours discussion it with Eric and trying to understand his argument
Z
18:37
Zack
In reply to this message
Total value is conserved.
Value is being transformed from electricity form into currency form.
ᴅ
18:43
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Hmm I had never thought about it through that lens

Interesting

How does that actually cause the the asset price not to decrease though due to the new units? What is the mechanism that links that idea of conservation of value to what actually happens?
Z
18:44
Zack
why would new units make the asset price decrease?
18:46
Bread is at least as expensive as the flour used to make it. Otherwise they would have left it in flour form.
ᴅ
18:47
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Does this mean that if say ethereum added the ability for you to acquire new eth tokens by burning an equivalent value of other tokens (hypothetically, ofc), it would not be inflationary to the price of eth?
Z
18:48
Zack
In reply to this message
I think it would not impact the price of eth very much.
It might have a small positive effect, because if there is more total eth, then ethereum can take advantage of network effects.
ᴅ
18:50
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
And I suppose this would also be the case if it auctioned them off for the tokens as well?
18:51
Since it is just a dollar auction so the price will be the same?
18:52
But if this is true, then what if we took it to the logical extreme and it auctioned off 2,000,000,000 eth per day
18:52
Surely that would be inflationary
Z
18:52
Zack
In reply to this message
I think that wouldn't work.
It is like an ICO. they can participate in their own auction, and keep the money at the end in addition to the tokens.
They can take out a big loan to do this.
18:53
It is necessary to burn the tokens paid in the auction
ᴅ
18:53
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Oh yeah the tokens are burnt
18:53
In both cases
Z
18:55
Zack
If you auction off too big an amount of eth, second-order effects come into play.
The demand curve is only linear for small changes in the total supply.

It is like the law of diminishing returns.
If we already have all the eth that we need for all the contracts and investments that we want to do right now, then increasing the supply of eth more will cause a glut.
18:56
Like if I auctioned off 100k tons of bread to a small town, and only accepted flour as payment.
the amount of flour I would get could easily be less than how much was used to make the bread.
18:56
because they don't have the capacity to eat the bread before it goes stale
18:58
If you auction off a single loaf of bread, you would get paid equal to, or more than the amount of flour needed to make that loaf.
ᴅ
18:59
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Does this mean that is possible that if the bitcoin block reward was high enough atm then btc mining could be inflationary?
18:59
Since btc mining is just an auction of btc
Z
18:59
Zack
yes, the block reward can be too high.
it depends on the demand for new bitcoin.
19:00
Amoveo uses futarchy to decide what our block reward should be. To optimize for the price of VEO. or maybe to optimize for the long term hashrate.
we still aren't sure if those are the same thing.
ᴅ
19:00
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
So you are saying that there is like a cut off of sorts where after it gets above a certain amount it starts to become inflationary but before such a point it isn't inflationary at all?
Z
19:01
Zack
the block reward can be too low as well.
If there is demand for new coins, and we don't meet that demand, we are missing out on network effects.
ᴅ
19:02
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
Wouldn't that demand just go to the exchange markets for btc instead then?
Z
19:04
Zack
markets just move the value around.
19:04
over-rewarding early investors is inefficient. it slows growth and prevents network effects.
ᴅ
19:05
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I get that
19:05
I am not saying you are wrong or that low inflation is always ideal etc
19:05
In reply to this message
I am just wondering if this is true as far as you are concerned
Z
19:05
Zack
imagine if a town only had one pair of scissors, and we all took turns using them.
We could use a market to more efficiently allocate time with those scissors.
but at some point, it is better to have more pairs of scissors.
19:06
so we can cut stuff in parallel
19:06
currency is for solving coincidence of wants problems, and if we have more currency we can solve more of those problems in parallel
ᴅ
19:08
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Is the amount irrelevant to its usefulness for solving such a problem due to the fact that it is effectively arbitrarily divisible?
Z
19:09
Zack
You can divide up a $100 of bitcoin very small.
But if you want to buy $100 of fish, you need at least $100 of bitcoin. $0.00001 of bitcoin wont be enough.
ᴅ
19:10
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Isn't that solved by increased demand for bitcoin causing the price to appreciate and therefore increasing the total value of all coins?
19:12
And therefore increasing the amount of $100 units of bitcoin that are simultaneously usable?
19:13
Also isn't this the purpose of credit?
Z
19:13
Zack
increasing demand for bitcoin causes the price to increase, but this is a slower effect in comparison to creating more bitcoin.

currencies are in competition, and you need network effects to win.
If you can't grow quickly, then you lose.

It is also less efficient. If we are over-rewarding early investors, that is an extra cost on later investors. A less liquid supply of bitcoin means the price is more volatile, and they pay more of a premium to buy bigger amounts.

Instead of transforming electricity value into cryptocurrency value, we are transforming volatility risk value and these premiums into more cryptocurrency.
19:15
Transforming electricity value into bitcoin is well understood, it is a cost that can be prepared for.
It is a better way to do it, instead of having hidden surprise fees on our users when they are unprepared.
I
19:20
Instinct
In reply to this message
Won’t there always be an inequality in transition of currencies? - ie early bitcoin holders have benefited a lot more than new participants
ᴅ
19:20
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Doesn't this mean that when the state prints money it can sometimes not be inflationary depending on the amount assuming the state also auctions off the money it prints, such as to the highest bidder of a road contract etc?
19:21
So state currency inflation is only different to bitcoin mining inflation when they just give the money away
19:21
Or print too great an amount?
Z
19:21
Zack
In reply to this message
a road is valuable too. that isn't the same thing as burning money.
19:21
Certain businesses and residences gain in value from having a road near them
ᴅ
19:22
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm interesting good point
19:22
I hadn't considered that
Z
19:22
Zack
In reply to this message
perfection is impossible.
ᴅ
19:23
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I guess it is like dai
19:24
Or a hypothetical dollar stablecoin that is 100% collateralized
19:24
Creating new ones doesn't decrease the value of the other ones
19:25
Oh no that is probably a flawed analogy since they are backed by the asset that is being used to create them
19:25
And it isn't burned
Z
19:27
Zack
maybe a government could agree to give money to communities that destroy their roads, and that wouldn't cause the money to lose value
19:27
haha
ᴅ
19:27
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Wouldn't be surprised if equivalent practise aren't already in place by under various states
19:28
Lol
19:28
In fact the us govt pays farmers to destroy their produce
Z
19:29
Zack
maybe that is helping the value of their currency somehow
ᴅ
19:29
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hehe
19:29
You would make a good agricultural lobbyist
19:29
;)
Z
19:29
Zack
it is pretty difficult to measure how much should be paid. if they over-pay, it is harmful to the value of their money
19:29
if they under-pay, then the farmers wont destroy their crops
19:30
the network effects of money are second order, so you need to get the price really accurate for this to work
19:32
maybe the best strategy is to just buy lots of food from the market, and destroy it all
ᴅ
19:33
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
I am pretty sure this is all funded though via tax dollars
ᴅ
20:02
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
https://amoveobook.com/
20:03
In reply to this message
Will this be working soon btw?
20:03
Looks like a good ui
Z
20:32
Zack
In reply to this message
It was from a long time ago. Back when amoveo smart contracts were purely in state channels.
20:40
Amoveo is approaching its 3 year anniversary
x
20:40
x
i think the light node is enough,
B
21:29
Ben
In reply to this message
for market adoption we need way more then that. an modern UI is mandatory for wide adoption
21:30
if the target audience of amoveo are the 5-6 people here in the channel that are interested only in the concepts, then of course the Light node is enough.
IS
21:31
Ilmu Somebody
us concept folks also want to build on top of this, I think zack is doing a fine job
21:31
if the concepts are good then people will come and extend it
x
21:33
x
Yeah, maybe the current light node need a domain name so that it get more users, at the same time tell them offline light node is better. it's not easy to remember the ip addresss.
IS
21:34
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
the idea is that anyone can set up a light node themselves, being too reliant on someones instance (for generating keys for example) is a bad habit?
B
21:34
Ben
the idea of zack for the light node was that you don't have to trust a third party
x
21:42
x
In reply to this message
of course, offline no 3rd party is always better . online version is completely unneccesary , But to get users, it still need zack to host an online version, and it needs a domain name that's easy to remember
B
21:44
Ben
we have the great amoveo wallet from exantech maybe we should pay them to extend the wallet
x
21:44
x
after online version got users , then recommend users to use offline version,
IS
21:44
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
I somewhat disagree but yeah that is the canonical way to do it
x
21:46
x
In reply to this message
actually I think that seems to have been unnecessary rework.... they could''ve just add new design to the light node
B
21:46
Ben
i disagree
Z
21:46
Zack
I tend to use more of the bottom to top design philosophy in software.
It is hard to know exactly what the final product should look like, so instead I try to build small, independent, reusable parts.
That way, whatever interface we end up wanting in the future, we can have it built right away by composing the parts we need.

For example, this headers module https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/light-node-amoveo/blob/master/src/js/headers.js
it only depends on the module for the hash function, and a module for big integers.
It can be easily reused in any other javascript code we could want.
Almost all the modules are like this.

I am writing in vanilla JS, so we don't depend on any external libraries that could get depreciated, and it is compatible with all browsers.
21:47
In reply to this message
they did just add a design to the light node. it is the same light node code underneath.
x
21:48
x
oh, i see
x
22:08
x
In reply to this message
metamask for example, is also an offline wallet,
IS
22:10
Ilmu Somebody
I think we are thinking about this on different timescales, if you are correct in your design and the people who will actually contribute start investing in your platform then you will prevail. Slow and steady wins this race.
B
23:37
Ben
currently a new Financial ecosystem is formed, Amoveo coud play an important role, but we are still in the laboratory and try to find the 100% Soltuion while other rule the market with 70% products
23:37
i have the fear that we will miss the train completly
ŽM
23:38
Živojin Mirić
In reply to this message
lol
5 February 2021
ᴅ
04:15
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hey @zack_amoveo I was thinking about our conversation last night
04:17
Wouldn't the hypothetical feature that allows you to buy eth in exchange for burning an equivalent value of tokens cause the eth price to never increase above its price when such a feature was implemented?
04:18
Since people would only buy from it as opposed to from the market
04:20
So it wouldn't cause the price to decline per se but just prevent it from increasing?
Z
04:21
Zack
if it declined even a little, people would stop using the burn feature, right?
ᴅ
04:21
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
No
04:21
Because the burn feature would change the price at which you had to burn at to the current market price
Z
04:22
Zack
if the burn price corrects downward, why not correct upward?
I guess it depends on the specifics of how this mechanism would be implemented.
I could imagine people trying to make some other coin look more valuable than it really is, so it could be used to burn for eth.
ᴅ
04:22
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
But it would never correct upward
04:23
Since no one would ever buy on an exchange again
04:23
Since doing so induces slippage
04:23
Which isn't present in the burn feature
Z
04:23
Zack
sounds like an unpopular mechanism, if it only influences the price downward.
ᴅ
04:23
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Hmm yes
04:25
I suppose a coin auction (mining) is different as it allows the price paid to be whatever the highest bidder is willing to pay
04:26
So it doesn't necessarily prevent the price from appreciating
Z
04:30
Zack
I think I read Vitalik write about a PoW coin where 1 hash always produces the same amount of cryptocurrency.
He says we reject that model because Moorse law would make the currency always lose value.

If you account for Moorse law, and have 1 hash worth a little less every day, I think it still doesn't work, because if the market price dropped a bit, no one would mine.
ᴅ
04:34
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
It would also prevent the price from ever going above the cost of how ever much it currently costs in hash power to mine one coin
Z
04:34
Zack
yeah
ᴅ
04:36
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
It still seems to me that having an auction mechanism inbuilt into the protocol such as mining competes with other sellers on the market and reduces the price appreciation relative to what it would have been in the absence of such an auction existing
Z
04:36
Zack
price growth and market cap growth are not the same goal
ᴅ
04:37
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
What did I say that makes it seem as though I am conflating the two?
Z
04:38
Zack
the currency that will win needs a bigger market cap to take advantage of network effects.
04:38
We shouldn't optimize for just price growth
ᴅ
04:40
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Yeah I am not saying I disagree with that, I am not making normative statements but am just trying to gain a better understanding of whether such an auction mechanism causes the price to be lower than what it otherwise would be without it
04:40
Without considering the other network affect related factors you refer to above
04:40
Although I am interested in those, I just want to isolate them temporarily to focus on this question
04:42
Like I am interested in the hypothetical where there is no network affect related advantage in having a higher marketcap
MF
04:47
Mr Flintstone
im not sure that selling volume impacts market price very much in the longer run but i am aware that is not a standard opinion. but consider the hypothetical where we have a coin flip token, so one for heads and one for tails, and then we do a hard update to pay miners a tails token for every block they mine, and they sell it in an on chain AMM for veo. i dont think this changes the price in the market, even if we increase the number of tails tokens in the block reward almost arbitrarily. then you need to generalize this example to any market price. i think just because the risk is very well defined for one person to statistically arbitrage this market to put it to the right price it doesnt make it significantly more special than other markets whose risks may be less well defined but you have so many participants pricing them it becoems accurate
Z
05:35
Zack
In reply to this message
I have (1), (2), and (3) done.
(2) is invisible until the hard update activates around the 13th.

(3) was actually pretty complicated. im not sure I did the best strategy.
It looks up all your subcurrencies and tries to figure out which ones are part of an active crosschain swap by looking up the associated contract and parsing the oracle text.
it looks up the txs associated to that contract, it parses the tx to figure out who matched with you. It does some security verification to make sure they are really the person who matched with you. and it makes a button to send your type1 shares to them.
looking up all your subcurrencies was really slow, but we were already doing that to make the dropdowns in the wallet.html page. So I set up some memoization. If you already looked up a subcurrency, it wont look up the same one again. It stores a copy locally. That made it fast enough.

I think (4) and (5) should be a lot easier.
IS
07:02
Ilmu Somebody
In reply to this message
Ah nice that you work like this, thanks.
x
07:54
x
In reply to this message
I withdraw this statement, actually veo need different frontend, it doesn't matter if it's centralized, as long as they are legally allowed to provide such services.
08:02
there's a certain percentage of population want easy front end.

also amoveo can have frontends that is focused on different market
08:04
it doesnt' have to be named 'predition market' only, maybe someone can also use it to create gambling sites front end for it,
08:05
or binary options,
08:05
etc
08:05
there's a lot of options, i guess
TONY R3ddm15t invited TONY R3ddm15t
Z
15:35
Zack
In reply to this message
Maybe a different design would be better.
Instead of sending the losing tokens to the winner, what if both loser and winner used limit orders to sell their tokens, and someone else buys both sides of the contract to combine back to veo?

As long as the losing shares cost more than doing the oracle mechanism, and the winning shares cost more than (total collateral - interest costs to lockup for oracle duration), then i think this is secure from trolls.

It is shorter code and more incentive compatible. It gets rid of the need for (5), and so is a simpler interface.

Later on we can make an arbitrage tool that finds sets of limit orders to match in flash minting and profit.
So the person buying the shares can have an easy interface too.
15:36
I think we also need a button like "the expiration date has passed, and your doge have still not been delivered"
To sell winning shares when the other kind of share has won.
Z
17:20
Zack
I rewrote the button for releasing the money you are selling after you get paid on the other blockchain.
I also made a button for disputing the exchange, if they refuse to send you the money on the other blockchain, and they ran out of time.

Both of these buttons are just creating a limit order to sell your shares in the contract.
17:21
next up I want to make a similar button for the person who is sending the coins on the other blockchain.
After they deliver the money they should be able to sell their side of the contract for 99.5% of it's value.
17:22
then the first version of the specialized crosschain DEX interface will be done, and we can shift to focusing on improvements to make it easier to use.
Z
17:53
Zack
In reply to this message
I made this button.
I also made a button for if you agreed to sell some coins on another blockchain, but changed your mind and want to cancel.
17:54
I have 159 DOGE that I want to sell. Can someone make an offer to buy?
x
18:05
x
In reply to this message
qtrade address is ok?
18:05
i searched balance is 0
Z
18:12
Zack
In reply to this message
you need to use a dogecoin address in the interface
18:12
for where I send the dogecoin
18:12
oh, does qtrade allow for doge?
18:12
yeah, that should work
x
18:12
x
yes
Z
18:13
Zack
oh wait
18:13
not just that balance is 0
18:13
i it is important that the address has never had a positive balance before
18:13
my.dogechain.info
you can look up the address history here
18:14
In reply to this message
I updated the crosschain DEX interface. Now it hides advanced options, and there is a toggle to see them.
x
18:16
x
what is the smallest amount veo allow to send?
Z
18:17
Zack
you can send 1 satoshi, but that is much less than a tx fee, so it doesn't make sense to do that
x
18:19
x
How much currency should your counterparty need to lock into the contract as a security deposit to enforce that they actually deliver. (they need to lock up the same currency type as you are spending) (i.e. 0.015
18:19
what's this
Z
18:20
Zack
that is an advanced option. if you refresh the page, or download the newer version of the light node, it should be hidden by default
18:21
If you want to sell say, 1 veo to buy DOGE, the worry is that someone will match the other side of your trade and refuse to send the DOGE, just to waste your time.
So by default they need to lock in 10%, which is 0.1 VEO in this case, into the contract, so that you get compensated for your time having been wasted.
18:21
you can customize the amount that gets locked up by using that interface
x
18:22
x
Giving more time can allow for them to pay a lower fee, and you to trade at a better price. (i.e. 48
Z
18:23
Zack
it defaults to 2 days.
there is currently no button to cancel your trade, so you need to wait the full 2 days for the trade to become invalid, if no one matches it.
x
18:23
x
can i enter 1000000
Z
18:24
Zack
yeah. it probably doesn't matter since I will match the trade right away, as long as your price is good
18:24
how many veo will you pay for the 159 doge?
18:25
looks like $7 of DOGE
18:25
how about 0.1555 veo?
18:27
oh, the 2 days isn't until it gets cancelled.
that is how long we need to wait until we can do the oracle
18:27
In reply to this message
don't do that
18:27
because then the oracle can't run for centuries
18:27
I should probably have some upper limit on that option
x
18:30
x
i made the trade
Z
18:30
Zack
I see your offer. looks like you are only paying 0.12 veo
18:32
ok, ill match it
18:34
I sent the DOGE
x
18:35
x
yes
x
18:35
x
saw it
18:35
on qtrade
Z
18:35
Zack
can you release my veo?
x
18:36
x
whihc page
Z
18:36
Zack
it is in the crosschain DEX tab http://159.89.87.58:8080/wallet.html
the "refresh" button should reveal the "release" button
x
18:38
x
what if i dont
Z
18:39
Zack
I can use the oracle to get my money out eventually. You will miss out on collecting a small amount of veo, because that money will be used to pay the oracle instead.
18:40
We want to release right away so I can post to twitter about the first successful use of the new crosschain DEX UX
x
18:40
x
i see
18:41
maybe i need to update the light node first
18:41
file:///home/.../sync/bak/light-node-amoveo/src/js/wallet.html
Z
18:42
Zack
is your account loaded?
x
18:42
x
this page no release botton
18:42
yes
Z
18:42
Zack
do you see "refresh available actions" button at the bottom?
18:42
if not, then you need the newer version
x
18:43
x
i clicked on the " you have been paid"
Z
18:46
Zack
oh, I know what happened. the "you have been paid" button couldn't appear until the tx I made to join the contract got included in the blockchain
x
18:47
x
i clicked several times, no response
Z
18:48
Zack
it should have displayed a message
18:48
I see that you posted the offer to the order book 4 times
x
18:49
x
I only clicked on the "you have been paid button"
18:49
several times
Z
18:51
Zack
yeah, im going to remove the 3 excess offers you made, and ill set it up to hide the button after clicking once and succeeding to post the offer
x
18:51
x
"you are buying 8 has in address D9J9s3psyqky5UXRZGZxu5cWmZQ4FL6gW8" there's this sentence after the 2 buttons
Z
18:53
Zack
that is weird. it should say "159 DOGE in address"
x
18:57
x
onfirms10 / 12
Z
18:57
Zack
?
x
18:58
x
confirms on qtrade for doge is that
Z
18:59
Zack
cool
Z
19:30
Zack
I updated it so you can't click that button more than once. and the text of the button changes to make it more obvious what happened.
x
19:33
x
i see.
19:33
probably "make crosschain trade offer" also
19:35
it need to let users know that, it has been clicked
Z
19:36
Zack
In reply to this message
that conflicts with the goal of being able to publish more than one offer without refreshing the page
x
19:37
x
I see
Z
19:37
Zack
ill do it though. because I think making an error here would be bad, and it is not so important to publish many offers without refreshing.
x
19:38
x
maybe it only need to show a message after clicked once, probably it already showed i didn't pay attention
Z
19:38
Zack
oh, maybe another alternative would be to delete some stuff from the form. so if you clicked it again, it wouldn't happen
19:38
In reply to this message
it does show a message
x
19:40
x
then
19:40
enough for me
Z
20:55
Zack
It would be nice if 2 people used the crosschain dex, and i wasnt either of them.
20:55
Im here to help if you get stuck
20:55
Or have questions
r
21:21
rico
Happy to test it
Z
23:56
Zack
If you send the contract offer directly to the other person instead of putting it on the server, and they delete it at the end, then there is no recorded connection between the tx on bitcoin and the tx on amoveo.
I think this can kind of work like a mixer.
23:56
someone should do a swap with Rico
6 February 2021
x
01:47
x
i can but i'll sleep today
01:47
now
EA
01:56
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
DMing him
J
02:23
Josh
Quick noob question -- is a receiving address in Amoveo just the public key?
EA
02:23
Eric Arsenault
yup
Z
02:23
Zack
In reply to this message
yes. it is the same cryptography as a bitcoin pubkey
EA
02:24
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
I'm not sure I'm a fan of this
02:25
mainly because it requires people who aren't in the VEO ecosystem to buy VEO first
Z
02:25
Zack
In reply to this message
yes, that is a limitation
02:26
I still don't know any workaround that doesn't sacrifice security.
J
02:26
Josh
In reply to this message
ok but base32 instead of base58?
Z
02:26
Zack
In reply to this message
our pubkey is base 64 encoded I believe
J
02:27
Josh
that was my second guess
Z
02:27
Zack
we can swap it all out to another format, since it is just the crypto underneath that matters
EA
02:27
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
in some of the defi projects, you can "farm" tokens by using tokens in different ways. What if we used a similar strategy?
Z
02:27
Zack
In reply to this message
i don't see how that would help
EA
02:28
Eric Arsenault
it would give some incentive for people to lock tokens up in these trades that could possibly not get matched
02:29
It might be hard to implement something like that though..
02:29
or we just remove that requirement
02:29
maybe people will want to offer potential trades, since it is beneficial to them to have more people onboarded to VEO
Z
02:30
Zack
a troll could match all the trades for free, lock up your money, and it costs them nothing
J
02:30
Josh
In reply to this message
yep
02:38
I have to admit, qTrade sends out VEO pretty quick.
MF
02:52
Mr Flintstone
In reply to this message
by coordinating, you can put the pubkey in the oracle language
02:52
and this cant happen
02:52
i think
02:53
oh it wouldnt prevent that type of griefing
02:53
i dont think you need the time value compensation to be 10% though
Z
02:55
Zack
especially if the lockup period is only like 20 minutes, we could probably get it down to 0.1%
02:55
2 days for default might be excessive
MF
02:55
Mr Flintstone
at minimum it is oracle finalization for someone who just takes a bet and refuses to send the coin though right?
02:55
so like a week
Z
02:55
Zack
oh, but you need to at least charge the cost of the tx fees to do the oracle
02:56
so like 0.01 veo + 0.1% of the total
MF
02:56
Mr Flintstone
so the compensation is time value of bet + time value of oracle initial liquidity*2
02:56
over a week
Z
02:56
Zack
oh yeah, the time value of the oracle liquidity too. I was just thinking of the tx fees to do the oracle
MF
02:56
Mr Flintstone
yeah plus tx fees as a fixed cost
Z
02:57
Zack
In reply to this message
right, so making it 20 minutes doesn't help much.

But at least after 20 minutes you can sell your side of the contract to someone who is more willing to wait a week.
MF
02:58
Mr Flintstone
probably something in the range of 0-2% of initial liquidity and 1% of bet is fine to start with. the time value is also multiplied by the probability of default which is not 100%
Z
02:59
Zack
a persistent attacker could make your probability worse
02:59
it needs to be secure for the worst case
03:01
In reply to this message
whichever one of you is selling veo can just put up your trade offer and you don't have to be online for the rest
03:01
it can be asynchronous
MF
03:02
Mr Flintstone
yeah, i guess the ratio of destroy/spend for griefing becomes >0 when you use a probability less than 100%
MF
03:17
Mr Flintstone
as an aside i was thinking about a scheme for the case where you want to buy veo with another coin. i think there is just a way to sell veo for another coin currently right

if you want to use amoveo dex to create a limit order to buy 100 veo for 100k dogecoin maybe you would create a bet using 1 veo where you receive a 100:1 payout (so 100 veo) if 100k dogecoin is sent to address X (so betting on true)

the problem with this method is that it is interactive, so id think the person owning address X would rather just make a limit order selling veo for the other coin instead of sending the address and waiting for the counterparty to propose the trade
03:23
it feels like there should be some way to chain this method together with the method we have to sell veo for dogecoin in order to do something like trade btc for eth using the amoveo dex
I
03:31
Instinct
In reply to this message
Yes we could have like an automatic service if someone was market making in the pair & they get so much Veo from the person buying as a fee.
Z
03:35
Zack
If the market is active enough, maybe you can just match with someone who already made an offer.
N
03:37
Noxemo
Would the Amoveo dex allow decentralised margin trading or will it simply be swaps?
MF
03:40
Mr Flintstone
In reply to this message
maybe the trick is something like, instead of receiving 100 veo from the 100:1 bet after transferring 100k dogecoin to the veo seller's dogecoin address, you actually are betting in subcurrencies representing a stake in a btc veo cross chain transaction at 100:1
Z
03:40
Zack
In reply to this message
Amoveo is a platform for derivatives.
We can make leveraged assets inside of Amoveo linked to the price of BTC, or Gold, or anything.
You can use the Amoveo DEX to swap directly from BTC on Bitcoin into a leveraged asset in Amoveo.
MF
03:42
Mr Flintstone
In reply to this message
there is a capital requirement of 100 tokens for whoever is buying btc with doge, but if both tx are included in the same block i think you can just flash loan it
Z
03:43
Zack
In reply to this message
I don't understand
ᴅ
04:31
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
In reply to this message
I think the difference between the coin flip shares you mention in this analogy and normal crypto being mined/inflated is that the coin flip shares aren't being diluted (in the hypothetical) since they are backed by a 50% probability of receiving whatever the reward is if they win, while normal crypto isn't backed per se by anything and the more of it there is the lower % each coin is as a percentage of the supply available to people who want to purchase it
04:32
I agree though that people selling the coin in and of itself doesn't have a long term impact on the price
04:32
Due to arbitrage of the fundamentals still being the same
04:32
Only when it is due to inflation
04:35
In reply to this message
I think a better way of putting this is that crypto is backed by demand for it but increasing the supply means that there are more coins available to satisfy the demand, so each coin should be able to attract a lower compensation/price
MF
04:36
Mr Flintstone
it seems like the change in the price of the asset because of dilution is related to the long run expectation of the dilution changing
04:38
so there is some kind of long run expectation here, and this is also paired with the knowledge that the block reward will change
OK
06:39
O K
In reply to this message
Could the seller pay both fees to sponsor the buyer without owning the private key?
Z
07:18
Zack
Maybe we can use a proof of burn on the other blockchain to initiate the trade. So it costs them something.

It only needs to be like 0.2% of the amount being swapped. Maybe a trusted third party can hold that 0.2% in form of the other currency during the trade.
07:18
Even if the trusted third party robs them sometimes, in that case it becomes like a proof of burn, and still works.
EA
07:20
Eric Arsenault
In reply to this message
That’s interesting
07:22
So the oracle would be initiated by the burn or something?
07:23
At what point would the person selling VEO’S Funds be locked up?
Z
07:24
Zack
The person with veo would make the contract and send the other party their side of the contract for free, once they had paid the trusted third party
EA
07:44
Eric Arsenault
“Once they have paid the trusted third party”.... In that sentence, “they” is the person with the btc?
Z
07:55
Zack
In reply to this message
Yeah
EA
08:03
Eric Arsenault
Sounds like a good solution. Good UX will be pretty important
08:04
The trusted 3rd party can probably make decent $ just relaying transactions like that
G
09:21
Gregory
hey zack look whats launched on polka and mooned
09:21
top1 on uni by volume
ᴅ
10:04
ᴅɪꜱᴛʙɪᴛ ⛓️💵
Btw zack what do you think of the governance system on polkadot? It seems waay too easy for fundamental decisions and alterations to the protocol and history to be made by coinholders than it should be